March 30th, 2008
The LA Times gets the story of the fighting in Iraq right. It points out that the attacks are a power grab by some corrupt Shiite factions to destroy their more popular rivals in the Mehdi Army. Meanwhile, Reuters reports that US Special Forces have joined the fighting in Basra on the side of the corrupt “government” forces, better known as the Iranian-backed Badr Organization.
With the Iraq government cracking down on Sadr fighters in Basra, the U.S. military’s own gains with the militia are at risk
By Ned Parker, Los Angeles Times Staff Writer
March 30, 2008
BAGHDAD — The biggest surprise about the raging battles that erupted last week in southern Iraq was not that the combatants were fellow Shiites, but that it took this long.
Enmity has long festered between the two sides: one a ruling party that has struggled against the widespread perception that it gained power on the back of the U.S. occupation, the other a populist movement that has positioned itself as a critic of the U.S.-backed new order.As they vie for power before October provincial elections that will determine who controls the oil-rich south, the stakes are high not only for the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, the largest Shiite faction in the Iraqi coalition government, and the Mahdi Army, the militia loyal to cleric Muqtada Sadr.
The conflict also poses great difficulties for the Americans, who are widely seen as siding with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council and Prime Minister Nouri Maliki’s Islamic Dawa Party against Sadr.
The Iraqi government’s offensive in Basra has spelled the end to a seven-month cease-fire by Sadr’s militia in all but name.
In an ominous sign Saturday, Sadr in a rare TV interview praised armed resistance. Separately, he urged his followers to defy Maliki’s ultimatum to surrender their weapons.
Iraqi forces battling the Mahdi Army called in U.S. airstrikes Saturday in Basra, and two American soldiers were killed in a mostly Shiite area of east Baghdad.
Sadr’s cease-fire, which he imposed in August after his loyalists clashed with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council’s militia in the southern city of Karbala, was widely credited with helping calm Baghdad.
The U.S. military now risks forfeiting gains with the Sadr group, arguably the most popular Shiite political movement across Iraq. Already, U.S. officers have reported an increase in the number of attacks against them in Baghdad, where soldiers had benefited from the Mahdi Army’s tacit cooperation.
“It would be disastrous if the United States ended up as supporters on a crackdown on the Sadrists for reasons mainly to do with internal Shiite politics,” said Reidar Visser, editor of the southern Iraq-related website historiae.org.
“The fight in Basra shows the folly of trying to control all the Shiites of Iraq through a small minority, which appears to be the current U.S. policy.”
Many Iraqis have viewed the members of the post-Saddam Hussein administrations as isolated returning exiles, backed by Iran or the U.S. The officials’ credibility has been diminished by government failings since the U.S.-led invasion — notably endemic corruption, the lack of security and abysmal public services.
In contrast, the Sadr movement’s foundations are built upon the legacy of Sadr’s father, who challenged Hussein’s rule in sermons and was killed in 1999. Its voice, fiercely anti-U.S. and staunchly nationalist, has emerged as one of the few alternatives for Iraqis. The movement has even survived a two-year stint in the government and, like other Shiite militias, its involvement in sectarian killings.
Sadr loyalists allege that as the elections approach, their group has been deliberately targeted by the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council through the army and police’s top commanders, where the party wields influence. The Sadr camp mostly boycotted the last local elections in January 2005, and predicts that it will rout its opponents this time.
But a senior Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council leader, Sheik Jalaluddin Saghir, said the Sadr loyalists were trying to cover up their criminal activities with the allegations of politically motivated attacks.
“They have an overt plan to control the provinces; this is what is happening. They want to take over certain provinces. There is no hiding this,” he said. “They will deal with the devil, they will deal with criminal elements if it helps them reach their goals.”
The dislike runs deep. Sadr loyalists curse members of the rival group’s armed wing, the Badr Organization, with a play on words, calling them “Ghadr” — Arabic for treachery. Mahdi Army fighters accuse the Badr Organization of killing Sunnis in Baghdad and then blaming it on them.
In turn, asked about Sadr, one senior official from the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council answered coldly: “You know what they say, once a problem, always a problem.”
The animosity is also rooted in a historic rivalry between the Sadr family, long seen as a champion of the underclass, and the Supreme Council’s senior leader, Sheik Abdelaziz Hakim, son of a conservative grand ayatollah, whose family traditionally enjoyed the support of the country’s Shiite merchant class.
Observers warned a year ago that the situation in the Shiite-majority south was deteriorating as anger mounted within the Mahdi Army over delays in holding provincial elections. Then, the senior coalition commander in the southern city of Diwaniya, Polish Maj. Gen. Pawel Lamla, said that an increase in Shiite militia violence could be traced to the power struggle.
“The Badr Organization and the government are a little afraid of the future elections,” Lamla said. “Now they have the power, but who knows about the future?”
Many in the Mahdi Army had chafed under the cease-fire, believing that the Americans and Iraqi security officials, backed by the Badr Organization, continued to go after Sadr supporters who weren’t involved in violence.
“The law has been taken advantage of by certain actors for political gain,” said Liwa Sumaysim, head of Sadr’s political bureau. “There is fear and anxiety that this is what is happening in Basra.”
Fueling the Sadrists’ concerns about Basra is the fact that some of Maliki’s trusted security advisors are from the Badr camp. The head of the Basra security command, Gen. Mohan Freiji, is also considered loosely affiliated with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, or SIIC, said a Western advisor at the Defense Ministry.
The offensive in Basra so far has targeted only Sadrist neighborhoods and has avoided going after the Al Fadila al Islamiya party of Basra Gov. Mohammed Waeli or the Badr Organization, both of which have elements that have contributed to the problems in the port city.
“How could the Sadrists interpret U.S. air support of the Basra operation other than as the manifestation of a U.S.- SIIC alliance?” asked Joost Hiltermann, a Middle East expert with the International Crisis Group think tank.
British officers have noted that the Fadila party is suspected of involvement in oil smuggling, one of the major security concerns in Basra. The Badr Organization has also been implicated in racketeering at ports and controlling the city’s police intelligence service, according to the International Crisis Group. Without tackling Fadila and Badr’s lawless elements, Basra’s problems are likely to continue.
The current violence also jeopardizes the Americans’ detente with Sadr loyalists around the country. After the cleric’s cease-fire in August, U.S. officers in Baghdad cut deals with moderate elements of the Mahdi Army to stabilize the capital’s western neighborhoods. Officers were even given lists of Mahdi Army fighters they could not arrest.
Now, the same Shiite militiamen are battling U.S. forces again.
Abu Ali, a member of the Sadr movement in the capital’s New Baghdad area, had been helping enforce Sadr’s cease-fire, but said his local office had returned to planting homemade bombs in case U.S. soldiers dared to enter their area.
“We have called for jihad,” Abu Ali said. “The government came with the occupier and supports the occupiers and they know the Americans will protect them. We are fighting to get our rights.”
Times staff writers Saif Rasheed, Mohammed Rasheed and Said Rifai contributed to this report.