Archive for September 7th, 2008

US Soldier, afraid of being ordered to torture, seeks Canadian asylum

A US soldier seeks asylum in Canada based upon the fear that he could be ordered to torture:

U.S. deserter feared torture orders

Arabic-speaking soldier may prompt Canada to wade into legal debate

By Michelle Shephard

Peter Jemley is unique among the growing ranks of war resisters who have sought refuge in Canada.

For one thing, he’s old by military standards. The only reason the army considered the 38-year-old recruit three years ago was because the age cap had been raised to fill the U.S. military’s growing void.

The Tacoma, Wash., father of two young children also bucks the soldier stereotype. Jemley is a college history major, both quiet and fervently independent. If describing a bad situation he’s likely to say it “sucked,” then apologize for his profanity.

Now Jemley’s reasons for deserting set him apart too, and make his case a historic first.

He wants Canada to accept him as a refugee because he’s opposed to torture.

Jemley argues that as one of only a small number of Arabic linguists with top security clearance, he could be forced to violate international law by participating in the interrogations of terrorism suspects. It was something he hadn’t considered when he enlisted in 2005 and was handpicked to undergo two years of intense training due to his adeptness with languages.

Only last February did he discover that his government had sanctioned new rules on how terrorism suspects could be interrogated. He believes it’s torture and when he realized he might be asked to be a part of it, he fled.

“It’s a soldier’s obligation to say `no’ if their commander is doing things that are criminally complicit,” Jemley, now 42, said in a recent interview in Toronto. “I think everyone is agreeing now that torture is really what has been going on … I have every reason to believe that from my small pool that I belong to, with my credentials, that I’d be ordered to do such things.”

`Torture’ has become a much-debated word with profound legal implications since the 9/11 attacks and the U.S. administration’s decision to re-write the laws of war.

Detainees held at Guantanamo Bay and the undisclosed CIA prisons around the world have claimed widespread abuse. The CIA has admitted to using `coercive techniques’ during interrogations, such as waterboarding, a process whereby agents simulate drownings.

Much of the legal community considers this treatment torture and point to international laws such as the Geneva Conventions, which were established after WWII to impose legal restrictions on the barbarity of war.

Canada so far has largely been able to sidestep the debate about torture and the Bush administration’s post-9/11 policies. Other cases of deserters in Canada have focused on the larger question of the legality of the Iraq war. About a dozen cases are working their way through the refugee board and courts with varying legal arguments and one deserter has already been deported back to face a court martial.

The issue of Guantanamo’s legality arose earlier this year in the Supreme Court case concerning Canadian detainee Omar Khadr. The high court justices ruled that Canadian agents had acted illegally by interrogating the Toronto teenager in 2003 and 2004. But the high court relied on a U.S. Supreme Court decision that deemed Guantanamo illegal, rather than debating issues of torture and indefinite detention specifically.

Jemley’s case is the first to deal with the issue directly. The CIA has admitted it uses acts such as waterboarding. There’s evidence that Guantanamo detainees were subjected to programs such as sleep deprivation, intimidation with dogs and sexual humiliation. If these tactics are torture, thereby violating international law, Jemley argues he could be prosecuted for war crimes if he participates.

Canada must decide whether the U.S. administration has sanctioned torture in deciding his case, his lawyer says.

“There are specific rules for soldiers and the basic idea is nobody should participate in torture, ever,” said Jemley’s lawyer Jeffrey House. “Nobody should associate themselves with torture or violations of the Geneva Conventions because if we start to wink at violations of the Geneva Conventions they’re no longer law, they’re just guidelines.”

Calls to Jemley’s commander at the 341st Military Intelligence Battalion at Camp Murray, Tacoma, were not returned this week. But a letter of “unexcused absence” emailed to Jemley from Maj. Brian Bodenman outlined what penalties he could face if he failed to show up to training by yesterday’s deadline.

Punishment includes a court martial with possibility of jail time or a discharge and transfer to “inactive ready reserve.” The latter means Jemley could still be called to duty for a period of five years.

“To me it’s like being an indentured servant. You can’t leave, and you can’t give your skills back,” Jemley said.

Since the U.S. invaded Iraq in March 2003, there is no accurate account of how many deserters have fled to Canada – best guess is a couple hundred, with many remaining underground having not filed a refugee claim.

Comparisons are often made to the Vietnam War when thousands came to Canada. But during Vietnam there was a draft, and Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative government has little sympathy for today’s deserters.

Jemley’s decision to join the army was not one he took lightly, nor one borne of patriotic duty. “It wasn’t a political decision. I didn’t really like the Bush administration any more then, than I do now, but Iraqis are people too and I’m not afraid of doing difficult things. So I thought I could help,” Jemley said.

After scoring extremely high on the army’s Defense Language Aptitude Battery test he was asked if he’d become a linguist and was sent to the Army’s language school in Monterey, Calif., for two years. Upon graduation, he spent a brief stint at the secretive National Security Agency, the U.S. government’s electronic eavesdropping agency, and then sought independent contracts where he could work until his unit was deployed.

In February, he signed a lucrative contract with Washington’s Office of Military Commissions, the legal arm of the Guantanamo trials that is prosecuting a couple dozen detainees, including Khadr. It was when Jemley started doing his own research into the Guantanamo cases that he came up with media reports about the waterboarding of suspects. When he was asked to sign an addendum to his OMC contract, which added that he must be available to be on-call for “other language related assignments,” he refused and was fired.

A second contract offered him work in unspecified locations with “the agency” based in northern Virginia. No one would confirm it was the CIA and when he couldn’t get answers about what he’d be doing he turned down the job.

By then he knew he was trapped. These were positions he could refuse, but if he was ordered to duty he couldn’t say no.

“I did everything I was supposed to. I’m not afraid to be deployed. I’m not afraid to die,” Jemley said.

“(But) I’m ashamed about what’s going on.”

His wife Sarah and children aged 8 and 3 have remained in Tacoma until Sarah can finish her master’s nursing degree. They hate the separation but Jemley says he’s confident in his decision.
“I know it sounds glib but I mean it. If one less person gets tortured then it’ll all be worth it.

Add comment September 7th, 2008

Velvel on prosecution of administration war criminals

Dean Lawrence Velvel of the Massachusetts School of Law discusses on his blog issues around possible prosecution of Bush administration figures. He has called a conference for the weekend on Planning For The Prosecution Of High Level American War Criminals. The conference will discuss the following ten topics:

1. Brief introductory remarks stressing that the crimes and misconduct have now occurred twice in forty years — in Viet Nam and then again in Iraq — and that the high level perpetrators need to be punished (as occurred at Nuremberg and Tokyo in 1946) in order to insure that people will not do these things again (as the Germans and Japanese have not committed their crimes again).

2. A discussion of his recent book, The Torture Team, by Philippe Sands, including how Executive Branch lawyers failed in their duties (yet remained in power or gained soft landings (as, e.g., federal judges and professors at leading law schools)).

3. What domestic and international crimes were committed, which facts show crimes under which laws, and what punishments are possible.

4. What high level Executive officials (and federal judges and legislators too, if any) are chargeable with crimes.

5. What international tribunals, foreign tribunals and domestic tribunals (if any) can be used, and how to begin and prosecute cases in front of them.

6. What cases have already been brought, with what results and the reasons for the results.

7. What must be done to make the question of prosecutions an issue in the 2008 political campaign and to have the question become a significant subject in the media and on the internet.

8(a). Creating an umbrella coordinating committee with representatives from the various — and increasing number of — organizations that are involved in cases.

(b). Creating a Center to keep track of and organize compilations of relevant briefs, articles, books, opinions, facts, etc.

9. The possibility of having a Chief Prosecutor’s office ala Nuremberg.

10. Review and summary of the action items that have been decided upon.

Here is a new post by Velvel on legal issues involving prosecution. [Of course, other attorneys differe on their interpretations of these issues. Some feel that prosecutions for torture are ruled out by the justice Department Office of Legal Counsel opinions stating that US "enhanced" interrogation techniques were legal, no matter how wrong-headed the decisions.]:

Attempted Statutory Immunity For The Executive’s War Crimes

By Lawrence Velvel

September 4, 2008

Re: Attempted Statutory Immunity For The Executive’s War Crimes.

By now it seems beyond serious doubt that George Bush and company committed numerous war crimes. There has now been book after book detailing their actions; some of the books are legal in character, even when directed at a much broader audience than lawyers, while others are not legal in nature (e.g., Charlie Savage’s and Jane Mayer’s). The question now, in reality, is not whether crimes have been committed. It is, rather, what if anything to do about them. Suggestions range from doing nothing, to a truth and reconciliation commission, to Congressional hearings (ala the Church committee), to criminal trials before state, federal, foreign or international courts, to civil suits for damages brought by injured persons (e.g., innocent persons — some of whom are Americans) who were detained for months or years and/or physically abused or tortured.

I shall deal here only with certain matters relevant to criminal trials in American courts and possibly relevant, to some extent, to civil trials for damages in domestic courts.

Based on fairly extensive readings from about 2002-2003 until today, it seems pretty clear that people who were responsible for or committed torture were well aware from the get - go that what they were doing constituted crimes. That realization is why CIA officials, from 2002 to 2006 or 2007 demanded memoranda, from the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice, falsely claiming that the abuse and torture were not criminal acts. The officials wanted these OLC memos so that they could later avoid or defeat prosecutions by claiming that the decisionmaking office of the DOJ had approved the legality of what they were doing. The officials wanted a “golden shield,” a “get out of jail free card.”

As well, knowledge that the acts and Justice Department memoranda supporting them would be strongly opposed if they came to light were among the crucial reasons the acts and supporting memos were kept secret for years. The opposition, it was well understood, would be based both on American concepts of morality and the fact that the acts were violations of both international criminal law and domestic criminal law. It was understood by perpetrators and legal enablers of torture that many lawyers in the Executive Branch and the military would be among the strong opponents of what was being done — lawyers such as the generals and admirals who were the military JAGs, certain armed forces General Counsels, State Department lawyers, and DOJ lawyers. Thus these lawyers were kept out of the loop to the maximum extent possible. Information was kept on “a close hold” or “a very close hold,” information was confined to as few people as possible, so that there would be no knowledge, or as little knowledge as possible, on the part of those who would object to the criminal acts. The perpetrators and enablers feared the objectors would say the acts were criminal, would say so internally if not externally and, in some cases (e.g., if opponents were legislators), might publicly denounce and condemn the actions as criminal.

It is, frankly, impossible to overestimate the crucial importance of, and concern for, secrecy to hide the criminal acts. It was well understood that what was being done could not be done if there were widespread knowledge of it. While the Executive likes to claim that secrecy was essential lest terrorists learn what was being done and prepare themselves for it — the type of claim that in the last few years has been made to cover many Executive misdeeds — it is at least equally if not more true that secrecy was employed because of knowledge that torture and abuse would have to end - - because they would be seen as both immoral and criminal — when and if they and their supporting DOJ memos became widely known.

And, after the immoral and criminal actions did become widely known, the Executive Branch, via the vociferous demands of Dick Cheney, and with the cooperation of a complaisant John McCain, obtained what it hoped would be immunity for its criminal conduct. This was done in two statutory sections. The “McCain Amendment” to the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 provides that in any criminal or civil case arising out of “specific operational practices” involving “detention and interrogation of aliens” whom Bush or his agents “believe[] to be engaged in or associated with international terrorist activity that poses a serious, continuing threat to the United States . . . and that were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time that they were conducted,” it will be a defense that the defendant “did not know that the practices were unlawful and a person of ordinary sense and understanding would not know the practices were unlawful.” In determining whether an ordinary person would know the practices are unlawful, the McCain Amendment tells courts that “an important factor” to consider is “Good faith reliance on advice of counsel.”

The other immunity-creating provision is Section 7(e) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. Subsection (1) of the Section provides that no court can grant habeas corpus to an “alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.” Subsection (2) says no court “shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action . . . relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.” (Emphasis added.)

The first part of Section 7(e) of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 — i.e., the “no habeas corpus” provision of 7(e)(1) — was struck down by the Supreme Court in the Boumediene case in 2008. At least some experts say it is not totally clear whether the second part of the Section was also struck down, i.e, whether Subsection 7(e)(2), barring any action other than habeas corpus, was also struck down by the Boumediene decision. I shall assume for purposes of discussion that the Boumediene case did not itself strike down the second subsection, but instead left its legality to be determined in the future.

When one reads the two immunity provisions closely, it is obvious that there are certain holes in the immunity they might otherwise give. For example, the provisions give immunity only where the victim was an alien, not where he (or she?) was a citizen. But there were large numbers of citizens who got detained, got questioned, and in lots of cases were abused or even tortured. Also, the McCain amendment gives immunity only where the acts of abuse or torture were officially authorized and determined to be lawful at the time they were done. But there were lots of acts, apparently, that, when done, either had not yet been officially authorized, or had not been determined lawful, or both.

As well, the second subsection of the Military Commissions Act gives immunity only if the alien has been “determined . . . to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.” But numerous people who were abused or tortured have now been released without any determination that they were enemy combatants. (Indeed, a court could find that there is no such legal category as “enemy combatant” — in reality there isn’t; it was something that was simply made up by the Executive — so that the provision is in effect a nullity because it gives immunity only for a category that does not lawfully exist.)

There is also a so-called “preemption” issue. The wording of the two statutes does not distinguish between federal courts and state courts, but instead seem to confer immunity in any court. But can this be done? Can the federal government preemptively immunize Bush and company from liability for murder under state law — the crime for which Vincent Bugliosi says Bush and his henchman could and should be prosecuted in state courts?

But aside from the obvious holes in the statute, there is also a broader point, one that, at least morally speaking, and perhaps legally speaking too, is far more important. It goes something like this: Can a person, knowing that acts are unlawful, engage in those acts and then obtain immunity by exercising power over the legislative process and by finding lawyers who are willing to write the most incompetent and atrocious legal opinions designed to give the guilty a get out of jail free card?

It is evident that if these things can be done, then there is an end of law where the truly wealthy and powerful are concerned. Whether it is Al Capone or Dick Cheney, the filthy rich or obscenely powerful will have it in their power to do the most awful things yet escape the law by using contributions or power to obtain immunity from preexisting law and to buy the opinions of immoral lawyers. That is the moral and philosophical basis why these things can’t be permitted. What the precise legal rationale would be is something I’m not sure of, is something on which research must be done. Perhaps there is some constitutional argument about perverting the legislative process — which, however, is often perverted — or some so-called “equitable” doctrine, or some (long forgotten?) doctrine of criminal law, which bars this kind of societal distortion. Or perhaps there is some theory which sets aside immunity if the provision granting it is the product of what in effect is a criminal enterprise. I myself am not sure of what the legal grounds would be, but I do feel that the immunity here is impermissible, and that a legal methodology must be found to render it impermissible, if we are to have a country of laws.

The issue of acting on advice of counsel raises additional questions. It is widely thought that there are perhaps six to ten lawyers who are guilty of crimes because they facilitated, they enabled, the criminal conduct perpetrated by torturers. The names Yoo, Addington, Haynes, Gonzalez, Flanigan, Bradbury, Bybee are among those that leap to mind. These people cannot claim advice of counsel; they were the counsel who were doing the advising and were drafting get out of jail free cards for others. They also knew that what they were advising was illegal, which was one of the main reasons they kept everything a close hold and insured secrecy so that Executive lawyers and officials who would object to their advice as immoral and unlawful would not learn what they were doing.

Guys like Cheney and Bush shouldn’t be able to plead good faith reliance on the advice of counsel either, because they told the counsel what advice to give. Could Al Capone or Lucky Luciano receive immunity for acting in accordance with the advice of counsel when they told counsel what to advise? Not to mention that, rather than acting in good faith reliance on the advice of counsel, Cheney and Bush knew that they were ordering violations of law. The fact that they were doing so, and were well aware they were doing so, was one of the reasons why they, like a significant number of CIA officials who knew the same, demanded that lawyers produce legal cover for them in the form of OLC memos authored by the likes of Yoo and Bradbury.

Then there is the situation of the lower level CIA and military people — persons in the chain of command and/or who committed the torture and the renditions for torture. These people did not read the Yooian type memos — actually a lot of involved higher level people didn’t either — so they cannot claim direct reliance on advice of counsel. But, high level or low, no doubt they were told that torture was approved by lawyers. Nonetheless, these people too cannot claim good faith reliance on the advice of counsel. For they had to know that torture was forbidden no matter what some lawyers said. You could not grow up in America and not know this. (Would someone be allowed to successfully claim to have thought murder was lawful because some lawyer told him so?) People who grew up in America cannot realistically claim that they thought it was lawful to beat people mercilessly, to smash their heads against walls, to kill about one hundred of them apparently, to hang them from ceiling hooks, to make them freeze, to deny them sleep for weeks on end, and so forth. I don’t care what they were told lawyers supposedly had said. They knew what they were doing was wrong. FBI and NCIS guys on the scene knew it regardless of what lawyers like Yoo said, and it was knowledge that what they were doing was wrong that caused some lower level CIA guys too to want a get out of jail free card.

Beyond all this, the claim of good faith reliance on counsel, like the cognate claim of being tasked or ordered to torture, kidnap or rend, and like the immunity provisions themselves, simply are an effort to escape the Nuremberg principles by saying that others said what the culprits were doing was okay. Nuremberg established the principle that there are things that simply can’t be done, a principle later furthered in other treaties, conventions and cases. Nuremberg also established that one cannot rely on the defense that one is merely doing what others said to do. But claiming that their actions were immune because others okayed them is precisely what Cheney, Bush, their whole crowd, and even McCain have been attempting to do. They have been and are seeking to do forbidden acts and then to escape punishment by retroactive immunity, including immunity based on the so-called advice of counsel. They knew what they were doing was illegal, as evidenced by the extreme secrecy they practiced lest it be learned they were practicing, and lest they be accused of practicing, the crimes they were in fact practicing. Morality, decency, and Nuremberg alike forbid this.

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There is another question, one analogous to immunity, which has also arisen. What if Bush, it is asked, before leaving office, were to pardon himself and all others involved in the crimes at issue? The theory widely accepted is that the pardon power is absolute, so the President can pardon himself and anyone else for all crimes. Some people feel the President cannot grant himself a pardon, precisely because he grants pardons - - the theory here being, I presume (but don’t actually know), that you can only grant something to someone else, not yourself. (This is purely semantic and not very persuasive, I would think.)

The idea that a President has an absolute, unfettered ability to grant pardons does not strike me as persuasive. Could a President order the mass murder of 5000 people and then allow the perpetrators and he himself to escape all punishment by pardoning them and himself? The idea is preposterous and would mark the end of a government of laws. Were such a pardon permissible, the law is at an end and we might as well all move to Canada — or, as I believe Lincoln said, to Russia, where they take their tyranny straight, without the base alloy of hypocrisy.

So there must be some limits to the pardoning power. No doubt they are inherent in the history of the original creation of the power (perhaps in England?), a history I know nothing of and have never seen reference to. We need research on the subject. Perhaps the research will show that there cannot be a pardon for the President’s own criminal acts or for other persons who helped him carry out his criminal acts. Perhaps it will show other limits. But it is not really possible that the pardoning power lets a President commit whatever crimes he chooses, no matter how heinous and obviously unlawful, and then pardon himself as well as all others who helped him carry out atrocious illegal acts like killing hundreds or thousands of people. A claim of such unfettered power defies common sense*

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*This posting represents the personal views of Lawrence R. Velvel. If you wish to comment on the post, on the general topic of the post, or on the comments of others, you can, if you wish, post your comment on my website, VelvelOnNationalAffairs.com. All comments, of course, represent the views of their writers, not the views of Lawrence R. Velvel or of the Massachusetts School of Law. If you wish your comment to remain private, you can email me at Velvel@VelvelOnNationalAffairs.com.

VelvelOnNationalAffairs is now available as a podcast. To subscribe please visit VelvelOnNationalAffairs.com, and click on the link on the top left corner of the page. The podcasts can also be found on iTunes or at www.lrvelvel.libsyn.com

In addition, one hour long television book shows, shown on Comcast, on which Dean Velvel, interviews an author, one hour long television panel shows, also shown on Comcast, on which other MSL personnel interview experts about important subjects, conferences on historical and other important subjects held at MSL, presentations by authors who discuss their books at MSL, a radio program (What The Media Won’t Tell You) which is heard on the World Radio Network (which is on Sirrus and other outlets in the U.S.), and an MSL journal of important issues called The Long Term View, can all be accessed on the internet, including by video and audio. For TV shows go to: www.mslaw.edu/about_tv.htm; for book talks go to: www.notedauthors.com; for conferences go to: www.mslawevents.com; for The Long Term View go to: www.mslaw.edu/about¬_LTV.htm; and for the radio program go to: www.velvelonmedia.com.

Add comment September 7th, 2008

Money takes over academic research

The New York Times has an op-ed discussing the perversion of the academy occurring under the influence of the profit motive and universities’ and researchers’ strengthened corporate ties:

When Academia Puts Profit Ahead of Wonder

By  Janet Rae-Dupree

“It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported research or development” and “to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and nonprofit organizations, including universities.”

- The Bayh-Dole Act, a k a the University Small Business Patent Procedures Act

THE law of unintended consequences is perhaps less a “law” than a simple statement of fact: We cannot accurately predict all the results of our actions. We may do something with the best of intentions, and sometimes even accomplish the good toward which we aim. Yet, at the same time, we are all too often surprised by results that didn’t occur to us beforehand.

The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 started out with the best of intentions. By clearing away the thicket of conflicting rules and regulations at various federal agencies, it set out to encourage universities to patent and license results of federally financed research. For the first time, academicians were able to profit personally from the market transfer of their work. For the first time, academia could be powered as much by a profit motive as by the psychic reward of new discovery.

University “tech transfer” offices have boomed from a couple dozen before the law’s passage to nearly 300 today. University patents have leapt a hundredfold. Professors are stepping away from the lab and lecture hall to navigate the thicket of venture capital, business regulations and commercial competition.

None of these are necessarily negative outcomes. But more than a quarter-century after President Jimmy Carter signed it into law, the Bayh-Dole Act, sponsored by the former Senators Birch Bayh, Democrat of Indiana, and Robert Dole, Republican of Kansas, is under increasing scrutiny by swelling ranks of critics. The primary concern is that its original intent - to infuse the American marketplace with the fruits of academic innovation - has also distorted the fundamental mission of universities.

In the past, discovery for its own sake provided academic motivation, but today’s universities function more like corporate research laboratories. Rather than freely sharing techniques and results, researchers increasingly keep new findings under wraps to maintain a competitive edge. What used to be peer-reviewed is now proprietary. “Share and share alike” has devolved into “every laboratory for itself.”

In trying to power the innovation economy, we have turned America’s universities into cutthroat business competitors, zealously guarding the very innovations we so desperately want behind a hopelessly tangled web of patents and royalty licenses.

Of course, there is precedent for scientific secrecy, notes Daniel S. Greenberg , author of “Science for Sale: The Perils, Rewards and Delusions of Campus Capitalism” (University of Chicago Press, 2007). When James Watson and Francis Crick were homing in on DNA’s double-helix structure in the 1950s, they zealously guarded their work from prying eyes until they could publish their findings, to be certain that they would get the credit for making the discovery.

“They didn’t try to patent it,” Mr. Greenberg notes, “but somebody doing the same work today would certainly take a crack at patenting the double helix.”

In fact, it was the life sciences - in particular, biotechnology - that started universities down the slippery commercial slope in the first place. Even before the Bayh-Dole Act, pharmaceutical companies were eagerly trolling campuses, looking for projects to finance. After the law was passed, they stepped up their efforts, but now with renewed zeal for keeping potential trade secrets from competitors.

While patients have benefited from the growing supply of new medications, the universities have obtained patents not only for the actual substances but also for the processes and methods used to make them, potentially hampering discovery of even more beneficial treatments.

“Bayh-Dole tore down the taboos that existed against universities engaging in overtly commercial activity. Universities really thought that they were going to make it rich,” said Jennifer Washburn, author of “University Inc.: The Corporate Corruption of Higher Education” (Basic Books, 2005). “Each school was convinced that if they came up with that one blockbuster invention, they could solve all their financial problems.”

Ms. Washburn says that was “extremely wrong-headed.” Initially reacting to the law by slapping patents on every possible innovation, universities quickly discovered that patents were an expensive proposition. The fees and legal costs involved in obtaining a single patent can run upward of $15,000, and that doesn’t count the salaries of administrative staff members. Instead of bringing home the bacon, university tech transfer offices were throwing money into the void with little hope of returns.

To date, Ms. Washburn says, data gathered by the Association of University Technology Managers, a trade group, show that fewer than half of the 300 research universities actively seeking patents have managed to break even from technology transfer efforts. Instead, two-thirds of the revenue tracked by the association has gone to only 13 institutions.

Part of the problem has been a lingering misunderstanding about where the value lies in innovation. Patenting a new basic science technique, or platform technology, puts it out of the reach of graduate students who might have made tremendous progress using it.

Similarly, exclusive licensing of a discovery to a single company thwarts that innovation’s use in any number of other fields. R. Stanley Williams, a nanotechnologist from Hewlett-Packard, testified to Congress in 2002 that much of the academic research to which H.P. has had difficulty gaining access could be licensed to several companies without eroding its intellectual property value.

“Severe disagreements have arisen over conflicting interpretations of the Bayh-Dole Act,” he said. “Large U.S.-based corporations have become so disheartened and disgusted with the situation, they are now working with foreign universities, especially the elite institutions in France, Russia and China.”

THE issue is further clouded by “reach through” licenses, complex arrangements used by many tech transfer offices. A reach-through lets the patent holder claim a share of any profits that result from using, say, an enabling technology, even if those profits come several steps down the market transfer line. Several universities are already embroiled in messy lawsuits trying to sort out who is entitled to what.

Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of campus commercialization is that research decisions are now being based on possible profits, not on the inherent value of knowledge. “Blue sky” research - the kind of basic experimentation that leads to a greater understanding of how the world works - has largely been set aside in favor of projects considered to have more immediate market potential.

In academia’s continuing pursuit of profit, the wonder of simple serendipitous discovery has been left on the curb.

Janet Rae-Dupree writes about science and emerging technology in Silicon Valley.

1 comment September 7th, 2008

NASW on community organizing and Gov. Palin

The National Association of Social Workers [NASW] responds to Gov. Palin’s obnoxious dismissal of community organizers. They neglect, however, to point out that Palin’s comments were designed to fan her audience’s hatred of minorities and inner-city dwellers, as well as Sen. Obama:

Social Workers Respond to Gov. Sarah Palin’s Attack on Community Organizers

The National Association of Social Workers was outraged to hear Alaska Governor Sarah Palin, one of the nation’s vice-presidential candidates, malign in a live international broadcast the work of community organizers.

The social work profession takes great pride in its community organizing roots and lauds the contributions of its members, and other professionals, who commit their careers to helping residents of different communities organize their resources and take social action to improve life for themselves and their families. Small town reformers and urban community organizers have much in common.

The concepts of community organizing, community building and community development undergird the premise of American democracy. As a result of these efforts, institutions and officials often deliver more effective economic growth strategies, as well as mental health, health, and family services for people of all ages.

Community organizing is also the foundation of most successful political campaigns. Meeting fellow Americans in their communities and working with them to find solutions to problems that limit their potential is valuable and necessary work—with significant responsibilities.

The profession of social work was founded on the legacy of outstanding women leaders such as Nobel Laureate Jane Addams, who practiced community organizing in the Settlement Houses she created for the poor and working class immigrants of Chicago. The profession also counts Civil Rights icons such as Dr. Dorothy I. Height among its luminaries. It is fitting that both women are considered two of the most influential people in American history, and are inspirations for many of our country’s finest leaders.

During this election year, NASW encourages both parties to stay focused on issues of substance to the American people. We hope that instead of denigrating the lives and work of huge segments of the population, candidates will demonstrate how their plans for the country will protect and elevate the quality of life for all Americans.

Add comment September 7th, 2008

Excuses, excuses: Intellectual Work Found To Induce Excessive Calorie Intake

A Université Laval research team explains, via Science Daily,  why I eat too much:

Thinking People Eat Too Much: Intellectual Work Found To Induce Excessive Calorie Intake

ScienceDaily (Sep. 5, 2008) — A Université Laval research team has demonstrated that intellectual work induces a substantial increase in calorie intake. The details of this discovery, which could go some way to explaining the current obesity epidemic, are published in the most recent issue of Psychosomatic Medicine

The research team, supervised by Dr. Angelo Tremblay, measured the spontaneous food intake of 14 students after each of three tasks: relaxing in a sitting position, reading and summarizing a text, and completing a series of memory, attention, and vigilance tests on the computer. After 45 minutes at each activity, participants were invited to eat as much as they wanted from a buffet.

The researchers had already shown that each session of intellectual work requires only three calories more than the rest period. However, despite the low energy cost of mental work, the students spontaneously consumed 203 more calories after summarizing a text and 253 more calories after the computer tests. This represents a 23.6% and 29.4 % increase, respectively, compared with the rest period.

Blood samples taken before, during, and after each session revealed that intellectual work causes much bigger fluctuations in glucose and insulin levels than rest periods. “These fluctuations may be caused by the stress of intellectual work, or also reflect a biological adaptation during glucose combustion,” hypothesized Jean-Philippe Chaput, the study’s main author. The body could be reacting to these fluctuations by spurring food intake in order to restore its glucose balance, the only fuel used by the brain.

“Caloric overcompensation following intellectual work, combined with the fact that we are less physically active when doing intellectual tasks, could contribute to the obesity epidemic currently observed in industrialized countries,” said Mr. Chaput. “This is a factor that should not be ignored, considering that more and more people hold jobs of an intellectual nature,” the researcher concluded.

In addition to Jean-Philippe Chaput and Angelo Tremblay, the study’s authors include Vicky Drapeau, Paul Poirier, and Normand Teasdale.


Adapted from materials provided by Université Laval, via EurekAlert!, a service of AAAS.

Add comment September 7th, 2008

The dialectic of Sarah Palin

The Daily Show on reactions to Sarah Palin:

[h/t Effect Measure.]

Add comment September 7th, 2008

Obama as ex-community organizer

John Judis, in The New Republic, provides insight into Obama’s community organizing background and what he took away from it:

Creation Myth

By John B. Judis

What Barack Obama won’t tell you about his community organizing past

In late October 1987, Barack Obama and Jerry Kellman took a weekend off from their jobs as community organizers in Chicago and traveled to a conference on social justice and the black church at Harvard. During an evening break in the schedule, they strolled around campus in their shirtsleeves, enjoying the unseasonably warm weather. Two-and-a-half years earlier, Kellman had hired Obama to organize residents of Chicago’s South Side. Now, Obama had something to tell his friend and mentor.

It had to do, in part, with his father. At the time, Obama had just learned from his African half-sister what had happened to Barack Obama Sr., who abandoned him when he was two years old. After receiving his master’s degree in economics from Harvard, the elder Obama had returned to Kenya, where he became a high-ranking government official. But, when he criticized Kenya’s increasingly corrupt and authoritarian government, he lost his job and had to live from hand to mouth, depending on the goodwill of relatives while drinking heavily. Obama told Kellman that he feared ending up destitute and unhappy like his dad. “He wanted to marry and have children, and to have a stable income,” Kellman recalls.

But Obama was also worried about something else. He told Kellman that he feared community organizing would never allow him “to make major changes in poverty or discrimination.” To do that, he said, “you either had to be an elected official or be influential with elected officials.” In other words, Obama believed that his chosen profession was getting him nowhere, or at least not far enough. Personally, he might end up like his father; politically, he would fail to improve the lot of those he was trying to help.

And so, Obama told Kellman, he had decided to leave community organizing and go to law school. Kellman, who was already thinking of leaving organizing himself, found no reason to argue with him. “Organizing,” Kellman tells me, as we sit in a Chicago restaurant down the street from the Catholic church where he now works as a lay minister, “is always a lost cause.” Obama, circa late 1987, might or might not have put it quite that strongly. But he had clearly developed serious doubts about the career he was pursuing.

Yet, two decades later, to hear Obama the presidential candidate tell it, those years in Chicago as a community organizer shaped the person–and the politician–he has become. Campaigning in Iowa last year, he declared that community organizing was “the best education I ever had, better than anything I got at Harvard Law School.” In a video this spring, Obama stated that community organizing is “something I carry with me when I think about politics today–obviously at a different level and in a different place, but the same principles still apply.” “Barack is not a politician first and foremost,” Michelle Obama has said. “He’s a community activist exploring the viability of politics to make change.”

Certainly, Obama has good reason to tout his community organizing experience. After graduating from an Ivy League college, Obama passed up more lucrative jobs to devote three years to organizing low-income African Americans in Chicago. Th

But his campaign has taken the point a step further, implying that Obama the politician is a direct descendant of Obama the organizer–that he has carried the practices and principles of community organizing into his campaign, and would carry them into the White House as well. This is the version of Obama’s biography that most journalists have accepted.

In truth, however, if you examine carefully how Obama conducted himself as an organizer and how he has conducted himself as a politician, if you consider what he said about organizing to his fellow organizers, and if you look at the reasons he gave friends and colleagues for abandoning organizing, then a very different picture emerges: that of a disillusioned activist who fashioned his political identity not as an extension of community organizing but as a wholesale rejection of it. Indeed, the most important thing to know about Barack Obama’s time as a community organizer in Chicago may not be what he gained from the experience–but rather why, in late 1987, he decided to quit.

Obama arrived in South Chicago in 1985 to find a bleak scene. Roseland and the northern edge of Riverdale, the neighborhoods to which he was assigned, had been decimated by the collapse of the steel industry. In Dreams from My Father, Obama wrote of “the boarded-up homes, the decaying storefronts, the aging church rolls, [and the] kids from unknown families who swaggered down the streets.” Most middle-class whites had moved out, and, while the area was home to a few middleclass blacks, “[t]he stores and banks had left with their white customers, causing main thoroughfares to decompose.” Many of the area’s residents lived in the 2,000-unit Altgeld Gardens, public housing that was bounded by the fetid Calumet River, an expressway, and a sewage treatment plant that emitted, Obama wrote, a “heavy, putrid odor.”

The election in 1983 of Chicago’s first black mayor, Harold Washington, had given blacks in South Chicago “a new idea of themselves,” Obama observed. Yet the mayor’s efforts to revive the city’s worst neighborhoods were stymied by the conservative white majority on the city council.

Obama had moved to Chicago to work for Kellman, a transplanted New Yorker eleven years his senior, and his partner, Mike Kruglik. The pair was trying to build a regional community organization that spanned South Chicago, Chicago’s southern suburbs, and Northwest Indiana. Kellman and Kruglik wanted their new recruit to establish a branch centered in Roseland. It was to be called the Developing Communities Project.

Obama had worked briefly as an organizer in Harlem, but, in Chicago, he learned the principles of community organizing from Kellman, Kruglik, and other disciples of Saul Alinsky, a hardscrabble, profane Chicagoan who, in the late 1930s, had organized white ethnic meatpacking workers in the area around the old Chicago Stockyards. Alinsky was heavily influenced by John L. Lewis, the president of the United Mine Workers and founder of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). He wanted to do for working-class communities what Lewis and the CIO had done for workplaces: unite people of different backgrounds around common goals and use their collective strength to wring concessions from the powers that be.

Alinsky had died in 1972, but not before achieving considerable success in Chicago and other cities. And, while some of his opinions–like his derogation of Martin Luther King’s abilities as an organizer–were not shared by Kellman and other followers, his general principles would guide groups like the Gamaliel Foundation, which trained people who went on to work for the Developing Communities Project and similar organizations. They became the underpinning of Obama’s approach. “His assignment was to operate in the classic style,” Kruglik, a stubby, scruffy, intense man who now works for Gamaliel, tells me.

These rules can be reduced, more or less, to a few central ideas. Alinsky believed that humans respond to their own selfinterest rather than conscience or morality. (People are “moved primarily by perceived immediate self-interests, ” he argued, while morality is a “rhetorical rationale for expedient action and self-interest.”) As a result, the job of an organizer is to discover what citizens think is in their self-interest and then help them fight for it. Alinsky also instructed that the organizer himself should not become a public leader, but should operate behind the scenes to encourage “natural” or “native” leaders among the people he is organizing. That is, the goal of an organizer is never to create a movement based on his own charisma. (”We’re trying to build an organization with staying power, not a movement based on instant power and charisma,” Ernesto Cortes Jr., a prominent Alinsky disciple, explained in 1988. ) Finally, Alinsky felt that organizers should draw a clear line between their work and the political world. An organization should forge “no permanent political ties,” declared a guide put out by the Industrial Areas Foundation, which Alinsky created. When I asked former community organizer John Kretzmann–who teaches at Northwestern and writes about organizing–whether organizers saw all politicians as “whores,” he replied, “Even if you found one that wasn’t, it makes no sense to get close to them.”

Obama attempted to put these principles into practice in South Chicago. Kellman and Kruglik’s initial objective was to revive the region’s manufacturing base–and preserve what remained of its steel industry–by working with unions and church groups to pressure companies and the city; but those hopes were quickly dashed. Indeed, during his three years in South Chicago, Obama was constantly having to scale back his objectives as one project after another faltered. First, he got community members to demand a job center that would provide job referrals, but there were few jobs to distribute. Then, he tried to create what he called a “second-level consumer economy” in Roseland consisting of shops, restaurants, and theaters. This, too, went nowhere. At that point, Kellman advised Obama to move elsewhere. “Stay here, and you are bound to fail,” he told him.

But Obama remained. Next, he began to focus on providing social services for Altgeld Gardens. “We didn’t yet have the power to change state welfare policy, or create local jobs, or bring substantially more money into the schools,” he wrote. “But what we could do was begin to improve basic services at Altgeld–get the toilets fixed, the heaters working, the windows repaired.” Obama helped the residents wage a successful campaign to get the Chicago Housing Authority to promise to remove asbestos from the units; but, after an initial burst of activity, the city failed to keep its promise. (As of last year, some residences still had not been cleared of asbestos.) In waging these campaigns, Obama’s organization added staff, gained adherents, and won church support, including from the congregation of Reverend Jeremiah Wright. But it failed to stem the area’s overall decline. “Ain’t nothing gonna change, Mr. Obama,” says one resident quoted in Dreams from My Father who grows disillusioned with the Developing Communities Project. “We just gonna concentrate on saving our money so we can move outta here as fast as we can.”

Publicly, however, Obama did not appear discouraged. He continued to train other organizers for the Gamaliel Foundation. “It was the same traditional organizing leadership training,” recalls Obama trainee David Kindler. Obama also put the best face on what he was doing. Sometime before he left Chicago, he wrote an article for a magazine called Illinois Issues that would eventually appear in an anthology titled After Alinsky: Community Organizing in Illinois. In the article, he insisted that his project had achieved “impressive results” in South Chicago. While acknowledging that the “exodus from the inner city of financial resources, institutions, role models and jobs” posed difficulties for organizers, he insisted that “none of these problems is insurmountable.”

Reflecting organizers’ general attitude toward politicians, he downplayed the importance of Mayor Washington. “The election of Harold Washington in Chicago or of Richard Hatcher in Gary were not enough to bring jobs to inner-city neighborhoods or cut a 50 percent drop-out rate in the schools, although they did achieve an important symbolic effect,” he wrote. “In fact, much-needed black achievement in prominent city positions has put us in the awkward position of administering underfunded systems neither equipped nor eager to address the needs of the urban poor and being forced to compromise their interests to more powerful demands from other sectors.” To be successful, Obama argued, the efforts of politicians had to be “undergirded by a systematic approach to community organization.” Obama also criticized the role of charismatic leadership, writing that “a viable organization can only be achieved if a broadly based indigenous leadership–and not one or two charismatic leaders–can knit together the diverse interests of their local institutions.”

Yet there is considerable evidence that, even as he was writing these words, Obama was having doubts about community organizing. By the early fall of 1987–a little more than two years after he had come to Chicago–Obama had decided to apply to Harvard Law School. At some point thereafter, he began to explain his decision to friends and colleagues. The most revealing of these discussions are not reported in Dreams from My Father.

It was not just the walk he took with Kellman through Harvard’s campus. Obama also talked to Kruglik about his reasons for leaving Chicago. In their conversations, he described politics–and winning political office–as the most important step toward achieving change. And, instead of seeing Harold Washington as buffeted by forces beyond his control, he now aspired to be Washington. “He was fascinated by Mayor Washington,” says Kruglik. “Harold Washington inspired him to think about becoming a politician.” Kruglik says that Obama wanted to follow in the mayor’s footsteps: Washington had gone to law school, later becoming a state senator, then a congressman, and finally Chicago’s mayor. “He told me that he was thinking of running for mayor some day, ” Kruglik says.

Obama also talked to Northwestern professor John McKnight, a former community organizer who is a member of the Gamaliel Foundation’s board of directors and had helped to train Obama. He asked McKnight for a law school recommendation and told him that he eventually wanted to go into politics. McKnight warned him that politics, unlike community organizing, would inevitably require compromising his values and ideals. “The average legislator is surrounded by competing interests,” McKnight told him. “Most of the time what they are doing is trying to balance interests.” Obama, however, was not to be dissuaded. Recalls McKnight, “At the time, neighborhood organizing was very parochial. … He could see that the impact wouldn’t reach beyond the neighborhood. The change he was seeking was bigger.”

But it wasn’t simply that Obama dreamed of pursuing change on a grander scale. By late 1987, he seems to have grown disillusioned with the underlying principles of community organizing. In September 1989, the editors of Illinois Issues organized a symposium featuring, among others, the contributors to After Alinsky. It took place around a circular table in a conference room at the Woods Charitable Fund (a backer of the Gamaliel Foundation) in downtown Chicago. Kretzmann was the moderator, and participants included political scientist Paul Green, author Ben Joravsky, and Obama, who was then entering his second year of law school.

Joravsky kicked off the discussion by recounting Alinsky’s core principles. Green then brought up a controversial organization, Save our Neighborhoods/Save our City (SON/SOC), that had launched in February 1984 in response to fears that Harold Washington would promote public housing in certain white neighborhoods–leading to an influx of black residents. As Green noted, SON/SOC was organized by Alinsky disciples who were following their mentor’s principle of basing demands on self-interest.

Green insisted that there was an anti-establishment core to son/soc’s agenda. “Here are a bunch of blue-collar people … working to help their neighborhood, ” he said. He also pointed out that the group had carefully directed its ire against unscrupulous realtors rather than blacks and had tried to reach an accommodation with Mayor Washington. Joravsky responded by criticizing SON/SOC for using racial appeals to build its organization. As others joined and the argument threatened to grow heated, Kretzmann called on Obama to discuss organizing in low-income black communities. But Obama had been provoked by the discussion of SON/SOC. And, a year removed from South Chicago, he wanted to say something about community organizing in general.

Obama–sporting a white shirt, tie, and incipient Afro–was clearly troubled by the example of SON/SOC, which suggested that an organization, acting on Alinsky’s principles, could become racist. (Indeed, Alinsky’s first group, the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, had become a bastion of support for segregationist George Wallace in the 1960s.) Obama was also troubled by his own experience in South Chicago, where he had failed to make any headway on the community’s central problem–the absence of jobs–and had been reduced to demanding repairs in public housing. That, too, had derived from acting according to Alinsky’s principle of trying to win victories against the powers that be based on immediate self-interest.

But Obama was not ready to state his case forthrightly. (”We were all on our best behavior,” Joravsky recalls.) Instead, he expressed his doubts obliquely by drawing a distinction between the “two roles that an organizer was supposed to play … getting power, getting the stop sign, making things work” and “the educative function of organizing.” By the latter, Obama meant an organizer’s duty to frame citizens’ efforts in terms of a larger objective and a greater good: something more noble than dissuading realtors from selling homes to blacks in white neighborhoods or more substantial than getting a stop sign installed.

Obama put it this way: “The process whereby people in communities, like the community SON/SOC was organizing or the community where I was organizing, start to get bigger horizons, start to understand how they connect up with other people, how their power is involved with the power of other people–it seems to me that that strain gets lost. … At some point, you have to link up winning that stop sign or getting that home equity with the larger trends, larger movements in the city or the country.” He quoted an Alinsky disciple as saying, “I am not trying to build some grand utopian organization. I would just like to win it.” “That’s problematic,” Obama noted. In other words, winning wasn’t important if what was won was harmful or insignificant.

But Obama didn’t stop there. He had a litany of criticisms of Alinsky-style organizing that he wanted to put forward. He objected to community organizers’ dismissal of charismatic leadership and of movements. Instead of making the point directly, he recalled a friend telling him of an IAF trainer who complained that “movements are rotten with charismatic leaders.” Obama said his friend had responded, “That’s nonsense. We want a movement. I would love to have Martin Luther King here right now.” Obama argued that charismatic leaders and movements bring “long-term vision,” and that community organizers cannot be effective without such vision.

Obama also criticized community organizers’ “suspicion of politics.” “The problem we face now in terms of organizing is that politics is a major arena of power,” Obama said. “That’s where your major dialogue, discussion, is taking place. To marginalize yourself from that process is a damaging thing, and one that needs to be rethought.”

Before he was done, Obama had rejected the guiding principles of community organizing: the elevation of self-interest over moral vision; the disdain for charismatic leaders and their movements; and the suspicion of politics itself. But he did so in a way that seemed to elude the other participants. Two decades later, Green couldn’t recall any disagreement over his more positive take on SON/SOC. Joravsky also didn’t remember Obama’s criticisms of organizing. Instead, he recalled thinking how “cool” and “well-spoken” Obama was.

Obama, too, seemed initially oblivious to the harsh implications of his own words. While he was at Harvard, he would return to Chicago to train organizers at Gamaliel, and, after graduating and moving back to Chicago, he would retain ties to the city’s community organizing network–serving on the boards of the Woods fund and the Lugenia Burns Hope Center, which promotes organizing among African Americans on the city’s South Side. But he would never again practice community organizing, as he did in the 1980s. And he would begin to construct a political identity for himself that was not simply different from his identity as a community organizer–but was, in fact, its very opposite.

Based purely on his organizing background, one would have expected Obama to become a bread-and-butter politician, a spokesman for his constituents’ immediate needs. Instead, Obama became a politician of vision, not issues–one who appealed to voters’ values rather than their immediate self-interest. As a state senator in Illinois, he was best known for his advocacy of government reform. Asked in September 1999 to explain why someone should vote for him for Congress against incumbent Bobby Rush, Obama told the Hyde Park Citizen that, unlike Rush, he had “a vision.” And, as a Democratic presidential candidate, he has run on an abstract platform of “change” that appeals to many young and upscale voters, but has fallen flat among the white working-class voters whom Alinsky once courted.

Obama has also eschewed the retiring persona of the organizer. Initially awkward as a speaker, he became a charismatic politician whose run for president has produced something very much like a movement. And, while his campaign has used some techniques from community organizing to rally state-by-state support, it is the antithesis of the ground-up, locally dominated, naturally led network of community groups that Alinsky envisioned. Obama, in short, has become exactly the kind of politician his mentors might have warned against.

None of this is to say that Obama was wrong to abandon community organizing for politics. Or that his critique of organizing was incorrect. In fact, many of today’s community organizers would acknowledge that Obama was absolutely right to question the limitations of Alinskystyle organizing. The elevation of self-interest at the expense of higher ideals can clearly be an ugly thing. Improving people’s lives has to be about more than installing stop signs. And no one who hopes to truly change urban communities can stay out of politics altogether. Indeed, in contrast to what Alinsky advised, many community organizations now participate in political campaigns.

Still, one has to wonder: In making the transition from organizer to politician, did Obama go too far in rejecting one of the cardinal principles of community organizing? True, appeals to selfinterest can sometimes lead organizations astray. But such appeals are also a necessary part of community organizing–and politics as well. Few candidates could hope to win an election at any level without convincing their constituents that they understand their immediate hopes and fears. And presidential candidates are no exception. Bill “I feel your pain” Clinton certainly had the ability to persuade voters that he identified with their interests. So did Ronald Reagan. Al Gore and John Kerry did not.

In this election, Obama can count on the votes of African Americans in Roseland as well as many upscale voters attracted by his message of change. But he also needs to win support from the descendants of Back of the Yards and SON/SOC–working-class voters who, today, are more worried about high gas prices and rising heath care costs than about the prospect of blacks moving in next door. To win their votes, Obama needs to do precisely what he once taught organizers to do: speak to the self-interest of ordinary people.

So far, this has not been Obama’s strong suit as a presidential candidate. To his credit, he has certainly talked about gas prices and health insurance. But, as Obama would have told his trainees 20 years ago, conveying concern requires more than saying the right thing; it involves seeing the world from the vantage of those you are trying to win over–and convincing them that your empathy is sincere.

When Obama came to South Chicago, he believed in community organizing; within two-and-a-half years–by the time he and Jerry Kellman went for their late October walk around Harvard’s campus–he was clearly growing disillusioned. Now, having fashioned a political identity in near-total opposition to the core principles of his one-time profession, Obama’s bid for the presidency may come down to this: Is he willing to rediscover–and put into practice–one of the main principles he followed as a twentysomething activist all those years ago?

John B. Judis is a senior editor at The New Republic and a visiting fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

1 comment September 7th, 2008


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