Archive for November 21st, 2008

Case against Mohammed Jawad collapses

In a major development, it looks as if the war crimes trial against Mohammed Jawad has collapsed. Last month the Military Commissions judge threw out Jawad’s confession to Afghan authorities, ruling that it had been extracted through torture. This week the same judge threw out Jawad’s confession given to US authorities upon his being turned over to the US, ruling that the latter cobfession was the result of fear continuing from his Afghan torture:

in part because the U.S. interrogator used techniques to maintain “the shock and fearful state” associated with his arrest by Afghan police, including blindfolding him and placing a hood over his head.

“The military commission concludes the effect of the death threats which produced the accused’s first confession to the Afghan police had not dissipated by the second confession to the U.S.,” Henley wrote. “In other words, the subsequent confession was itself the product of the preceding death threats.”

According to the former prosecutor, who resigned because he felt vital information was being withheld from the defense, this ddevelopement signifies the end of the case:

“It’s not the death knell of the case _ it buries the case,” said Darrel Vandeveld, a lieutenant colonel in the Army reserves. “The commissions at this point are utterly lifeless.”

Great credit should be given to his vigorous and principled defense attorney, Maj. David Frakt, who has used every tool available to him to fight for his client and for justice and human decency.

Here is the complete AP story:

Gitmo judge tosses out detainee’s 2nd confession

By David McFadden

SAN JUAN, Puerto Rico — A U.S. military judge has blocked Pentagon prosecutors from using a Guantanamo prisoner’s statements to U.S. authorities as trial evidence, saying they were tainted by an earlier confession tortured out of the suspect by Afghan officials.

Mohammed Jawad’s confession to U.S. authorities in Afghanistan following his capture in 2002 was the last incriminating statement available to prosecutors for the Afghan’s war-crimes trial at Guantanamo Bay, his military defense attorney, Air Force Maj. David Frakt, said Thursday.

Wednesday’s dismissal of Jawad’s confession in U.S. custody decimates the government’s case against the Afghan prisoner at Guantanamo Bay, according to the former prosecutor, who quit several weeks ago in a dispute over the handling of the case.

“It’s not the death knell of the case _ it buries the case,” said Darrel Vandeveld, a lieutenant colonel in the Army reserves. “The commissions at this point are utterly lifeless.”

Jawad, now about 23, is scheduled to face trial Jan. 5 on charges that he threw a grenade that wounded two American soldiers and their Afghan interpreter. He was 16 or 17 at the time of the 2002 attack in Kabul.

The Army judge, Col. Stephen Henley, ruled last month that Jawad’s confession to Afghan police commanders and high-ranking government officials on Dec. 17, 2002 was only achieved after they threatened to kill him and his family _ a strategy that he said was intended to inflict severe pain and constituted torture.

In Wednesday’s ruling, Henley disqualified Jawad’s second confession while in U.S. custody on Dec. 17 and 18, in part because the U.S. interrogator used techniques to maintain “the shock and fearful state” associated with his arrest by Afghan police, including blindfolding him and placing a hood over his head.

“The military commission concludes the effect of the death threats which produced the accused’s first confession to the Afghan police had not dissipated by the second confession to the U.S.,” Henley wrote. “In other words, the subsequent confession was itself the product of the preceding death threats.”

Under the Military Commissions Act, which governs America’s first war-crimes trials since the World War II era, statements obtained through torture are not admissible. But some statements obtained through “coercion” may be admitted at the discretion of a military judge.

A spokesman for the Pentagon’s Office of Military Commissions, Joseph DellaVedova, said prosecution authorities could not immediately comment on Henley’s ruling.

Hina Shamsi, staff attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union, said in a statement that it would be a “tragic legacy” for the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush if Jawad’s case proceeds at Guantanamo.

November 21st, 2008

The ever rising number of child soldiers at Guantanamo

Last week the U.C. Davis Center for the Study of Human Rights in the Americas reported that, despite Defense Departmen t claims to the UN that only eight juveniles had been held at Guantanamo, the true number was at least 12 and possibly much higher. The DoD then admitted their “error” and revised their UN report Andy Worthington reports today that the true number is at least 22. Evidently no one in the Defense Department passed elementary arithmetic, or truth-telling:

Number of juveniles held at Guantanamo almost twice official Pentagon figure

By Andy Worthington

On Sunday, the Pentagon admitted that 12 juveniles — those under the age of 18 at the time their alleged crimes took place — have been held at Guantanamo Bay (as opposed to the figure of eight that was submitted to the UN in May). But a RAW STORY count, drawn from the Pentagon’s own records, reveals that the total number of juveniles held at Guantanamo is at least 22 — nearly double the official Pentagon figure.

In a submission to the 48th Session of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (PDF), the Pentagon claimed that it had only held eight juveniles during the life of the Guantanamo Bay prison. It acknowledged that three Afghans under the age of 16 were released in January 2004 (as reported in the New York Times), stated that another three juveniles were repatriated between 2004 and 2006 and claimed that it was only holding two prisoners who were juveniles at the time of their capture: the Canadian Omar Khadr and the Afghan Mohamed Jawad, who are both facing a trial by Military Commission. The much-criticized Commission was created by the Defense Department as part of “terror trials” conceived in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

Last week, the Center for the Study of Human Rights in the Americas, based at the University of California, issued a report pointing out that, contrary to the Pentagon’s assertions, at least 12 prisoners were juveniles at the time of their capture. The report correctly stated that, in addition to Omar Khadr and Mohamed Jawad, Mohamed El-Gharani, a Saudi resident born to parents from Chad, was still imprisoned. Just 14 years old when he was seized in October 2001, El-Gharani had traveled to Pakistan to study information technology, but had been rounded up in a random raid on a mosque, tortured in Pakistani custody and then held in U.S. detention, first in Afghanistan, and then in Guantanamo.

The report also asserted that the Pentagon had forgotten to include Yasser Talal al-Zahrani. Al-Zahrani, a Saudi national, was 17 when he was seized in Afghanistan, andwas one of three prisoners who died in Guantanamo (apparently by committing suicide) in June 2006.

After the report was issued, the Pentagon acknowledged that it had revised its figure from eight to 12, and said it had provided a corrected submission to the United Nations. Navy Cmdr. Jeffrey Gordon claimed that the problems arose because many of the prisoners did not know their dates of birth. But as the director of the Center for the Study of Human Rights in the Americas explained the Center’s report had drawn on the Pentagon’s own sources, specifically the list of all the prisoners held at Guantanamo from January 11, 2002 until May 15, 2006, which included their names, nationalities, and dates of birth.

Close scrutiny of this list reveals that the Pentagon will need to revise its figures once more, as, by its own account, a total of 22 prisoners were juveniles at the time of capture. Moreover, contrary to the Pentagon’s account, five of these prisoners are still being held.

This imprecision seems to reflect the Pentagon’s lack of concern for whether prisoners were juvenile at the time of capture. Under the terms of Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (on the involvement of children in armed conflict), the U.S. administration is required to promote “the physical and psychosocial rehabilitation and social reintegration of children who are victims of armed conflict,” but in May 2003, when the story first broke that juvenile prisoners were being held at Guantanamo, defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld told a press conference, “This constant refrain of ‘the juveniles,’ as though there’s a hundred children in there — these are not children.”

Although the three juveniles released in January 2004 were held separately from the adult population and given some educational and recreational opportunities, there is no evidence that the rest of the juveniles held at Guantanamo received any preferential treatment whatsoever. In many cases, they were subjected to the kind of chronic abuse that has earned Guantanamo (and the U.S. prisons in Afghanistan) a reputation as facilities where the use of torture was routine.

The following is a list of the 22 juveniles held at Guantanamo:

Including Omar Khadr, Mohamed Jawad and Mohammed El-Gharani, five prisoners who were juveniles at the time of capture are still being held at Guantanamo. The two not previously mentioned are:

* Faris Muslim al-Ansari, a Yemeni, was 17 when he was seized crossing the Pakistani border. In Guantanamo, he explained (PDF, pp. 128-33) that his family had left Yemen when he was a child, and had moved to Afghanistan, where his father had fought the Russians. Denying an allegation that he was a Taliban fighter, he said, “I have never done anything military-related at all, and I don’t know anything about military fighting,” and added that he fled Jalalabad, where he was living with his parents, because “The Americans would target any Arabs, not just al-Qaeda or the Taliban, and the Northern Alliance would kill any Arab they saw.”

* Hassan bin Attash, a Saudi of Yemeni descent, is the brother of a “high-value detainee” charged in connection with the 9/11 attacks, and was 16 or 17 when he was seized in Pakistan and transferred to the “Dark Prison,” a CIA prison near Kabul, which resembled a medieval dungeon, but with the addition of painfully loud music which was blasted into the cells 24 hours a day. He was then rendered to Jordan, where proxy torturers “worked on” him for 16 months. In Guantanamo, he told his lawyer that he was hung upside down, beaten and threatened with electric shocks, and added that afterwards he told his interrogators “whatever they wanted to hear.” In January 2004, he was rendered back to Afghanistan, and arrived in Guantanamo in September 2004.

In addition to the three juveniles released in January 2004 (Asadullah, Naqibullah and Mohammed Ismail), the following thirteen prisoners who were juveniles at the time of capture have also been released:

* Abdul Qudus, an Afghan, was 14 when he was sold to US forces by opportunistic Afghan soldiers. In Guantanamo, he explained (PDF, pp. 22-7) that he and Mohammed Ismail (one of the three juveniles released in January 2004) had been looking for work, and had ended up spending the night at an Afghan militia post. The following morning, the soldiers wanted to give them weapons and make them fight, and when they refused they were put in a car, delivered to the Americans, and accused of being with the Taliban. He was released in 2005 or 2006.

* Shams Ullah, an Afghan, was 15 or 16 he was seized by U.S. forces. In Guantanamo, it was alleged (PDF, pp. 71-4) that he had fired at U.S. and Afghan forces who had stopped him during a patrol. Shams had vague recollections of the events, but his uncle, Bostan Karim, who was seized separately, and is still held in Guantanamo, noted (PDF, pp. 138-50) that he had “a mental problem,” and explained, “When the Americans came to our house there was a Kalashnikov in our house and he knew that the Americans would take this gun. So, he took the gun and went to the mosque. The Americans asked him to stop and he didn’t stop, so they shot him and he became lame.” He was released in 2005 or 2006.

* Qari Esmhatulla, an Afghan, was 16 or 17 when Afghan soldiers stopped him as he walked home from visiting a shrine. In Guantanamo, he said (PDF, pp. 1-7) that he “admitted the things that were not true only to make them stop beating me,” and added, “I heard my captors talk about receiving a bounty from American forces for people they captured. They placed a grenade near me so they could have an explanation for arresting me.” He was released in October 2006.

* Peta Mohammed, an Afghan, was 17 when he was seized with two of the juvenile prisoners released in January 2004, after a raid by U.S. Special Forces on the compound of a warlord named Samoud. All were treated brutally in a U.S. base in Gardez and at Bagram, where, according to another released prisoner, Habib Rahman (PDF, pp. 84-9), they were abused until they admitted attacking U.S. forces. Mohammed was released in 2005 or 2006.

* Yousef and Abdulsalam al-Shehri, two Saudi cousins, were both 16 when they were seized in Afghanistan. Yousef was transported to a prison in Sheberghan run by Afghan warlord General Dostum, where he spent six weeks in horribly overcrowded conditions, surrounded by the dead and dying, before being transferred to U.S. custody. Abdulsalam was sent to Qala-i-Janghi, a fort run by Dostum, where several hundred prisoners were killed in bombing raids and by artillery fire after a number of them staged an uprising. The others, who hid in the basement, survived death by bombs and flooding. When asked at Guantanamo (PDF, pp. 158-66) if he took part in the uprising, Abdulsalam said, “How am I going to fight? With my fingers? I didn’t have a weapon.” He was released in June 2006 and Yousef was released in November 2007.

* Abdulrazzaq al-Sharekh, a Saudi, was 17 when he was seized after crossing the Pakistani border from Afghanistan. He had apparently been recruited to help the Taliban fight the Northern Alliance (PDF, pp. 35-42), and was released in September 2007.

* Rasul Kudayev, a former wrestling champion from the Russian territory of Kabardino-Balkaria, north of Georgia, was 17, according to the Pentagon, when he was seized in Afghanistan and imprisoned in Qala-i-Janghi. He was released in March 2004, but was arrested in October 2005, after 300 gunmen attacked government buildings in his hometown, and tortured horribly in police custody, despite protesting his innocence.

* Haji Mohammed Ayub, a Uighur (a Muslim from China’s Xinjiang province), had fled to Afghanistan to escape Chinese persecution, and was 17 when the settlement he shared with other Uighurs was bombed by U.S. forces (PDF, pp. 49-55). Seized by Pakistani villagers and sold to U.S. forces, he and four other Uighurs were released in May 2006 and sent to Albania, the only country prepared to accept them, where they have no work opportunities, and no prospect of ever being reunited with their families.

* Two Pakistanis, Mohammed Omar and Saji Ur Rahman, were, respectively, 17 and 15 years old when they were seized in Afghanistan and imprisoned in local jails for three months before being handed over (or sold) to U.S. forces. This year, they spoke to Tom Lasseter of McClatchy Newspapers (interviews here and here) as part of a survey of released prisoners, and it appeared that they had been recruited to fight, like thousands of other young Pakistanis, by militants connected to his madrassa (religious school). They were released in 2004.

In addition, two other Pakistani juveniles — Khalil Rahman Hafez and Sultan Ahmad (both 17 at the time of capture) — were released without their stories being told, and the 22nd juvenile prisoner was Yasser Talal al-Zahrani.

It remains plausible that the dates of birth of several other prisoners were recorded incorrectly by the Pentagon, and it should also be noted that Sami al-Haj, the al-Jazeera journalist released in May, told his lawyers at the legal action charity Reprieve that he believed that at least two dozen other prisoners were juveniles when they were seized.

Hundreds of juvenile prisoners are still being held in Afghanistan and Iraq. In its submission to the UN in May, the Pentagon claimed that it had held “approximately 90″ in Afghanistan since 2002, and was currently holding “approximately ten,” and had held “approximately 2,400″ in Iraq since 2003, and was currently holding “approximately 500.” If Guantanamo is anything to go by, these figures may not be reliable at all.

***********************8

Andy Worthington is the author of The Guantanamo Files: The Stories of the 774 Detainees in America’s Illegal Prison (published by Pluto Press).

November 21st, 2008

Sullivan: No on Brennan for CIA!

Andrew Sullivan comes out strongly against John Brennan as Obama’s pick for CIA Director:

No Way. No How. No Brennan.

By Andrew Sullivan

Marc reports the Republican, former chief-of-staff for George Tenet (who authorized war crimes as CIA head), admirer of Dick Cheney, CEO of the company one of whose contract employees improperly accessed Obama’s and McCain’s passports, and defender of renditions and “enhanced interrogations” is still Obama’s front-runner pick to head the CIA. No, I’m not making this up. Brennan was high up in the agency during the run-up to the Iraq war and has since conceded this about the intelligence he was in part responsible for:

Looking back on it now, as we put pieces together, it probably is apparent to some, including Paul, that it was much more politicized than in fact we realized.

So Brennan was complicit and naive in the run-up to the Iraq war. And Obama wants to reward him? Brennan is also a believer in Cheney’s term “the dark side,” wishing merely to have some limits within it. He clearly has a mindset that has far more in common with the war crimes of his former boss than with the clear, and indisputable beliefs of the Obama movement. Listen to the ambivalence about torture here:

I think George [Tenet] had two concerns. One is to make sure that there was that legal justification, as well as protection for CIA officers who are going to be engaged in some of these things, so that they would not be then prosecuted or held liable for actions that were being directed by the administration. So we want to make sure the findings and other things were done probably with the appropriate Department of Justice review.

But at the same time, there is a question about how aggressive you want to be against terrorism in terms of, what does it mean to take the gloves off? There was a real debate within the agency, including today, about what are the minimum standards that you want to stoop to and beyond where you’re not going to go, because we don’t want to stoop to using the same types of standards that terrorists use. We are in this business, whether it be intelligence or the government, to protect freedom, democracy and liberty, not to violate that.

When it comes to individuals who are determined to destroy our nation, though, we have to make sure that we take every possible measure. It’s a tough ethical question, and it’s a question that really needs to be aired more publicly. The issue of the reported domestic spying — these are very healthy debates that need to take place. They can’t be stifled, because I think that we as a country and a society have to determine what is it we want to do, whether it be eavesdropping, whether it be taking actions against individuals who are either known or suspected to be terrorists. What length do we want to go to? What measures do we want to use? What tactics do we want to use?

Hopefully, that “dark side” is not going to be something that’s going to forever tarnish the image of the United States abroad and that we’re going to look back on this time and regret some of the things that we did, because it is not in keeping with our values. …

Sometimes there are actions that we are forced to take, but there need to be boundaries beyond which we are going to recognize that we’re not going to go because we still are Americans, and we are supposed to be representing something to people in this country and overseas. So the dark side has its limits.

The simple answer to the question – what length do we want to go? – is to abide by the rule of law. Why is that so hard to understand? And yet Brennan and Tenet didn’t. They authorized clear torture sessions. Why is such a man even considered for the post under Obama? This man cannot end the taint of Bush-Cheney. He was Bush-Cheney. In fact, if Obama picks him, it will be a vindication of the kind of ambivalence and institutional moral cowardice that made America a torturing nation. It would be an unforgivable betrayal of his supporters and his ideals. It would be an acknowledgment that Tenet himself is not a war criminal, while the facts indisputably prove that he was.

In fact, I’d like to see much more evidence of whether Brennan himself is implicated in the war crimes and unlawfulness of the past eight years. If nominated, the Senate should find out. Whatever his qualities, Brennan is not change. He has even used Tenet’s disgusting adoption of the Gestapo euphemism “enhanced interrogation.” Here he is arguing against change earlier this year:

Even though people may criticize what has happened during the two Bush administrations, there has been a fair amount of continuity. A new administration, be it Republican or Democrat — you’re going to have a fairly significant change of people involved at the senior-most levels. And I would argue for continuity in those early stages. You don’t want to whipsaw the [intelligence] community. You don’t want to presume knowledge about how things fit together and why things are being done the way they are being done. And you have to understand the implication, then, of making any major changes or redirecting things. I’m hoping there will be a number of professionals coming in who have an understanding of the evolution of the capabilities in the community over the past six years, because there is a method to how things have changed and adapted.

It’s fine not to uproot the entire agency and to have some continuity. But for Obama to appoint a Bush-Cheney apologist to the CIA? How on earth did this idea get this far?

It may be that Brennan will stop torture under any euphemism. But the trouble with this area of policy is that it is necessarily secret and so trusting the people running the CIA is essential. I don’t trust Brennan. On the question of torture, it is absolutely vital that there be a clean break with Bush-Cheney at the top of the agency. Many CIA staffers have been implicated in war crimes, and their cover-up. If you were to de-Cheneyize the entire place after eight years of entrenchment, you’d have few people with real skills left. So the top leadership is vital. It needs to signal that there is no longer any doubt that the US is abiding by Geneva, including Article 3, in all its branches of government.

The least we know is that Brennan is ambivalent about this. Ambivalence on this matter is unacceptable. We haven’t fought for decency and reform and a return to American values for so long to be turned back now. We didn’t work our butts off to elect Obama only to get Bush another four years at CIA. If Brennan emerges as the pick, those of us against the continuation of war crimes and the prosecution of war criminals will have to oppose him strenuously in the nomination process. We will, in fact, have to go to war with Obama before he even takes office.

And if Obama doubts our seriousness, I have three words for him. Yes we can.

November 21st, 2008


Pages

Calendar

November 2008
M T W T F S S
« Oct   Dec »
 12
3456789
10111213141516
17181920212223
24252627282930

Posts by Month

Posts by Category