Ken Pope on issues in revising APA “Nuremberg Code” 1.02
June 27th, 2009
From psychologist Ken Pope comes this comment regarding possible revisions of the American Psychological Association’s section 1.02 which wrote the “Nuremberg Defense” [just following orders] into the ethics code in 2002:
I thought I’d pass along a news report of a new court decision — which I would otherwise not circulate — for its potential relevance to Section 1.02 of the APA ethics code.
In 2002, the American Psychological Association adopted a new enforceable standard allowing members to set aside their ethical responsibilities that were in irreconcilable conflict with governmental authority:
“If the conflict is unresolvable via such means, psychologists may adhere to the requirements of the law, regulations, or other governing legal authority.”
APA endorsed and taught this enforceable standard during the last 7 years but recently issued a formal invitation for comments on it.
Council may vote at one of its future meetings to change 1.02 so that it no longer opposes the Nuremberg ethic that individuals cannot avoid personal accountability by just following orders, laws, or other forms of state authority
The new court decision is relevant to one of the suggested “fixes” for 1.02 that was suggested early but discarded when serious problems became apparent.
(Fortunately other suggested changes would reverse 1.02’s stance of contradicting the Nuremberg ethic but would make needed adjustments for the diverse areas of psychological practice such as forensic psychology, military psychology, civilian government service, etc.)
The suggested “fix” that turned out not to solve the Nuremberg issue though it created new problems was to change the enforceable standard so that it did not apply when “just following the law, “just following orders,” etc., would lead to a violation of human rights.
One of the problems with qualifying 1.02 only with a vague and unclear “human rights” proviso in the enforceable standards — where standards must be clearly understood — is that that the term is undefined and there is considerable disagreement about what it means, what is and is not included.
An example of the sharp disagreements about what the term “human rights” means is the array of what came to be called harsh interrogation methods used in settings like the Abu Ghraib prison and Guantanamo Bay detainment camp.
The U.S. president, vice president, secretary of defense, secretary of state, and attorney general of one administration stated that these methods were consistent with human rights; there have also been some prominent public figures who disagreed with this view.
The recent court decision that illustrates how what constitutes “human rights” differs significantly depending on time, culture, context, who is making the assessment, and many other factors is the supreme court of France’s decision that internet access is a “basic human right.”
Here’s how the *Times* of London begins its news report (“Top French court rips heart out of Sarkozy internet law” by Charles Bremner):
France’s highest court has inflicted an embarrassing blow to President Sarkozy by cutting the heart out of a law that was supposed to put France in the forefront of the fight against piracy on the internet.
The Constitutional Council declared access to the internet to be a basic human right, directly opposing the key points of Mr Sarkozy’s law, passed in April, which created the first internet police agency in the democratic world.
As the headline in another newspaper (U.K. *Daily Mail*) put it:
“Internet Access Is A Fundamental Human Right, Rules French Court.”
The U.N. backs the French court’s view (as do some other countries).
When an abstract term like “human rights” is fluid and flexible enough to include internet access as a basic or fundamental human right, it raises as many questions as it seems to answer (such as whether domestic jails and prisons routinely violate prisoners’ basic or fundamental human rights).
A profession’s ethics code must set forth enforceable standards that provide clear guidance, avoid vagueness and ambiguity, and take adequate account of the profession’s different roles ( such as forensic psychology, military psychology, etc.) and settings (such as courts, prisons, etc.).
In our *British Medical Journal* article addressing these issues, Tom Gutheil and I emphasized the diversity of psychologists’ work and work settings:
“The 54 divisions of the APA, for example, represent such divergent fields as consumer psychology, population and environmental psychology, industrial and organisational psychology, experimental psychology, the psychology of aesthetics, creativity, and the arts, and military psychology.”
Ethics codes must provide a “good fit” for these diverse fields — and fortunately various approaches have been suggested that would accomplish this in a way consistent with the Nuremberg ethic.
Codes can and should
“reflect major differences of roles, but no one should be able to escape personal ethical accountability merely through following orders, laws, and other forms of state authority. History has shown what can result when professionals follow this kind of fallacious ethical reasoning.”
PLEASE FORWARD THIS MESSAGE to any lists or individuals who are interested in these issues.
Ken Pope
Entry Filed under: APA, Psychology