Psyche, Science, and Society

CIA torture victim Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah talks to Democracy Now!

Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah is the only victim of the CIA’s rendition and the “black sites” to be released and be free to speak to the press. The other day we had Mark Benjamin’s account of Bashmilah’s life inside the black sites. Amy Goodman has now interviewed Bashmilah on Democracy Now! You can watch or listen to the interview here. And here is the transcript:

AMY GOODMAN: Today, a Democracy Now! broadcast exclusive. A victim of the CIA rendition program—kidnapped, held in secret jails and tortured—speaks out in his own words. His name is Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah, one of hundreds of men to have passed through the CIA’s so-called “black sites.” Today, he tells his story.

A citizen of Yemen, Mohamed came to Jordan with his wife in the fall of 2003 to arrange surgery for his ailing mother. He was living in Indonesia at the time. Jordanian authorities took him into custody shortly after seizing his passport. There, he says he was tortured, threatened and forced to sign a false confession. He was turned over to the CIA within days and flown to a secret prison he later found out was in Kabul, Afghanistan.

In CIA custody, Mohamed says he was held in a freezing-cold cell, interrogated, shackled, force-fed, subjected to sleep deprivation and loud music for days. He attempted suicide at least three times. He talks about his interrogators and the American psychiatrists or psychologists who also played a role.

Mohamed has brought a lawsuit against a Boeing subsidiary accused of abetting his kidnapping. The American Civil Liberties Union is suing Jeppesen Dataplan on behalf of Mohamed and four other victims of CIA kidnapping and torture. The lawsuit accuses Jeppesen of providing direct logistical support for the CIA flights.

Yesterday, I spoke to Mohamed Bashmilah on the phone from his home in Yemen, in his first broadcast interview. We’re going to play that interview in a moment, but first I want to turn to Meg Satterthwaite. She is director of the International Human Rights Clinic at New York University Law School. She’s Mohamed Bashmilah’s attorney, joining us from Washington, D.C. Welcome to Democracy Now!, Meg Satterthwaite.

MEG SATTERTHWAITE: Thank you very much.
AMY GOODMAN: Talk about the significance of what Mohamed Bashmilah describes happened to him.
MEG SATTERTHWAITE: So, one of the reasons that Mohamed Bashmilah’s story is so important is that he is one of a very small number of individuals to have actually come out of the so-called “high-value detainee” program. This is a program that targeted individuals who were suspected of being quote/unquote “high-level al-Qaeda” members or had associations with such members. Mohamed is one of very few people who was later released from that program, rather than being sent to Guantanamo. And for that reason, he is able to tell about some of the black sites that, really, we haven’t heard much about from any perspective outside of the US government perspective.
AMY GOODMAN: He was never charged and then ultimately released, after being—
MEG SATTERTHWAITE: That’s correct.
AMY GOODMAN: —held in—the last jail was in Yemen for ten months, he says, at the behest of the Americans.
MEG SATTERTHWAITE: Right. So he was never charged by the Americans in any way. In fact, he still doesn’t know to this day why the Americans picked him up and why they requested his transfer from Jordan. He was charged finally by the Yemeni government. When he was transferred to Yemen, the Yemeni government has said that they were told to hold him on behalf of the US government. They later received a file from the US government, and essentially they felt that they didn’t have any evidence that he was a terrorist, so they interviewed him and they found that he admitted to using a false identity document at one point when he was in Indonesia, and they charged him with forgery. They then sentenced him to time served, and they counted the time that he spent in secret prisons abroad.
AMY GOODMAN: Meg Satterthwaite, why is he and the other men who you’re representing suing this Boeing subsidiary, Jeppesen?
MEG SATTERTHWAITE: So the Jeppesen suit, which was brought by the American Civil Liberties Union, is a suit that challenges corporate complicity in the rendition and secret detention program. And the point here is to show and to try to stop the complicity of regular corporations in the secret detention and forced disappearance program.
AMY GOODMAN: We’re talking to Meg Satterthwaite, director of International Human Rights Clinic at New York University Law School. And what is the Boeing subsidiary’s response—Jeppesen?
MEG SATTERTHWAITE: Well, we actually haven’t had a response from the defendant, Jeppesen, in this case. What has happened instead is that the US government has made a motion to intervene, and they’ve also at the same time made a motion to dismiss the lawsuit or to get a summary judgment granted in their favor on the basis of the state secrets doctrine. So the idea is the US government needs to come in and say, “Wait, we can’t forward with this case. We can’t even go forward to have a response from the defendant, because the issues in the case are so linked to national security that the entire case must be dismissed on the basis of state secrets.”
AMY GOODMAN: Meg Satterthwaite, we’d like you to stay with us. We’re going to turn now to the interview that I did with Mohamed Bashmilah. Fuad Yahya provided the translation. I spoke to Mohamed at his home in Yemen. He began by talking about his initial capture in Jordan before he was turned over to the CIA.

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] It was approximately six days, but what I endured there is worth years. They took me there, and in the evening they started their interrogations process. They started putting some psychological pressure on me. They wanted me to confess to having some connections to some individuals of al-Qaeda. They tried several times to get me to confess, and every time I said no, I would get either a kick, a slap or a curse. Then they said that if I did not confess, they will bring my wife and rape her in front of me. And out of fear for what would happen to my family, I screamed and I fainted. After I came to, I told them that, “Please, don’t do anything to my family. I would cooperate with you in any way you want.”

AMY GOODMAN: CIA torture and rendition victim, Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah. He was speaking to me yesterday from his home in Yemen. We’ll come back to this interview in a moment.[break]
AMY GOODMAN: We return now to this broadcast exclusive, the interview with CIA torture and rendition victim, Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah. I spoke to him at his home in Yemen late yesterday and asked him to talk about his transfer to CIA custody after his detention in Jordan.

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] They took me at 1:30 in the morning out of the detention facility. I was told that I was being released. I was cautiously optimistic, because how could someone be released at 1:30 in the morning?
They took me to the room where I deposited my belongings. And my belongings consisted of my passport, $200, an ID card and my wedding ring. I signed receipt of these items, but they were not given to me. They were put inside an envelope. In addition, they put also the paper that I had signed, the confession, which was essentially a false confession.
While we were walking out, I asked one of the guards where I was being taken and where is my family? At that time, my heart was in distress. I felt there was something wrong, there was some kind of a conspiracy regarding my fate.
At that time, the guard lifted the blindfold partially so that I would speak to the interrogator, and I saw another man who had a Western look. He was white and somewhat overweight and had dark glasses on. I realized then that they were probably handing me over to some other agency, because during the interrogations I had with the Jordanians, one of the threats was that if I did not confess, they will hand me over to American intelligence. At that time, I did not take that threat seriously, because they had threatened me before that they would rape my wife, so I thought this was just psychological pressure. But at this moment, I realized I was being handed over to some other parties.
When we left the building and we got into the vehicle and the vehicle started to move, so I realized if the vehicle turned left and then turned right, that would mean that I was being taken to the airport, and that could mean that I would be handed over to some other parties. On the other hand, if the vehicle turned left and then turned left again, then that would mean that we were going to the city center, and that could mean that I was being released. I could not see or hear, but I could feel the movement, and the vehicle went into the direction toward the airport. I became increasingly afraid, increasingly worried, because I was being handed over to some other parties, and I didn’t understand why.
When we arrived at the airport, they took me to a hall. And without any precautions or anything, I felt that I was being pulled violently by some other people. They took me to another room. They started tearing down my clothes, from above all the way down. And I was being stripped completely naked. They started taking pictures from all directions. And they also started to beat me on my sides and also my feet. And then they put me in a position similar to the position of prostration in Muslim prayer, which is similar to the fetal position. And in that position, one of them inserted his finger in my anus very violently. I was in terrible pain, and I started to scream. When they started taking pictures, I could see that they were people who were masked. They were dressed in black from head to toe, and they were also wearing surgical gloves.
And then, they started in the process of preparing me for travel, and that consisted of putting a diaper on me. And then they put pants, which went down to below the knee, and a top with the sleeve to the middle of the forearm. And then, they also put some gauze on my eyes. And then they put what looked like headphones on my ears—sorry, these were not headphones; they were like little plugs inside the ears, plastic. And then they put gauze on that, on the ears. And then they taped that with very strong adhesive tape. And then they put a hood over my head. And then, on top of that, they put a headphone. This is as far as the top of my body was. And then they handcuffed me with a chain, and also they chained my ankles. Then they put a belt above the pants, and then they tied the hands and the ankles to that belt. This was after being slapped and kicked until I almost fainted.
And then they took me into an aircraft, and they had me lie down on the floor of the airplane. Then they strapped my legs at my chest so that I wouldn’t move right or left. The aircraft flew for about two-and-a-half to three hours. And I was in such a terrible psychological state, only God could determine. There was a lot of physical pain because of what I had endured, and also all the thoughts regarding what might happen to my wife and my mother. This is knowing that my mother was seriously ill, and my wife could not speak Arabic very well so she could be of much help to my mother. And so, throughout this flight, I was in some kind of a coma, and I would come to and I would faint and come to. And so, during those times when I was thinking of my wife and mother, I would be distracted from the pain, and then the pain would distract me from the thoughts to my wife and mother.
About three hours later, we landed somewhere. And then some [inaudible], and they handled me very roughly. They took me to a detention center. I was in a very poor psychological state. Then they took me to a room where they took my weight, and they examined my eyes and my ears. Then they put me in a solitary cell.
AMY GOODMAN: Were you beaten in this place?
MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] In this place, I was not beaten. They did not seem to have anything that indicated that I should be treated that way. In addition to that, they could see that I was in a terrible psychological state. It did not make any sense to pressure me in interrogations.
I was terribly agitated, and I was crying inconsolably, thinking of my mother and my wife. Also, I was thinking what they were thinking—why would they take me from one detention center to another? And I remained in this cell for three months, during which I had no relief at all, despite the fact that they brought a number of psychiatrists, in addition to the general practice physician there.
AMY GOODMAN: Mohamed, who were you being held by here?
MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] Based on what the Jordanians had told me, that they would hand me to American intelligence, in addition to the interrogators in this place who came to see me with interpreters, I realized quite certainly that I was being held by American intelligence.
AMY GOODMAN: What clues did you have? Why did you think American?
MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] Some of the interrogators would come to me and interrogate me in the interrogation room, and they would tell me, “You should calm down and be comforted, because we’ll send all this information to Washington.” And they would say that in Washington, they will determine whether my answers are truthful or not.

AMY GOODMAN: Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah, speaking to us from Yemen, CIA torture and rendition victim. We’ll come back to this conversation with him in a minute.
[break]
AMY GOODMAN: We return to the last part of my interview with Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah, the CIA torture and rendition victim. In the previous excerpt, he described his ordeal while he was sent to the secret CIA prison in Afghanistan. I asked him to talk about the conditions at that prison.

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] In the beginning, it was totally dark. It was as if you were inside a tomb. Then, after that, they would turn a light on. Above the door, there was a camera. And there was constant loud music.

AMY GOODMAN: What kind of music?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] It was loud Western music, and it was very noisy.

AMY GOODMAN: In English?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] After a while, they switched to Arabic music.

AMY GOODMAN: How loud was it?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] It was loud enough so that you could not hear what happens in the other cells when the doors opened and closed.

AMY GOODMAN: Did you hear other prisoners?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] Yes, I heard other people very clearly, because sometimes there would be power outage, and during that time the music would stop and you could hear the other people.

AMY GOODMAN: What did you hear?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] Sometimes I would hear a call for prayer, and sometimes I hear them conversing about this new person who has just arrived, and that’s me, because I didn’t talk. So I would hear them once in a while.

AMY GOODMAN: What language were your guards and the interrogators speaking?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] The guards would not speak a single word, but the interrogators spoke in English, and they had interpreters with them.

AMY GOODMAN: Did you try to hurt yourself in this cell?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] During these three months in this cell, I tried hurting myself three times, because I could not take it in that place, because I had not done nothing wrong.
The first time, I tried to pull some thread from the blanket, trying to fashion a rope to hang myself. I tied it to the window that was opposite to the door, where the sound of music would come. I think they saw me through the camera, so the guards came and stopped me.
After a while, I collected some of the medicine that they were giving to me every day. I kept a number of these pills, about twenty, and then I dissolved them in a cup of water. But it just happened that at that time, the guards came, and it was just the wrong time.
And the third time was, I tried to slash my veins with a piece of metal that I had. But this piece of metal was not sharp enough, so I injured myself, but the wound was not deep enough.
Because of the recurrence of these incidents, then they started having the psychiatrists see me. And what these psychiatrists did was just give me the opportunity to speak and express myself. And the therapy mainly consisted of trying to look at my thoughts and try to interpret them for me, and in addition to some tranquilizers whenever they thought I needed some.
There was one time also when I started beating my head against wall. And then what happened was, they brought me a helmet, similar to what people wear when they play golf. So all of my attempts were unsuccessful.

AMY GOODMAN: Mohamed, why did you try to commit suicide three times?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] The main thing was that I had not done anything that would call for being transferred from one prison to another and to endure such suffering. In addition to that, knowing that my mother was seriously ill, and she and my wife were in a foreign country—imagine any mother having her son snatched away from her and taken away, even for just one week. Imagine what this person would suffer and how the mother would suffer also. This made me want to have nothing to do with life anymore.

AMY GOODMAN: How long were you held in Yemen?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] Ten months.

AMY GOODMAN: Were you tortured there?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] I was not tortured. I was questioned about the places where I had been detained, which, of course, I didn’t know. There was no need to torture me or even ask me about anything else in terms of violations of the law or anything. My detention in Yemen, as far as I could determine from what was written in the press, was at the behest of the Americans.

AMY GOODMAN: Can you describe finally being released to your family?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] My joy was indescribable. I could not believe that I was going to be released. As much as I was happy to be released and to be reunited with my wife and mother, I was also worried about what my wife and mother had endured during my absence. I did not tell them what I had suffered in Jordan or elsewhere.

AMY GOODMAN: Do you have a message for the American people?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] I believe that the American people are helpless during the administration of George Bush. When I was in detention, I would speak to the interrogators, and I told them that the policies of George Bush was wrong, especially sending American people to areas where they don’t belong. And I told them that it seems that the policy consisted of addressing wrongs with wrongs. I didn’t know that one day when I would be released, I would find out that there are American victims of this policy, as well.

AMY GOODMAN: Mohamed, did they ever charged you with anything?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] I was not charged with anything. This is what I have found. I was handed to Yemen, and they asked them to detain me.

AMY GOODMAN: Did you have any communication with your family?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] And there were no charges against me.

AMY GOODMAN: Did you have any communication with your family from Jordan to the time you were released?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] I could not contact my family or any human rights organization or the Red Cross or any agency, other than my interrogators, the doctors and the psychiatrists.

AMY GOODMAN: Did the Red Cross ever visit you?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] They never did. I wished they did.

AMY GOODMAN: So you did not speak to your family, even when you were ten months in Yemen in jail?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] After a month and a half of being in Yemen, I was able to communicate with my family.

AMY GOODMAN: Why did the Yemen authorities hold you?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] They said this was at the behest of the US authorities.

AMY GOODMAN: Do you have any message for other prisoners who are held at places like Guantanamo or the same prisons you were held in, who remain there?

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] I want to tell all prisoners in all places that one day truth and justice will prevail. They want to be released, but their jailers want to keep them, and God has a plan for them.

AMY GOODMAN: Mohamed, I want to thank you for taking this time to tell us your story.

MOHAMED FARAG AHMAD BASHMILAH: [translated] You’re welcome. It is my duty to sit here and express what has happened to me and also to hope that no one else will endure the same.

AMY GOODMAN: Mohamed Bashmilah, he was a victim of CIA rendition, imprisoned at black sites run by the CIA. I spoke to him at his home in Yemen, telling his story for the first time in a broadcast interview. He was translated by Fuad Yahya.
Mohamed Bashmilah’s lawyer, Meg Satterthwaite, is still with us from Washington, D.C. You have brought a suit on his behalf. You are not, though, suing the US government. You are suing Jeppesen for being part of extraordinary rendition, is that right, Meg?

MEG SATTERTHWAITE: That’s right. First, I’d just like to clarify that the suit was actually brought by the American Civil Liberties Union, and I’m co-counsel in the case, representing Mohamed Bashmilah. The case is against Jeppesen Dataplan for its complicity and essentially for enabling some of the flights that were used to take individuals into the rendition and secret detention program. This is a program that could not exist without corporate complicity. Jeppesen is a crucial example here. The CIA used purportedly civilian planes to avoid certain procedures that they normally would need to use if they used, for example, military planes or official government planes. So the corporate complicity is actually a crucial part of the CIA program.

AMY GOODMAN: And why not the US government, as well, a suit against the government?

MEG SATTERTHWAITE: There has been, of course, several suits against the government for the rendition and secret detention program. The most recent one that viewers and listeners may be familiar with is the case of Khaled el-Masri, also a suit brought by the ACLU. In that suit, the suit was dismissed on the basis of the state secrets doctrine, essentially for the reason that—the CIA and the US government was able to forward the argument that the case was so sensitive it should be dismissed, because it had to do with state secrets.
The point in this case is to say the government has already acknowledged the program’s existence, the President and other high officials have given lots of details about the program when it suited them, so it can’t be that the very basis and fact of the program is still a state secret. It cannot be that that is enough to get rid of a lawsuit about basic human rights and the violation of those basic human rights.

AMY GOODMAN: Meg Satterthwaite, were the interrogations of Mohamed videotaped?

MEG SATTERTHWAITE: We don’t know. What we do know is that there were video cameras in his cells and also in interrogation rooms. I would like to know, of course, if my client was videotaped. We have filed a Freedom of Information Act request seeking all records, which would include videotapes, if they existed, or transcripts. And all we’ve gotten from the CIA is the claim that they can neither confirm nor deny having any records of my client.

AMY GOODMAN: Meg Satterthwaite, I want to thank you for being with us, director of the International Human Rights Clinic at New York University Law School.
MEG SATTERTHWAITE: Thank you very much.

Add comment December 20th, 2007

University of Rhode Island Psych department protests APA policy

The University of Rhode Island psychology department has joined other psychology departments around the country in passing a resolution protesting the American Psychological Association’s interrogation’s policy. Here is a press release written by Bernice Lott of that department:

Psychologists Protest APA Policy on Torture

Faculty members of the Psychology Department at the University of Rhode Island, by majority vote, have signed a resolution stating that “direct or indirect participation by psychologists in interrogations of prisoners incarcerated in foreign detention centers that do not afford prisoners internationally recognized due process of law is unethical.”

URI’s resolution is part of a growing grassroots effort to urge the American Psychological Association to move beyond its current position, which allows psychologists working in foreign prisons to assist teams in certain kinds of interrogations.

The association’s failure to rule out all participation has been the subject of protest among some of its members, some of whom are withholding dues while others are resigning. Psychologists at six colleges and universities, URI among them, have passed resolutions in hopes that the APA will reconsider its stance.

APA’s policy regarding the ethics of psychologists working as behavioral science consultants to the military or CIA as it interrogates “enemy combatants” in foreign prisons has evolved from a taskforce report in 2005 that was never adopted or approved by the Council of Representatives to resolutions in 2006 and 2007 that were debated and approved. The 2007 resolution reaffirms APA’s condemnation of torture and other cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment or punishment under any conditions. But the APA Council did not approve an amendment asking psychologists to NOT participate in any way in the interrogation of foreign detainees, but to limit their role “as health personnel to the provision of psychological treatment.” This amendment was not approved despite the fact that the 2007 resolution expresses concern over the conditions of detainment in settings where detainees are deprived of international and human rights. In public statements, APA leaders maintain the wisdom of continuing to be “engaged” in the interrogation process.

I disagree. In detainee camps, psychologists work in secrecy; have not obtained informed consent; are not subject to legal, professional, and community oversight; and the rights of prisoners are not protected by constitutional and other guarantees.

Because of these circumstances, we should remove the focus on individual psychologists’ ethics, which has been at the forefront of our discussions. By centering attention on the behavior of individual psychologists, we have neglected to ask the more important social psychological questions having to do with situation and context. When psychologists work in hospitals, clinics, courts, prisons, etc. in this country, there are rules and a relatively open process; there is potential oversight by lawyers, family, and community.

Can our ethics say it is OK to work in situations where this is not the case, in secrecy, in places where violations of human rights systematically occur as a matter of institutional policy? Where prisoners are detained for indefinite periods and not charged with any crimes? Where they are not protected by international human rights protocols or provisions of the U.S. Constitution? Would we have condoned psychologists working (in any role) in Nazi concentration camps? Should psychologists work in any setting where processes are not subject to open review by courts, community, and oversight groups? I believe the correct and ethical response must be NO.

Bernice Lott, Professor Emerita
Psychology and Women’s Studies
University of Rhode Island

Add comment December 20th, 2007

Iraqis blame US occupation for discord, military study finds

Surprise! Iraqis of all stripes think the US occupation is the primary cause of discord, a focus-group study for the US military concludes. Here is the Washington Post article:

All Iraqi Groups Blame U.S. Invasion for Discord, Study Shows

By Karen DeYoung

Wednesday, December 19, 2007; A14

Iraqis of all sectarian and ethnic groups believe that the U.S. military invasion is the primary root of the violent differences among them, and see the departure of “occupying forces” as the key to national reconciliation, according to focus groups conducted for the U.S. military last month.

That is good news, according to a military analysis of the results. At the very least, analysts optimistically concluded, the findings indicate that Iraqis hold some “shared beliefs” that may eventually allow them to surmount the divisions that have led to a civil war.

Conducting the focus groups, in 19 separate sessions organized by outside contractors in five cities, is among the ways in which Multi-National Force-Iraq assesses conditions in the country beyond counting insurgent attacks, casualties and weapons caches. The command, led by Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, devotes more time and resources than any other government or independent entity to measuring various matters, including electricity, satisfaction with trash collection and what Iraqis think it will take for them to get along.

The results are analyzed and presented to Petraeus as part of the daily Battle Update Assessment or BUA (pronounced boo-ah). Some of the news has been unarguably good, including the sharply reduced number of roadside bombings and attacks on civilians. But bad news is often presented with a bright side, such as the focus-group results and a November poll, which found that 25 percent of Baghdad residents were satisfied with their local government and that 15 percent said they had enough fuel for heating and cooking.

The good news? Those numbers were higher than the figures of the previous month (18 percent and 9 percent, respectively).

And Iraqi complaints about matters other than security are seen as progress. Early this year, Maj. Fred Garcia, an MNF-I analyst, said that “a very large percentage of people would answer questions about security by saying ‘I don’t know.’ Now, we get more griping because people feel freer.”

Iraqi political reconciliation, quality-of-life issues and the economy are largely the responsibility of the State Department. But the military, to the occasional consternation of U.S. diplomats who feel vastly outnumbered, has its own “mirror agencies” in many areas. Officers in charge of civil-military operations, said senior Petraeus adviser Army Col. William E. Rapp, “can tell you how many markets are open in Baghdad, how many shops, how many banks are open. . . . We have a lot more people” on the ground.

On Iraqi politics, “we have four to six slides almost every morning on ‘Where does the Iraqi government stand on de-Baathification legislation?’ All these things are embassy things,” Rapp said. But Petraeus is interested in “his ‘feel’ for a situation, and he gets that from a bunch of different data points,” he added.

Even though members of the military “understand the limitations” of polling data, Rapp said, “subjective measures” are an important part of the mix. In July, the military signed a contract with Gallup for four public opinion polls a month in Iraq: three nationwide and one in Baghdad. Lincoln Group, which has conducted surveys for the military since shortly after the invasion, received a year-long contract in January to conduct focus groups.

Outside of the military, some of the most widespread polling in Iraq has been done by D3 Systems, a Virginia-based company that maintains offices in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces. Its most recent publicly released surveys, conducted in September for several news media organizations, showed the same widespread Iraqi belief voiced by the military’s focus groups: that a U.S. departure will make things better. A State Department poll in September 2006 reported a similar finding.

Matthew Warshaw, a senior research manager at D3, said that despite security improvements, polling in Iraq remains difficult. “While violence has gone down, one of the ways it has been achieved is by effectively separating people. That means mobility is limited, with roadblocks by the U.S. and Iraqi military or local militias,” Warshaw said in an interview.

Most of the recent survey results he has seen about political reconciliation, Warshaw said, are “more about [Iraqis] reconciling with the United States within their own particular territory, like in Anbar. . . . But it doesn’t say anything about how Sunni groups feel about Shiite groups in Baghdad.”

Warshaw added: “In Iraq, I just don’t hear statements that come from any of the Sunni, Shiite or Kurdish groups that say ‘We recognize that we need to share power with the others, that we can’t truly dominate.’ ”

According to a summary report of the focus-group findings obtained by The Washington Post, Iraqis have a number of “shared beliefs” about the current situation that cut across sectarian lines. Participants, in separate groups of men and women, were interviewed in Ramadi, Najaf, Irbil, Abu Ghraib and in Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods in Baghdad. The report does not mention how the participants were selected.

Dated December 2007, the report notes that “the Iraqi government has still made no significant progress toward its fundamental goal of national reconciliation.” Asked to describe “the current situation in Iraq to a foreign visitor,” some groups focused on positive aspects of the recent security improvements. But “most would describe the negative elements of life in Iraq beginning with the ‘U.S. occupation’ in March 2003,” the report says.

Some participants also blamed Iranian meddling for Iraq’s problems. While the United States was said to want to control Iraq’s oil, Iran was seen as seeking to extend its political and religious agendas.

Few mentioned Saddam Hussein as a cause of their problems, which the report described as an important finding implying that “the current strife in Iraq seems to have totally eclipsed any agonies or grievances many Iraqis would have incurred from the past regime, which lasted for nearly four decades — as opposed to the current conflict, which has lasted for five years.”

Overall, the report said that “these findings may be expected to conclude that national reconciliation is neither anticipated nor possible. In reality, this survey provides very strong evidence that the opposite is true.” A sense of “optimistic possibility permeated all focus groups . . . and far more commonalities than differences are found among these seemingly diverse groups of Iraqis.”

Add comment December 19th, 2007

Resignation letter of Virginia L. Senders, 60-year APA member

Virginia L. Senders, an American Psychological Association member of 60 years sends this resignation letter:

President Sharon Stephens Brehm, Ph.D.
American Psychological Association Presidential Office
750 First Street NE
Washington, DC, 20002-4242

Dear President Brehm:

It is with great reluctance that I write to you to resign from the American Psychological Association. If my memory serves me correctly, it was almost exactly sixty years ago that I first joined the association and attended my first convention in New York. Although I’ve been a non dues-paying life-member for a long while, I still consider APA my major professional affiliation.

HOWEVER, as I read the voluminous exchange of letters on psychologists’ partiipation in torture, I do not find any clear, unambiguous,unwaffling statement that no psychologist may participate in designing or administering, torture. (Former APA President, Bonnie Strickland has been good enough to forward to me all the e-mail that she has received and is receiving on this subject..) I won’t recapitulate it all here.

I was surprised and disappointed to learn of Council’s recent decision, and do not want Council’s viewpoint to represent me. Unambiguously, I will not participate in the design of torture or in its administration. I can imagine possible circumstances in which I might be able to participate in evaluating it.

Thank you for removing my name from your files..

Sadly and sincerely,

Virginia L. Senders, Ph.D.

Add comment December 19th, 2007

Cooperative Research History Commons: Destruction of CIA Interrogation Tapes Timeline

The Cooperative Research History Commons is conducting an experiment with Open Content Civic Journalism, chronicling over 8,000 historic events . From my initial examination, their Timeline on Destruction of CIA Interrogation Tapes is excellent. Here are two samples of their many entries:

Mid-March 2002: CIA Allows Ten Aggressive Interrogation Techniques of Dubious Legality, Including Waterboarding

In Mid-March 2002, the CIA comes up with a list of ten “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” that it will allow to be used on captured high-ranking al-Qaeda detainees. In 2005, ABC News will reveal six of the techniques on the list and describe them as follows:
The Attention Grab: The interrogator forcefully grabs the shirt front of the prisoner and shakes him.
The Attention Slap: An open-handed slap aimed at causing pain and triggering fear.
The Belly Slap: A hard open-handed slap to the stomach. The aim is to cause pain, but not internal injury. Doctors consulted advised against using a punch, which could cause lasting internal damage.
Long Time Standing: This technique is described as among the most effective. Prisoners are forced to stand, handcuffed and with their feet shackled to an eye bolt in the floor for more than 40 hours. Exhaustion and sleep deprivation are effective in yielding confessions.
The Cold Cell: The prisoner is left to stand naked in a cell kept near 50 degrees. Throughout the time in the cell the prisoner is doused with cold water.
Waterboarding: The prisoner is bound to an inclined board, feet raised and head slightly below the feet. Cellophane is wrapped over the prisoner’s face and water is poured over him. Unavoidably, the gag reflex kicks in and a terrifying fear of drowning leads to almost instant pleas to bring the treatment to a halt. [ABC News, 11/18/2005]
The New York Times will reveal that there are actually four more techniques on the list, but will not detail what they are. [New York Times, 11/9/2005] Waterboarding will be the most controversial technique used. In centuries past, it was considered by some to be the most extreme form of torture, more so than thumbscrews or use of the rack. [Harper's, 12/15/2007] The list is secretly drawn up by a team including senior CIA officials, and officials from the Justice Department and the National Security Council. The CIA got help in making the list from governments like Egypt and Saudi Arabia that are notorious for their widespread use of torture (see Late 2001-Mid-March 2002). [New York Times, 11/9/2005] Apparently, “only a handful” of CIA interrogators are trained and authorized to use these techniques. Later the same month, al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida will be captured and the CIA will begin using all of these techniques on him (see March 28, 2002). However, the White House will not give the CIA clear legal authority to do so until months after the CIA starts using these techniques on Zubaida (see March 28-August 1, 2002). In 2004, CIA Inspector General John Helgerson will determine in a classified report that these techniques appear to constitute cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under the Convention Against Torture, an international treaty signed by the US (see Spring 2004). [ABC News, 11/18/2005]

Entity Tags: John Helgerson, Central Intelligence Agency

Timeline Tags: Torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, Complete 911 Timeline

Another sample entry:

Mid-May 2002 and After: CIA Headquarters Approves and Closely Monitors Zubaida’s Torture

In 2007, former CIA official John Kiriakou will claim to have details about the interrogation of al-Qaeda leader Abu Zubaida. Kiriakou was involved in the capture and early detention of Zubaida (see March 28, 2002), but claims he was transferred to another task before harsh interrogation techniques such as waterboarding were used on him (see Mid-May 2002 and After). [ABC News, 12/10/2007 ] Kiriakou will claim that the activities of the interrogators were closely directly by superiors at CIA Headquarters back in the US. “It wasn’t up to individual interrogators to decide, ‘Well, I’m gonna slap him.’ Or, ‘I’m going to shake him.’ Or, ‘I’m gonna make him stay up for 48 hours.’ Each one of these steps, even though they’re minor steps, like the intention shake, or the open-handed belly slap, each one of these had to have the approval of the deputy director for operations.… The cable traffic back and forth was extremely specific. And the bottom line was these were very unusual authorities that the [CIA] got after 9/11. No one wanted to mess them up. No one wanted to get in trouble by going overboard. So it was extremely deliberate.” [ABC News, 12/10/2007] Kiriakou also will say, “This isn’t something done willy-nilly. This isn’t something where an agency officer just wakes up in the morning and decides he’s going to carry out an enhanced technique on a prisoner. This was a policy made at the White House, with concurrence from the National Security Council and the Justice Department” (see Mid-March 2002). [London Times, 12/12/2007] In 2005, ABC News reported, “When properly used, the [CIA interrogation] techniques appear to be closely monitored and are signed off on in writing on a case-by-case, technique-by-technique basis, according to highly placed current and former intelligence officers involved in the program.” [ABC News, 11/18/2005] CIA Director George Tenet will similarly claim in a 2007 book that the interrogation of high-ranking prisoners like Zubaida “was conducted in a precisely monitored, measured way…” He will also say that “CIA officers came up with a series of interrogation techniques that would be carefully monitored at all times to ensure the safety of the prisoner. The [Bush] administration and the Department of Justice were fully briefed and approved the use of these tactics.” [Tenet, 2007, pp. 242] Zubaida’s interrogations are videotaped at the time (see Spring-Late 2002), and CIA Director Michael Hayden will later claim this was done “meant chiefly as an additional, internal check on the [interrogation] program in its early stages.” [Central Intelligence Agency, 12/6/2007] The videotapes will later be destroyed under controversial circumstances (see November 2005).

Entity Tags: John Kiriakou, National Security Council, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of Justice, George J. Tenet, White House

Timeline Tags: Torture in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, Complete 911 Timeline

1 comment December 19th, 2007

Bush lawyers knew about, failed to preserve torture tapes

Most readers will be aware already about the New York Times article today reporting that top White House lawyers knew all about the destroyed CIA torture tapes and either advocated for their destruction or failed to order that they be preserved. Below is the article. But first, here’s the silly White House response:

The New York Times today implies that the White House has been misleading in publicly acknowledging or discussing details related to the CIA’s decision to destroy interrogation tapes.

The sub-headline of the story inaccurately says that the “White House Role Was Wider Than It Said”, and the story states that “…the involvement of White House officials in the discussions before the destruction of the tapes…was more extensive than Bush administration officials have acknowledged.”

Under direction from the White House General Counsel while the Department of Justice and the CIA Inspector General conduct a preliminary inquiry, we have not publicly commented on facts relating to this issue, except to note President Bush’s immediate reaction upon being briefed on the matter. Furthermore, we have not described - neither to highlight, nor to minimize — the role or deliberations of White House officials in this matter.

The New York Times’ inference that there is an effort to mislead in this matter is pernicious and troubling, and we are formally requesting that NYT correct the sub-headline of this story.

It will not be surprising that this matter will be reported with a reliance on un-named sources and individuals lacking a full availability of the facts — and, as the New York Times story itself acknowledges, some of these sources will have wildly conflicting accounts of the facts. We will instead focus our efforts on supporting the preliminary inquiry underway, where facts can be gathered without bias or influence and later disseminated in an appropriate fashion.

We will continue to decline to comment on this issue, and in response to misleading press reports.

Marty Lederman dissects this silliness, showing that,while deceptive, are part of distracting attention from the torture likely documented on the tapes.

Here is the Times article:

Bush Lawyers Discussed Fate of Tapes

By Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane

WASHINGTON — At least four top White House lawyers took part in discussions with the Central Intelligence Agency between 2003 and 2005 about whether to destroy videotapes showing the secret interrogations of two operatives from Al Qaeda, according to current and former administration and intelligence officials.

The accounts indicate that the involvement of White House officials in the discussions before the destruction of the tapes in November 2005 was more extensive than Bush administration officials have acknowledged.

Those who took part, the officials said, included Alberto R. Gonzales, who served as White House counsel until early 2005; David S. Addington, who was the counsel to Vice President Dick Cheney and is now his chief of staff; John B. Bellinger III, who until January 2005 was the senior lawyer at the National Security Council; and Harriet E. Miers, who succeeded Mr. Gonzales as White House counsel.

It was previously reported that some administration officials had advised against destroying the tapes, but the emerging picture of White House involvement is more complex. In interviews, several administration and intelligence officials provided conflicting accounts as to whether anyone at the White House expressed support for the idea that the tapes should be destroyed.

One former senior intelligence official with direct knowledge of the matter said there had been “vigorous sentiment” among some top White House officials to destroy the tapes. The former official did not specify which White House officials took this position, but he said that some believed in 2005 that any disclosure of the tapes could have been particularly damaging after revelations a year earlier of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

Some other officials assert that no one at the White House advocated destroying the tapes. Those officials acknowledged, however, that no White House lawyer gave a direct order to preserve the tapes or advised that destroying them would be illegal. The destruction of the tapes is being investigated by the Justice Department, and the officials would not agree to be quoted by name while that inquiry is under way.

Spokesmen for the White House, the vice president’s office and the C.I.A. declined on Tuesday to comment for this article, also citing the inquiry.

On Wednesday, the White House press secretary, Dana Perino, issued a statement saying “The New York Times’ inference that there is an effort to mislead in this matter is pernicious and troubling.”

Ms. Perino’s statement said that other than President Bush’s comment that he had not known about the tapes, White House officials have declined to discuss the matter because of pending investigations by the Department of Justice and the C.I.A. inspector general.

The new information came to light as a federal judge on Tuesday ordered a hearing into whether the tapes’ destruction violated an order to preserve evidence in a lawsuit brought on behalf of 16 prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. The tapes documented harsh interrogation methods used in 2002 on Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, two Qaeda suspects in C.I.A. custody.

The current and former officials also provided new details about the role played in November 2005 by Jose A. Rodriguez Jr., then the chief of the agency’s clandestine branch, who ultimately ordered the destruction of the tapes.

The officials said that before he issued a secret cable directing that the tapes be destroyed, Mr. Rodriguez received legal guidance from two C.I.A. lawyers, Steven Hermes and Robert Eatinger. The officials said that those lawyers gave written guidance to Mr. Rodriguez that he had the authority to destroy the tapes and that the destruction would violate no laws.

The agency did not make either Mr. Hermes or Mr. Eatinger available for comment.

Current and former officials said the two lawyers informed the C.I.A.’s top lawyer, John A. Rizzo, about the legal advice they had provided. But officials said Mr. Rodriguez did not inform either Mr. Rizzo or Porter J. Goss, the C.I.A. director, before he sent the cable to destroy the tapes.

“There was an expectation on the part of those providing legal guidance that additional bases would be touched,” said one government official with knowledge of the matter. “That didn’t happen.”

Robert S. Bennett, a lawyer for Mr. Rodriguez, insisted that his client had done nothing wrong and suggested that Mr. Rodriguez had been authorized to order the destruction of the tapes. “He had a green light to destroy them,” Mr. Bennett said.

Until their destruction, the tapes were stored in a safe in the C.I.A. station in the country where the interrogations took place, current and former officials said. According to one former senior intelligence official, the tapes were never sent back to C.I.A. headquarters, despite what the official described as concern about keeping such highly classified material overseas.

Top officials of the C.I.A’s clandestine service had pressed repeatedly beginning in 2003 for the tapes’ destruction, out of concern that they could leak and put operatives in both legal and physical jeopardy.

The only White House official previously reported to have taken part in the discussions was Ms. Miers, who served as a deputy chief of staff to President Bush until early 2005, when she took over as White House counsel. While one official had said previously that Ms. Miers’s involvement began in 2003, other current and former officials said they did not believe she joined the discussions until 2005.

Besides the Justice Department inquiry, the Congressional intelligence committees have begun investigations into the destruction of the tapes, and are looking into the role that officials at the White House and Justice Department might have played in discussions about them. The C.I.A. never provided the tapes to federal prosecutors or to the Sept. 11 commission, and some lawmakers have suggested that their destruction may have amounted to obstruction of justice.

Newsweek reported this week that John D. Negroponte, who was director of national intelligence at the time the tapes were destroyed, sent a memorandum in the summer of 2005 to Mr. Goss, the C.I.A. director, advising him against destroying the tapes. Mr. Negroponte left the job this year to become deputy secretary of state, and a spokesman for the director of national intelligence declined to comment on the Newsweek article.

The court hearing in the Guantánamo case, set for Friday in Washington by District Judge Henry H. Kennedy Jr. over the government’s objections, will be the first public forum in which officials submit to questioning about the tapes’ destruction.

There is no publicly known connection between the 16 plaintiffs — 14 Yemenis, an Algerian and a Pakistani — and the C.I.A. videotapes. But lawyers in several Guantánamo cases contend that the government may have used information from the C.I.A. interrogations to identify their clients as “unlawful combatants” and hold them at Guantánamo for as long as six years.

“We hope to establish a procedure to review the government’s handling of evidence in our case,” said David H. Remes, a lawyer representing the 16 detainees.

Jonathan Hafetz, who represents a Qatari prisoner at Guantánamo and filed a motion on Tuesday seeking a separate hearing, said the videotapes could well be relevant.

“If the government is relying on the statement of a witness under harsh interrogation, a videotape of the interrogation would be very relevant,” said Mr. Hafetz, of the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University law school.

In addition to the Guantánamo court filings, the American Civil Liberties Union has asked a federal judge to hold the C.I.A. in contempt of court for destroying the tapes. The A.C.L.U. says the destruction violated orders in a Freedom of Information Act case brought by several advocacy groups seeking materials related to detention and interrogation.

Add comment December 19th, 2007

John Lee Hooker & Van Morrison: Gloria

[h/t Crooks & Liars]

Add comment December 19th, 2007

Motion Picture Association censors out US torture

Denial of US torture is everywhere, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) had decided that the US public will not be allowed to see posters for the documentary Taxi to the Dark Side because a hooded prionser suggests torture, which isn’t suitable for children. Perhaps they should have told that to the administration before the US started torturing children in Iraq and Guantanamo.

From Variety:

MPAA rejects Gibney’s ‘Dark’ poster
Org objects to hood on torture docu’s one-sheet

By Anne Thompson

The MPAA has rejected the one-sheet for Alex Gibney’s documentary “Taxi to the Dark Side,” which traces the pattern of torture practice from Afghanistan’s Bagram prison to Abu Ghraib to Guantanamo Bay.

ThinkFilm opens the pic, which is on the Oscar shortlist of 15 docs, on Jan. 11.

The image in question is a news photo of two U.S. soldiers walking away from the camera with a hooded detainee between them.

An MPAA spokesman said: “We treat all films the same. Ads will be seen by all audiences, including children. If the advertising is not suitable for all audiences it will not be approved by the advertising administration.”

According to ThinkFilm distribution prexy Mark Urman, the reason given by the Motion Picture Assn. of America for rejecting the poster is the image of the hood, which the MPAA deemed unacceptable in the context of such horror films as “Saw” and “Hostel.” “To think that this is not apples and oranges is outrageous,” he said. “The change renders the art illogical, without any power or meaning.”

The MPAA also rejected the one-sheet for Roadside Attractions’ 2006 film “The Road to Guantanamo,” which featured a hooded prisoner hanging from his handcuffed wrists. At the time, according to Howard Cohen, co-president of Roadside Attractions, the reason given was that the burlap bag over the prisoner’s head depicted torture, which was not appropriate for children to see.

“Not permitting us to use an image of a hooded man that comes from a documentary photograph is censorship, pure and simple,” said producer, writer and director Gibney. “Intentional or not, the MPAA’s disapproval of the poster is a political act, undermining legitimate criticism of the Bush administration. I agree that the image is offensive; it’s also real.”

ThinkFilm plans to appeal the ruling, although Urman admitted that he “doesn’t know what that entails. I’ve only appealed ratings before.”

If ThinkFilm ignores the MPAA and uses materials that have not been approved, it runs the risk of having the rating revoked, which is what happened earlier this year to “Captivity.”

The “Taxi” ad art is actually an amalgam of two pictures. The first, taken by Corbis photographer Shaun Schwarz, features the hooded prisoner and one soldier. Another military figure was added on the left. Ironically, the original Schwarz photo was censored by the military, which erased his camera’s memory. The photographer eventually retrieved the image from his hard drive.

“It’s the photo that would not die,” Gibney said. “This movie is not a horror film like ‘Hostel.’ This is a documentary and that image is a documentary image.”

10 comments December 19th, 2007

250 sue torture firm CACI International

CACI International is infamous for its apparent role in the torture at Abu Ghraib. But not being lowly MPs, they got off .  Now hundreds of their victims are suing:

 WASHINGTON (AFP) - More than 250 people once held in Iraqi prisons, including the notorious Abu Ghraib, have filed suit against a US military contractor for their alleged torture, attorneys said Tuesday.

The Center for Constitutional Rights said a lawsuit was filed in US federal court on Monday asking for millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages against CACI International Inc. of Arlington, Virginia.

The complaint, filed in the name 256 former detainees who were released without ever being charged with a crime, alleges that CACI interrogators who were sent to Iraqi prisons directed and engaged in torture between 2003-2004.

The lawsuit charges that the detainees were repeatedly beaten, sodomized, threatened with rape, kept naked in their cells, subjected to electric shock and attacked by unmuzzled dogs, among other humiliations.

The court action also names two CACI employees — Stephen Stefanowski, knowns as Big Steve, and Daniel Johnson, known as DJ — accusing them of participating in the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib.

The two contractors allegedly directed corporal Charles Graner, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison for this role in the Abu Ghraib scandal, and sergeant Ivan Frederick, who is serving an eight-year jail term, according to the lawsuit.

“These corporate guys worked in a conspiracy with those military guys to torture people,” Susan Burke, the lead attorney in the case, told AFP.

“And now the military have been held accountable, but the company guys and the company have not been,” she said.

The complaint is the latest against CACI, which has faced lawsuits since 2004. A previous class-action lawsuit was rejected by a court.

Presumably Bush-Cheney will intervene and give CACI another juicy contract.

Add comment December 19th, 2007

Politicize military lawyers, administration proposes

In order to better pursue their pro-torture policies, the administration wants military lawyers to become subject to political hacks. Charlie Savage in the Boston Globe reports that the administration has proposed that all JAG [Judge Advocate General, the military's lawyers] promotions be “coordinated” with political appointees. The particular appointee they have in mind is the Pentagon’s general counsel, William Haynes, one of the architects of the administration’s torture policy.

The proposal does not spell out what coordination means. But both JAGs and outside legal specialists say that it is common bureaucratic parlance for requiring both sides to sign off before a decision gets made - meaning that political appointees would have the power to block any candidate’s career path.

“It only makes sense to put this in if you want [general counsels to exercise the power to give] thumbs up or thumbs down, in order to intimidate JAGs,” said retired Colonel Gordon Wilder, who was the Air Force’s top JAG specialist in administrative law until last January.

See Scott Horton’s comment: Bush Assails the JAG Corps

Add comment December 17th, 2007