Posts filed under 'Iraq'

Former Army Iraq interrogator Tony Lagouranis interviewed

Former Army interrogator Tony Lagouranis interviewed on FOX Chicago about the abuses he participated in in Iraq. Lagouranis is the author of the amazing book Fear Up Harsh: An Army Interrogator’s Dark Journey Through Iraq. In addition to giving the best sense of the abuse (aka, “torture”) rampant in Iraq, Lagouranis’ book helps understand why the Americans are not likely to win in Iraq. [From www.rejecttorture.org]

Add comment May 23rd, 2008

Ackerman on Longshoreman’s antiwar strike

Spencer Ackerman has written a detailed piece of the May Day West Coast Longshoreman’s strike against the war. This was one of the most important events in recent years:

Longshoremen Union Protests Iraq War
Some Say Walkout Signals a Working-Class Weary of War

By Spencer Ackerman

According to virtually every poll this election year, the working class voter — particularly the white working class voter — is most concerned about the economy, to the exclusion of almost all else. It’s through that prism, according to a parade of television pundits, that the working-class views the war in Iraq. Perhaps the war is unpopular to the working class, as it is to approximately 70 percent of Americans, but the greater danger, they believe, comes from overzealous opposition to the war.

If that was the case, the walkout in California earlier this month should not have happened. Across 29 California ports, as many as 25,000 longshoremen — members of the firebrand International Longshore & Warehouse Union — refused to show up for work in protest of the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Activity at the ports was significantly diminished on May 1 — the international day of labor solidarity. Labor historians interviewed by The Washington Independent were hard-pressed to remember the last anti-war labor strike of this magnitude.

(Matt Mahurin) The ILWU tied the war to the turbulence in the global economy to explain their action. “Big foreign corporations that control global shipping aren’t loyal or accountable to any country,” said Bob McEllrath, president of the union, in a prepared statement. “For them it’s all about making money. But longshore workers are different. We’re loyal to America, and we won’t stand by while our country, our troops, and our economy are destroyed by a war that’s bankrupting us to the tune of 3 trillion dollars. It’s time to stand up, and we’re doing our part today.”

Few outside analysts believe that the ILWU action is the vanguard of any large-scale labor action against the war. For one thing, the ILWU has traditionally had a strident aspect: it was the home of legendary labor firebrand Harry Bridges in the 1930s. Bridges was the union’s charismatic and radical spokesman during the 1934 longshoremen’s strike that brought shipping in the West Coast to a halt and the force of the police down on San Francisco longshoremen on the infamous “Black Thursday” events of July 5, 1934. But some see it as a sign that working-class Americans are increasingly fed up with the war.

According to the union, the push for the May 1 strike came from its locals, not union headquarters. The union duly notified the Pacific Maritime Assn., a conglomerate that owns the California ports. But ILWU said the organization did not accommodate the request for a work stoppage. As a result, as many as 25,000 ILWU members did not show up for work on May Day.

The strike affected 29 ports along the California coast, including Los Angeles and Long Beach, two of the country’s largest. A spokesman for the maritime association told AFP that the strike wouldn’t have a lasting economic impact but was nonetheless important. “It does come at a time when people are relying on U.S west coast ports operating smoothly,” Steve Getzug from the Pacific Maritime Assn. said. “These kinds of stoppages aren’t helpful.”

Repeated efforts to contact union representatives were unsuccessful. But Gene Bruskin, one of the leaders of U.S. Labor Against The War, a coalition of unions opposed to the war in Iraq that includes the ILWU’s Oakland chapter, said that the union made an attempt to coordinate with its brother workers in the Iraqi port of Basra to shut down that crucial oil-exporting port on May 1.

“That communication was a really powerful thing,” Bruskin said. “Port workers were talking to to port workers, as well as the oil workers who are very close to them, because Basra is the main port there. There were messages sent up and back… I fully understand why that didn’t happen — sometimes it’s complicated and over there you can’t always say what’s on their mind. But I think that was really powerful.”

While Basra did not shut down, some Iraqi labor groups issued a statement in solidarity with anti-war U.S. workers. “On this day of international labour solidarity we call on our fellow trade unionists and all those worldwide who have stood against war and occupation to increase support for our struggle for freedom from occupation — both the military and economic,” the Iraqi Labour Federation stated.

But the particular ethos of the longshoreman’s trade make exporting such an action to different U.S. unions difficult, labor historians say. “It’s part of the maritime culture,” said Pete Hoefel, an instructor in labor studies at the AFL-CIO’s National Labor College in Silver Spring, Md. “It’s very internationally minded. That union staked out positions on the civil war in Spain in the ’30s, the Hungarian revolution, Cuba, that sort of stuff. Unloading vessels, they talk with other maritime workers [from around the world]. It’s part of their own work culture.”

Indeed, building on the momentum of the strike would not be easy, said Gene Bruskin. “The longshoremen have a somewhat unique situation,” he said. “Their contract allows, under the right conditions, for them to take these kind of actions. But 90 percent of the contracts in the U.S. explicitly prevent this kind of action from happening. It’d be very difficult for most workers in the U.S. to join with the ILW even if they wanted to.”

Michael Kazin, a history professor at Georgetown University, pointed to the ILWU’s radical roots as reason to be skeptical that the strike will spread to other unions. “They were one of the first [unions] to come out against the Vietnam War, and I believe one of the first to come out against this war,” Kazin said. “I’m not sure how much of a harbinger it is.”

Still, it is hard to remember the last anti-war labor action of this magnitude. Hoefel recalled a demonstration in Washington in the 1980s of mostly public-sector unions against U.S. involvement in Nicaragua. But that was not an on-the-job action against a war. Bruskin remembered on-the-job actions of a similar size against Apartheid South Africa around the same time — undertaken, then as now, by the ILWU. Aside from those examples, there is little recent precedent for the action. “Iraq is big,” said Hoefel, “and within labor, it’s significant.”

Bruskin said a potential next step is to increase ties with Iraqi workers. A coalition of Iraqi unions — there is no unified labor movement in Iraq, a remnant of Saddam Hussein’s crackdown on civil society — is attempting to hold a labor conference against the U.S. occupation of Iraq in the relative safety of the Kurdish north, he said. “The relations between the labor movement here with USLAW, and even the official parts of the labor movement here, and the Iraqi unions are itself very historic,” Bruskin said. “In a time of war, when our country has invaded and occupied another country, to be in solidarity with those workers against the occupation, it’s important to provide [that] kind of support.” If the Iraqis hold the conference, Bruskin said he and representatives of U.S. Labor Against The War would attend.

As recounted in Rick Perlstein’s new book “Nixonland,” ever since the Vietnam War, the American right has used cultural issues to divide labor from liberals on foreign policy, a development capped in New York’s 1970 “Hardhat Riot,” in which stockbrokers and construction workers joined in attacking hippies demonstrating against the Vietnam War.

While the port strike remains, for now, an isolated incident, some believe it signals that such cultural appeals might be wearing thin. “The anti-war movement is very strong in the labor movement,” Hoefel said. “Like Vietnam, [Iraq] is a working-class war. Look at socio-economic background of the troops. Many are from a part of country where the economy has left them.”

Add comment May 21st, 2008

War: One teenager’s view

I was sent this meditation on war by a young teenager:

War. We don’t really know what this means. Children hopped up on drugs fighting the country’s wars, people getting killed for others’ small gain. No, we don’t know of this but we do know that war occurs yet even though our country is in one at this very moment we don’t stray far from our regular lives. Others die as we relax in front of the television and others sacrifice their lives…but for what. They always say “we’re protecting our country;” the irony of this statement is from what. The battles being fought aren’t on our soil so we don’t really know what war is like. We can see it, hear about it, even get involved with stopping it but we will never know what war is like. Our war was a pointless war. We wanted oil and so we attacked innocent Iraq when our oil buddies in Saudi Arabia had most of the terrorists behind the 911 bombings, but who cares. So while people fight and get killed every day, we can’t only do anything but hope that this war we never knew ends.

2 comments May 11th, 2008

Abu Ghraib and other Iraq abuses reported long before photos, but no one listened

On November 1, 2003, Associated Press reporter Charles Hanley wrote of the terrible abusive conditions in US detention centers in Iraq. As noted by Greg Mitchell of Editor & Publisher, the story was virtually ignored. No major paper published it and no other reporters followed it up. I’m proud to say that my Iraq Occupation and Resistance Report contained a link to the Hanley piece. As I quoted from the article on November 2 2003:

In Iraq’s American detention camps, forbidden talk can earn a prisoner hours bound and stretched out in the sun, and detainees swinging tent poles rise up regularly against their jailers, according to recently released Iraqis.

I’ll post here Mitchell’s article on this, which includes his May 1 2004 [after the Abu Ghraib photos came out and the scandal broke] interview with Hanley, followed by the original 2003 article. In the 2004 interview Hanley presciently said:

My gut tells me the story will spread outward to Guantanamo and Afghanistan and to other prisons in Iraq. I guess it already is.

Imagine how history could have been different if more of the press had done their job instead of acting as conduits for military propaganda and US lies.

Greg Mitchell’s piece:

Four Years Later: Why Did It Take So Long for the Press to Break Abu Ghraib Story?

Charles J. Hanley, Pulitzer winner for the Associated Press, uncovered abuses at the infamous prison months before the scandal really exploded. Why were so many others so slow to act?

By Greg Mitchell

(May 08, 2008) — Four years ago this month, as May unfolded, each day brought fresh horrors, images, or details about the Abu Ghraib prison abuses in Iraq. Pictures of shackled and hooded prisoners gave way to detainees on leashes, cowering before snarling dogs, or just plain beaten and bruised.

On May 10, 2004, an Iraqi human rights official charged that American overseer Paul Bremer had been repeatedly informed about abuses at Abu Ghraib. The New Yorker revealed that Donald Rumsfeld personally okayed a set of procedures that led to the abuses. Several major newspapers called for Rumsfeld to quit.

At that time, in a column, I disclosed how Pulitzer-winning correspondent Charles J. Hanley at The Associated Press had actually “broken” the Abu Ghraib story months before it came out via The New Yorker and other outlets—but the rest of the media had paid it little mind. This led me to ask, Is the press trying to make up for lost time once again?

The media was now bursting with accounts of prison abuse at Abu Ghraib and other Iraqi prisons, but where were they the previous fall when evidence of wrongdoing started to emerge—when a public accounting might have halted what turned out to be the worst of the incidents? “It was not an officially sanctioned story that begins with a handout from an official source,” Hanley told me.

Hanley started looking into accusations of abuse when he returned to Baghdad for his latest tour of press duty (he had earlier broken several key stories and worked on AP’s early revelations about heavy civilian casualties). It led to a series of pieces, culminating in a shocking report on Nov. 1, 2003, based on interviews with six released detainees.

He was still amazed that apparently no one else quickly looked into the allegations, and no major newspaper picked up on his reporting after it appeared. Why? “That’s something you’d have to ask editors at major newspapers,” he said. “But there does seem to be a very strong prejudice toward investing U.S. official statements with credibility while disregarding statements from almost any other source—and in this current situation, Iraqi sources.”

The Hanley stories that fall told of detainees being attacked by dogs, humiliated by guards, and spending days with hoods over their heads, now familiar images in the American—and Arab—mind. Even after the Pentagon promised an investigation in January, and announced arrests in March, Hanley was “surprised there was not more interest and investigative reporting done. It’s hard to fault my colleagues in Baghdad considering the pressure and danger they feel. Many stories are missed—that’s the way it is in war. But clearly there is a mindset in the U.S. media that slows the aggressive pursuit of stories that make the U.S. military look bad. The greatest fall down, of course, was the uncritical and often ignorant swallowing of claims about weapons of mass destruction presented by often unidentified sources.”

A partial transcript of our discussion in may 2004 follows.

When did you get involved in the prison angle?

Last September I arrived in Baghdad for another tour. What sparked my interest was an obscure British Web site which cited Amnesty International saying it had gotten some information about possible abuses.

I set about trying to locate released detainees. I think my first approach was to defense lawyer-types from the Iraqi League of Lawyers. They gave me some secondhand information. While working on that, I talked to the military officer at the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority] who was responsible for the prison program. He let out that they had just shut down Camp Cropper at Baghdad airport, which had the worst reputation for abuse at that time.

They did not announce it, they just told me that in passing. I can only surmise that they did not want to draw attention to Cropper.

I did that story on Oct. 5, mainly about the closing of Cropper but also cited Amnesty’s contention about physical abuse and their protests. Then on Oct. 9, I did a longer piece based mainly on the lawyers and what they were finding inside. The president of the Lawyers League was a former political prisoner under the Baathist regime. They had so many families coming to them saying husbands or sons did nothing, they had been held for months, and couldn’t even find where they were. Only a few of the lawyers had gotten inside. Of course we now know, from the Red Cross, that a large percentage of the inmates were mistakenly imprisoned.

What led you to the released detainees?

The key was finding the right person at the Iraqi equivalent of the Red Cross, the Red Crescent Society. Then they began leading me to released detainees. In the end, with my interpreter, we spoke to six of the former detainees and they were from all three major camps—Cropper at the airport, Bucca in the south, and Abu Ghraib. One of them might have been in all three. We spent hours talking to them. Nothing like what we found had been published at that time, as I found out in a check of our database.

After writing the big piece, we held it and presented the U.S. command in Baghdad with a list of specific questions: Were certain kinds of deprivation and physical punishment used against detainees, as we were told, and why? How many deaths had occurred, and what were the circumstances? What types of weapons were used to put down disturbances? How many cases had there been of discipline or prosecution because of abuse? We learned that the MP (military police) brigade had sent responses to the Baghdad command, but they were never released to us, and there was no explanation given. Around this time, the MP general, Janis Karpinski, told an Arab TV interviewer the detainees were treated humanely. We quoted her on that.

So what happened after your AP story came out on Nov. 1?

The play was very disappointing. A few papers ran it, like the Tulsa World and Akron Beacon Journal. It got wide use in Germany. None of the major U.S. newspapers published the story. And I was surprised to see that none of them followed up.

Why do you think no one else jumped on it?

One reason is simple and practical—it’s a difficult story to get, in a chaotic city like Baghdad. Although, in the end, simply realizing that the Red Crescent Society was the Red Cross liaison could have occurred to others. But the other thing is, there was no official structure to the story. It was not an officially sanctioned story that begins with a handout from an official source. A handout from CPA eventually happened in January, but even after that there was not much pursuit.

The story did not pop out at everybody. But there was a lot going on elsewhere. Clearly there is a lot of indiscriminate killing going on in Iraq in general and there’s little focus on that. It’s not like the only human rights story is behind the walls. But the one behind the walls is toughest to get out.

Why didn’t more papers just run your story, when it was handed to them, then?

That’s something you’d have to ask editors at major newspapers. But I do think there’s often disproportionate weight of credibility given to the statements of U.S. officials. There seems to be a tendency at times to discount the statements of others—people like Iraqi former detainees—if they’re not somehow supported by a U.S. source, or perhaps by photographs.

Rumsfeld said this week the military, not the media, reported the Abu Ghraib abuses.

This is strictly correct if you’re talking about the specific abuses shown in some of the photos. But the AP provided specifics on other abuses throughout the system many months earlier and at the time was unable to get the U.S. military command to comment on them.

What do you think will happen now?

My gut tells me the story will spread outward to Guantanamo and Afghanistan and to other prisons in Iraq. I guess it already is.
*
Greg Mitchell’s new book “So Wrong for So Long: How the Press, the Pundits–and the President–Failed on Iraq” explores this and other issues related to the war. It includes a preface by Bruce Springsteen and a foreword by Joseph L. Galloway.

Hanley’s November 1, 2003 article:

AP Enterprise: Former Iraqi detainees tell of riots, punishment in the sun, good Americans and pitiless ones


Associated Press

9:36 a.m. November 1, 2003

BAGHDAD, Iraq – In Iraq’s American detention camps, forbidden talk can earn a prisoner hours bound and stretched out in the sun, and detainees swinging tent poles rise up regularly against their jailers, according to recently released Iraqis.

In these secretive islands in a scorched landscape, “they don’t respect anyone, old or young,” Rahad Naif said of his U.S. Army guards. He and others told of detainees in wheelchairs, and of a man carried into a stifling hot tent in his sickbed. “They humiliate everybody.”

Naif, 31, is one of three brothers – butchers from the east Baghdad slums – who were thrown into the three biggest detention centers by the Americans in July after a nasty quarrel with an influential neighbor. They never faced charges; the last brother was finally freed Oct. 15.

The camps and prisons hold a mixed population: curfew-breakers and drivers who tried to evade U.S. checkpoints, suspected common criminals, anti-U.S. resistance fighters, and many of deposed President Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party leadership.

A Naif brother released in September, Hassan, 32, said there are “good people” among the U.S. guards, like an older man the Iraqis respectfully dubbed “al-Haji” – “Pilgrim.” Ex-detainees also say conditions improve at times, as new underwear, toothbrushes and other supplies arrive; some facilities are better than others, and none compares with Saddam’s bloody political prisons. On Oct. 1, the most notorious U.S. center, the Baghdad airport’s overcrowded Camp Cropper, was closed.

For the third brother, however, the bitterness is too fresh.

“They confined us like sheep,” the newly freed Saad Naif, 38, said of the Americans. “They hit people. They humiliated people.”

Although details cannot be otherwise confirmed, the accounts by a half dozen former detainees in Associated Press interviews corroborated each other on key points, and meshed with what Amnesty International has heard from released Iraqis. The human rights group has accounts of detainee uprisings, punishment by exposure to the sun, and other examples of what it calls “inhumane conditions.”

Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski, the U.S. Army commander of Iraq’s detention facilities, has said prisoners are treated humanely and fairly. Specific questions about AP’s ex-detainee accounts were submitted to the U.S. command on Oct. 18, but no response has been received.

Two pending U.S. military legal cases may offer a glimpse at problems in the detention system: In one, four soldiers are accused of beating Iraqi prisoners; in the other, two Marines are charged in connection with an Iraqi’s death in detention.

The number of prisoners is in dispute. The U.S. command says it holds 5,500, but some lawyers and other Iraqis believe the figure is higher. In toppling the Saddam government last April, the U.S.-British invasion force inherited a legal vacuum and began incarcerating ordinary criminals with prisoners of war and less well-defined detainees.

Iraq’s chief U.S. administrator, L. Paul Bremer, says he has moved to speed up release of unjustly held Iraqis, and Iraqi lawyers and judges are slowly taking on criminal cases. The International Committee of the Red Cross, responsible under international law for inspecting wartime prison camps, says the listing and processing of detainees has improved in recent weeks.

The Baghdad spokeswoman for the ICRC, whose representatives are the only outsiders allowed into the camps, said the organization’s policy does not allow any public comment on any abuse or other poor conditions detected. Nada Doumani noted, however, that the law – the Geneva Conventions – forbids all physical pressure on detainees.

The ICRC’s decision to reduce its Baghdad staff, because of the bombing of its headquarters, may limit its ability to visit detention sites.

Baathists deemed “high-value detainees” by the Americans have been concentrated at a detention site in southern Iraq called Camp Bucca.

Before he was moved to Camp Bucca, one of them, former Parliament speaker Saadoun Hammadi, shared a tent with more than 100 men at the Baghdad airport camp and “was in miserable condition, very thin,” said a former tentmate, Hassan Ali Muslim.

Hammadi, a man in his late 60s who once served as prime minister, “didn’t speak with anybody. In the morning and afternoon, he walked alone for an hour, back and forth along the fence,” Muslim said. The famous Baath politician was dressed in shorts, his dyed hair had gone white, and he’d grown a long beard, the freed detainee said.

At Camp Bucca, in the wastes near Basra, “we were suffering, sitting in the desert,” said one of the Naif brothers, Rahad, who was released from Bucca on Sept. 22.

Water was the first concern for internees everywhere, especially as summer temperatures topped 120 degrees. There was never enough to drink and wash with, they said.

“They’d give us hot water while we’d see them drinking cold water,” said Ra’id Mohammed Hassan, 41, freed from Bucca on Oct. 15 after two months’ detention for having a weapon in his car.

Rahad Naif said 1,000 men in his section at Bucca had to share just 10 water taps. “They would come, especially the Kuwaiti translators, and throw ice into the sand just to make us suffer psychologically,” Naif said.

At the airport’s Camp Cropper, Muslim, a 28-year-old factory worker, tried to keep a bottle filled and hidden from thieves. When the Americans finally erected a tank for showers, there was so little water the detainees got into vicious arguments over it, he said. Skin diseases became common, he said.

The ex-prisoners, uniformly, said the sick men among them were the camps’ saddest sight. “There were crippled people at Bucca. Some were in wheelchairs,” said Rahad Naif. He said two died in the next tent while he was there.

“At the airport, they brought in a chronically ill man in a bed and put him near me. He was very sick,” Hassan Naif said. One crippled man had to be carried up the steps to a toilet, he said.

The prisoners staged protests or hunger strikes demanding better care for their sick comrades. At other times, they would erupt in anger over their own plight.

“Twenty or so of us would start shouting, ‘Get us out! Let us go!’,” said Muslim, who was freed Sept. 20 after two months’ detention, accused of attempted carjacking.

“The demonstrations happened almost every day at Bucca,” said Rahad Naif, who described scenes in which military police countered with the tools of U.S. prison guards.

“Sometimes we’d fight the Americans with tent poles. The Americans would come at us behind riot shields, firing plastic bullets and electric pistols (stun guns). We can’t fight against that. We knew they’d win. We’d never manage to get out.”

The ex-detainees said the common punishment, even for such lesser infractions as shouting over to the next tent or stealing food, was “The Gardens” – a razor-wire enclosure where prisoners were made to lie face down on the burning sand for two or three hours, hands bound.

They said they would also be punished by having rations reduced or withdrawn, or by being denied two staples – cigarettes and tea. They were allotted two cigarettes a day.

At Camp Cropper, Muslim said, he endured four days in solitary confinement, in a dark, sweltering 3-by-6-foot cell, after a confrontation with a notoriously tough guard over cigarettes.

“It felt like my skin was melting,” he said of the heat in the cell. A doctor came on the second day to check on him, and the Americans apologized after he was freed, Muslim said. The guard responsible was moved elsewhere, he said.

“There are some good ones who don’t like to punish people,” Hassan Naif said of his time at Cropper. “There was an old black soldier we called ‘al-Haji’ who argued with the other Americans if they weren’t respecting our rights.”

But much of what detainees saw was intolerable, Naif said, “especially when we saw Iraqi women punished in the same way as men.”

When one detainee shouted to his sister in a nearby women’s tent, the guards punished the woman, Naif said. Seeing her lying bound in the sun, the brother angrily started to cross the razor wire ringing his tent, “and they shot him in the shoulder,” Naif said.

“The worst thing was their treatment of the women,” said Saad Naif, who spent time both at the airport and at Abu Ghraib prison outside Baghdad, where tents spread across the prison yards.

“Innocent women were kept for months in the same clothes,” he said. He said he remembered in particular an elderly woman “whose hands were tied up and she was lying in the dust.”

Saad Naif said he saw a prisoner shot dead at Abu Ghraib when he approached the razor wire.

Amnesty International says it has received credible reports of such shootings. AP queried the U.S. command here about deaths in the camps, but got no response.

Not knowing what they were charged with and when they might be released, detainees grew angrier and more depressed, said Ziad Tarik, 24, a friend who was swept up with the three Naif brothers after the fateful quarrel and spent more than a month at Abu Ghraib before abruptly being freed.

“They interrogated me about Saddam’s family, about al-Qaeda terrorists, about weapons markets – things I know nothing about,” he said. “I thought they’d ask me about my case. Why was I arrested?”

“There’s no law,” Rahad Naif said. “It’s up to them. It’s arbitrary.”

Tarik gave an example: An Iraqi colonel was released from Abu Ghraib, but the Americans still hold his wife and, according to Tarik, “she didn’t do anything.” That account could not be verified.

The Naif brothers’ mother, black-veiled Fawzia Ibrahim, 59, said she feels “like a bird” since their release, but she dreads the memory of the mid-July night when 16 U.S. soldiers, with Iraqi police, stormed into her house to take her sons away.

“Death would be better than the Americans again!” she said.

Ex-detainee Muslim says he knows of a worse fate – to have been imprisoned under Saddam Hussein, as his late father was for three months in 1995. Torture and summary execution became routine in the Baathist political prison system.

“Compared to Saddam, the Americans are better,” he said.

Add comment May 11th, 2008

Pressure to increase body count produces civilian deaths

Mark Benjamin and Christopher Weaver of Salon writes of how the military’s pressure of snipers to increase their body count led to the murder of civilians.

The snipers were told they could shoot if someone had “hostile intent”:

The snipers felt they were being pressured to interpret “hostile intent” loosely to justify kills. During testimony, sniper Spc. Joshua Michaud said that Lt. Col. Balcavage and Command Sgt. Maj. Knight “constantly pushed for ‘If you feel threatened, you know, obviously eliminate the threat.’ But they kind of said it in a manner in which a lot of us took it like, ‘Hey, you need to go out there and you guys gotta start getting kills.’”

Additionally, the rules explicitly allowed the killing of civilians:

At worst, the rules explicitly allowed the killing of unarmed Iraqis under certain circumstances, a particularly dicey concept given an enemy that does not wear a uniform and hides among civilians. Specifically, the snipers were allowed to shoot unarmed people running away from explosions or firefights. The chain of command was particularly frustrated by insurgents fleeing after attacks from roadside bombs, called improvised explosive devices. The notes from Army agents who later investigated the shootings said the battalion leaders, Balcavage and Knight, worried that the snipers had “let a lot of guys go after IED explosions.” The snipers called these fleeing, sometimes unarmed Iraqis “squirters.” Of course, it’s not unusual for innocent people to run from explosions.

One soldier involved in a killing got a 10-year sentence. As usual, the officers who created the conditions leading to the brutality were never even investigated:

Top battalion leaders, who had to sign off on the charges, have faced no serious questions about whether their demand for more bodies, their vague rules of engagement or the confusion sown by the secret program might have contributed to the events of spring 2007.

One of the soldiers involved explained succinctly the connection between the type of war and th brutality:

“If you have never been outside the wire, you really have no basis [to judge],” said Hand. “You’ve never been in a life-or-death situation where you have had to count on the guy to your left and right … You see stuff out there that no one back here is going to see.”

The answer is to end the war. Scapegoating a few soldiers will only increase the final death toll by helping to focus attention away from the brutality of occupation and onto the supposed depravity of a few, the perennial “bad apples” that seem to grow  whenever rotten trees are not recognized ad pruned.

Add comment May 9th, 2008

Huge strikes shuts ports in war protest

I was busy on Thursday and succeeding days. But I want to at least acknowledge the momentous event that occurred on May Day. The West Coast longshoremen shut down all West Coast ports in protest of the Vietnam Iraq war. If you haven’t already, go Watch, listen to, or read the Democracy Now! interview with union official Jack Heyman. We can only hope that this strike is portent both of a revitalized labor movement and of increasing engagement of labor in attempts to end this war. After all, the vast resources spent on this war are depleting the resources available for all the other vital needs in this country. And it is workers who do most of the fighting. Further, the threat of internal resistance to the war is one of the best brakes the populace can put upon the war-makers planning the next war.

Add comment May 5th, 2008

Sam Provance: Standard Operating Procedure continues the Abu Ghraib cover-up

Sam Provance accuses the film Standard Operating Procedure of obscuring the truth about the torture at Abu Ghraib. He asserts that the film continues the cover-up blaming the abuses on the MPs, rather than the civilian contractors and chain of command. He further claims that the film relies about the testimony of one of the CACI torturers, who, as part of the cover-up, focus the blame upon the MPs.

I have not seen the film and can’t judge Provance’s claims. But I feel that Provance, by speaking out when others remained silent, has earned the right to have his claims taken seriously.

“Sam Provance, a former Army sergeant specializing in intelligence analysis, refused to remain silent about the torture of Abu Ghraib, where he served for five months at the height of the abuses. He was punished for refusing to take part in the cover-up, and pushed out of the Army.”

Here is Provance’s article:

Abu Ghraib Film Obscures Truth

By Sam Provance
April 30, 2008

Editor’s Note: Former Army Sgt. Sam Provance was the only uniformed military intelligence officer at Abu Ghraib who broke the code of silence surrounding the infamous prisoner abuses. He spoke out during the Army’s internal investigation, at a congressional hearing and in press interviews.

For his brave integrity, Provance was punished and pushed out of the U.S. military, clearing the way for the Pentagon to pin the blame for the sadistic treatment of Iraqi detainees on a handful of poorly trained MPs. Now, history is repeating itself in Errol Morris’s supposedly hard-hitting documentary on the scandal:

Representatives for film director Errol Morris told me during pre-production that “Standard Operating Procedure” would be the very best documentary on the abuses of Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib - the one that would tell the whole truth.

I had pinned great hope on that. It didn’t turn out that way.

My perspective on the Abu Ghraib scandal came from spending from September 2003 to February 2004 at the Iraq prison as a sergeant in Army Intelligence. Working the 8 p.m.-to- 8 a.m. night shift, it was impossible not to notice who was directing the operation. And I shared all this with Morris.

But now I’ve seen the film and I’m disappointed. Morris does little to get to the bottom of what happened. He muddies already opaque waters regarding who was actually responsible for the abuse of prisoners.

The film focuses on the awful photos, the people in them and those who took them. This perspective plays right into the hands of the cover-up artists. It perpetuates the myth that the abuses are rightfully laid at the feet of those impressionable, but very human, young soldiers.

Morris should have been looking up the chain of command; at the civilian and military officials actually responsible for ordering these Military Police Reservists to rough up prisoners.

A no-holds-barred documentary? Give me a break.

Finally, the Whole Truth!

I was first put into contact with the makers of “SOP” while I was still in the Army. From the beginning, I was told this was going to be a huge project with the production support of Sony Pictures Entertainment; and that Morris, who had won an Oscar with his documentary, “The Fog of War,” would be at the helm.

This was to be the breakthrough investigation into what really happened at Abu Ghraib, who was responsible for the abuse and why it was ordered - the project that really got people’s attention, going where previous investigators and media had feared to tread.

Call me gullible but, believing this was to be a groundbreaking work, I fully cooperated with Morris. I assisted him in his quest for documents, videos, photos, notes and helped him contact fellow soldiers who were at Abu Ghraib and knew what happened.

When I was discharged from the Army in October 2006, I went to Boston for a two-day interview.

Morris asked me to sign several contracts before and after the interviews, and I did as he asked without paying much attention to them. I do remember however, that in one contract Morris agreed to pay me one dollar.

In any event, I never got the dollar, but was reminded of this last week when I read in the New York Times that others got paychecks for their participation.

I have never asked for or taken money for media interviews. To me, that undermines the process and trivializes the importance of the issues of torture and prisoner mistreatment and their meaning for the moral atmosphere in our country as a whole.

When the film was finished, Morris told me he had intended to use some of the footage from my two days of interviews and the materials I provided, but decided in the end to “narrowly focus” on the Military Police. This, of course, is what so many others have done and is in the worst tradition of a Nixon-style “modified, limited hangout.”

Chain of Command?

Here’s the oddest thing: Even though Morris’s lens is trained on the Military Police, he does find room for a civilian interrogator, Tim Dugan, who worked at Abu Ghraib for CACI, a contractor factory for civilian interrogators.

I witnessed for myself how civilian personnel, like Dugan, corrupted the military. Indeed, they were the genesis of the break from conventional interrogation techniques into what Vice President Dick Cheney hinted at when he spoke of the “dark side” of intelligence.

It was they who ordered the Military Police and some of my own unit’s Military Intelligence soldiers to “soften” the detainees for interrogation, and encouraged the behavior depicted in the photographs. I know; I was there. And, of course, I told Errol Morris.

So I was surprised, to say the least, to see Morris giving Dugan a place to contend that, essentially, the abuses were all the military’s fault.

Odd indeed. Even Maj. Gen. George Fay, whose investigation of Abu Ghraib left much to be desired, reported the pernicious effect civilian interrogators had on the impressionable and inexperienced soldiers.

Fay reported, for example that Daniel Johnson, one of Dugan’s CACI interrogator colleagues, whom I knew at Abu Ghraib, was using Spc. Charles Graner as “muscle” for his interrogations.

And yet, Morris describes Dugan as “remarkable.” Remarkable, indeed, Errol.

Did no one tell you that CACI, Dugan and several of his fellow interrogators were sued by their victims in Abu Ghraib, seeking to hold them accountable for their behavior?

In the civil case brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights on behalf of Abu Ghraib prisoners, the lawsuit implicates Dugan in the abuse.

“CACI interrogator Timothy Dugan also tortured plaintiffs and other prisoners,” the lawsuit alleges. “For example, he physically dragged handcuffed plaintiffs and other prisoners along the ground to inflict pain on them. He struck and beat plaintiffs and other prisoners. He bragged to a non-conspirator about scaring a prisoner with threats to such a degree that the prisoner vomited.

“When a young non-conspirator directed him to cease the torture and comply [with] Army Field Manual 34-52, Dugan scoffed at his youth and refused to follow the direction.”

The lawsuit further alleges that Dugan took part in a CACI cover-up of when a detainee died by going through “the charade of interrogating a prisoner who was already dead as part of the conspiracy’s efforts to conceal a murder.” Dugan is accused, too, of threatening a fellow CACI employee who talked to investigators.

CACI has denounced the lawsuit as baseless, and the individual defendants were dismissed out on a technicality. However, on Nov. 6, 2007, U.S. District Court Judge James Robertson in Washington denied CACI’s motion for summary judgment and ordered a jury trial against CACI.

A criminal investigation also is pending in the Eastern District of Virginia concerning some of the CACI employees.

In “SOP,” Dugan presents himself as a whistleblower who tried to stop the abuses. He claims that he reported to his “section sergeant” that two Army female interrogators were stripping detainees naked as an interrogation technique, and how shocked he was to see this.

Dugan claims he got the brush-off; was told not to get involved. So who was this “section sergeant?” And is he/she above the law?

Why did Dugan not offer himself as a witness in any of the various investigations? Where has he been if he felt then the way he now says he did? Again, why sport the good-guy badge now?

I came away with the impression that Morris was unprepared for the interview and was being taken for a ride.

CACI’s Defense

For obvious reasons, CACI has gone to extraordinary lengths to separate itself from the horrors of Abu Ghraib, arguing that the military alone was at fault.

CACI recently announced the release of a book, Our Good Name: A Company’s Fight To Defend Its Honor And Get The Truth About Abu Ghraib.

CACI contends strongly that its interrogators adhered to the military chain of command, something it has been feverishly trying to establish in the lawsuits against it.

And so, the behavior captured in the photos? That was the military’s responsibility, not CACI’s.

That is not what I observed from my ringside seat.

I told Morris that the reality was that the civilian contractors paid little heed to the military chain of command, and that they were the ones actually running the show. That didn’t make it into the final version of “SOP.”

Even though it is now an established fact that between 70 to 90 percent of detainees at Abu Ghraib were completely innocent, something I learned directly on site, Dugan implies that the harsh interrogation practices applied there were legitimate - except of course for the failings of the military.

This myth-making is intended to hold CACI harmless and help it maintain its very lucrative government contracts. CACI International had $1.6 billion in revenues in 2005. Folks have always told me it all has to do with money; I suppose they’re right.

But Congress should be asking some simple questions. It should start by asking why civilian contractors are being employed in connection with the interrogation of persons under detention in wartime, a function which previously has been entirely in the hands of the uniformed military?

This could yield some interesting answers. Indeed, evasion of military rules and discipline as well as avoidance of congressional oversight might be at the heart of the answers.

Morris takes pride in calling “SOP” a horror movie and - with the mood music and the needless slow-motion reenactments - he makes sure of that.

However, “SOP” does little more than humanize some of the “bad apples” (a good thing, I suppose), while gratuitously absolving the civilian interrogators actually responsible for fouling those apples.

But, wait. Abu Ghraib is not primarily about Military Police - or civilian interrogators. It is about the many thousands of wrongfully detained Iraqis - many of them abused, tortured and even killed. It is also about their families. What about their story?

Morris has called “SOP” just “the tip of the iceberg,” citing the unused volumes of material he’s collected since production began. But Morris owed his viewers a glimpse of the whole iceberg, not just the small misleading piece that bobbed above the surface.

He has announced his next film project: a comedy. Go figure.

Sam Provance, a former Army sergeant specializing in intelligence analysis, refused to remain silent about the torture of Abu Ghraib, where he served for five months at the height of the abuses. He was punished for refusing to take part in the cover-up, and pushed out of the Army. For his sworn testimony to Congress, click here.

Add comment May 4th, 2008

Media military “analysis” more akin to psyops manipulation

The New York Times today published its blockbuster analysis of the Pentagon psyops program to manipulate public discourse on the Iraq war and related matters by creating a cadre of retired military officers pretending to be independent military analysts on TV. Since these analysts were lobbyists helping their clients get military contracts, they were dependent on close ties in the Pentagon. They understood that independent analysis could threaten their access.

Those business relationships are hardly ever disclosed to the viewers, and sometimes not even to the networks themselves. But collectively, the men on the plane and several dozen other military analysts represent more than 150 military contractors either as lobbyists, senior executives, board members or consultants….

The administration has demonstrated that there is a price for sustained criticism, many analysts said. “You’ll lose all access,” Dr. McCausland said.

They acted in close collaboration with the Pentagon, echoing talking points and helping the military develop strategies to manipulate the media.

Internal Pentagon documents repeatedly refer to the military analysts as “message force multipliers” or “surrogates” who could be counted on to deliver administration “themes and messages” to millions of Americans “in the form of their own opinions.”

Though many analysts are paid network consultants, making $500 to $1,000 per appearance, in Pentagon meetings they sometimes spoke as if they were operating behind enemy lines, interviews and transcripts show. Some offered the Pentagon tips on how to outmaneuver the networks.

This was a systematic program designed in the early days of the administration:

From the start, interviews show, the White House took a keen interest in which analysts had been identified by the Pentagon, requesting lists of potential recruits, and suggesting names. Ms. Clarke’s team wrote summaries describing their backgrounds, business affiliations and where they stood on the war.

“Rumsfeld ultimately cleared off on all invitees,” said Mr. Krueger, who left the Pentagon in 2004. (Through a spokesman, Mr. Rumsfeld declined to comment for this article.)

Over time, the Pentagon recruited more than 75 retired officers, although some participated only briefly or sporadically. The largest contingent was affiliated with Fox News, followed by NBC and CNN, the other networks with 24-hour cable outlets. But analysts from CBS and ABC were included, too. Some recruits, though not on any network payroll, were influential in other ways — either because they were sought out by radio hosts, or because they often published op-ed articles or were quoted in magazines, Web sites and newspapers. At least nine of them have written op-ed articles for The Times.

[One had to read the article very carefully to come across this admission that that the Times was itself manipulated. Of course, they already had Judith Miller and Michael Gordon, who could be counted upon to publish administration propaganda on the front page, pretending to be news.]

Not only did these “analysts” help sell the bogus rationale for war, they sold the idea that the US was “winning,” even when they knew the opposite was the case. In September2003 a number of these analysts were taken on a trip to see the “progress” in Iraq. But actually they got a hint of how bad things were going.

Uncomfortable facts had bubbled up during the trip. One briefer, for example, mentioned that the Army was resorting to packing inadequately armored Humvees with sandbags and Kevlar blankets. Descriptions of the Iraqi security forces were withering. “They can’t shoot, but then again, they don’t,” one officer told them, according to one participant’s notes.

“I saw immediately in 2003 that things were going south,” General Vallely, one of the Fox analysts on the trip, recalled in an interview with The Times.

The Pentagon, though, need not have worried.

“You can’t believe the progress,” General Vallely told Alan Colmes of Fox News upon his return. He predicted the insurgency would be “down to a few numbers” within months.

“We could not be more excited, more pleased,” Mr. Cowan told Greta Van Susteren of Fox News. There was barely a word about armor shortages or corrupt Iraqi security forces. And on the key strategic question of the moment — whether to send more troops — the analysts were unanimous.

“I am so much against adding more troops,” General Shepperd said on CNN.

The trip was a huge success in manipulating American public opinion.

Inside the Pentagon and at the White House, the trip was viewed as a masterpiece in the management of perceptions, not least because it gave fuel to complaints that “mainstream” journalists were ignoring the good news in Iraq.

“We’re hitting a home run on this trip,” a senior Pentagon official wrote in an e-mail message to Richard B. Myers and Peter Pace, then chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In true American fashion, these “analysts” gor expanded business access as a reward for lying.

Charles T. Nash, a Fox military analyst and retired Navy captain, is a consultant who helps small companies break into the military market. Suddenly, he had entree to a host of senior military leaders, many of whom he had never met. It was, he said, like being embedded with the Pentagon leadership. “You start to recognize what’s most important to them,” he said, adding, “There’s nothing like seeing stuff firsthand.”

Some Pentagon officials said they were well aware that some analysts viewed their special access as a business advantage. “Of course we realized that,” Mr. Krueger said. “We weren’t naïve about that.”

They also understood the financial relationship between the networks and their analysts. Many analysts were being paid by the “hit,” the number of times they appeared on TV. The more an analyst could boast of fresh inside information from high-level Pentagon “sources,” the more hits he could expect. The more hits, the greater his potential influence in the military marketplace, where several analysts prominently advertised their network roles.

“They have taken lobbying and the search for contracts to a far higher level,” Mr. Krueger said. “This has been highly honed….”

Like several other analysts, Mr. Eads said he had at times held his tongue on television for fear that “some four-star could call up and say, ‘Kill that contract.’ ” For example, he believed Pentagon officials misled the analysts about the progress of Iraq’s security forces. “I know a snow job when I see one,” he said. He did not share this on TV.

“Human nature,” he explained, though he noted other instances when he was critical.

These “analysts” found their work so valued that other branches of the government started to utilize them.

Other branches of the administration also began to make use of the analysts. Mr. Gonzales, then the attorney general, met with them soon after news leaked that the government was wiretapping terrorism suspects in the United States without warrants, Pentagon records show. When David H. Petraeus was appointed the commanding general in Iraq in January 2007, one of his early acts was to meet with the analysts.

Finally, the article shows that the networks, while often aware that these “analysts” had potential conflics of interest, did absolutely nothing to learn if these conflicts were influencing their analysis. Of course, they never dreamed of identifying and hiring truly independent “analysts.” CNN was the best network in at least having some policies and procedures in place.

CNN requires its military analysts to disclose in writing all outside sources of income. But like the other networks, it does not provide its military analysts with the kind of written, specific ethical guidelines it gives its full-time employees for avoiding real or apparent conflicts of interest.

Yet even where controls exist, they have sometimes proven porous.

CNN, for example, said it was unaware for nearly three years that one of its main military analysts, General Marks, was deeply involved in the business of seeking government contracts, including contracts related to Iraq.

General Marks was hired by CNN in 2004, about the time he took a management position at McNeil Technologies, where his job was to pursue military and intelligence contracts. As required, General Marks disclosed that he received income from McNeil Technologies. But the disclosure form did not require him to describe what his job entailed, and CNN acknowledges it failed to do additional vetting.

“We did not ask Mr. Marks the follow-up questions we should have,” CNN said in a written statement.

In an interview, General Marks said it was no secret at CNN that his job at McNeil Technologies was about winning contracts. “I mean, that’s what McNeil does,” he said.

We get a sense here of the highly refined propaganda machine that has targeted us over the last seven years. Unfortunately, it has now set a standard to which future administrations will undoubtedly strive, unless we stop them. Clearly such a program is a substantial danger — as is the media conglomeration which makes this program so easy — to the democracy that remains in our country.

[Greg Mitchell of Editor & Publisher has a A Guide to 'NYT' Scoop on Pentagon's Media Propaganda. In another piece he shows Pentagon's Media Manipulation on War Extended to Newspapers. ]

Add comment April 20th, 2008

SERE techniques used in Gardez prison, Afghanistan

The ACLU has obtained documents on prisoner abuse and deaths at the US prison at Gardez, Afghanistan, showing that SERE techniques were used to abuse prisoners. Evidently, CID decided that these activities, including hitting, were not “abuse.” It all dependents on what the meaning of “abuse” is:

“These documents make it clear that the military was using unlawful interrogation techniques in Afghanistan,” said Amrit Singh, an attorney with the ACLU. “Rather than putting a stop to these systemic abuses, senior officials appear to have turned a blind eye to them.”

Special Operations officers in Gardez admitted to using what are known as Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) techniques, which for decades American service members experienced as training to prepare for the brutal treatment they might face if captured.

Today’s documents reveal charges that Special Forces beat, burned, and doused eight prisoners with cold water before sending them into freezing weather conditions. One of the eight prisoners, Jamal Naseer, died in U.S. custody in March 2003. In late 2004, the military opened a criminal investigation into charges of torture at Gardez. Despite numerous witness statements describing the evidence of torture, the military’s investigation concluded that the charges of torture were unsupported. It also concluded that Naseer’s death was the result of a “stomach ailment,” even though no autopsy had been conducted in his case. Documents uncovered today also refer to sodomy committed by prison guards; the victims’ identities are redacted.

“These documents raise serious questions about the adequacy of the military’s investigations into prisoner abuse,” added Singh.

The ACLU also obtained today a file today related to the death of Muhammad Al Kanan, a prisoner held at Camp Bucca in Iraq. The file reveals that British doctors refused to issue a death certificate for fear of being sued for malpractice.

Of course SERE techniques were used in the CIA black sites, as Katherine Eban reported in Vanity Fair, and at Guantanamo and in Iraq, as the Defense Department Inspector General reported.

The AP provides more on the story:

The documents, which were turned over Wednesday evening to the American Civil Liberties Union, focus on the 2003 death of Afghan detainee Jamal Nasser, who died in U.S. custody at the Gardez facility.

The documents detail interrogation techniques used on eight detainees, including Nasser, who were suspected of weapons trafficking.

The Army review found that abuse did not cause Nasser’s death. But the documents include interviews with some interrogators who acknowledged slapping the detainees — a technique they learned during survival training at the Army’s SERE school. SERE stands for Survive, Evade, Resist and Escape.

“You say you gave permission for (redacted) to hit detainees during interrogations; did you have a memorandum or order from your higher headquarters authorizing that?” a military criminal investigator asked one of the interrogators, according to a November 2004 transcript among the more than 300 pages of documents.

“No, I did not have a memorandum and had not seen one,” the interrogator answered, according to the transcript. “I used tactics that were used in SERE.”

The investigator continued: “Did you see (redacted) hit detainees during the interviews?”

“Yes, open or closed slaps, not punches,” the interrogator answered.

In another interview that day, according to the documents, the Army investigator asks whether “you ever heard of a tactic of pouring cold water or a water and snow mix on persons captured?”

“They do spray cold water on prisoners,” the interrogator answered, referring to SERE lessons. That interrogator was unaware, however, of men in his unit pouring cold water over the detainees, as the Afghans later complained.

ACLU attorney Amrit Singh said such interrogation techniques are taught at SERE schools only to show soldiers how to withstand them from enemy captors. She called the methods, when used together, a form of torture.

“They were intended to be defensive methods, not offensive methods,” Singh said. “This raises serious questions about the interrogation methods that were being applied in Afghanistan.”

SERE methods were also used on detainees by military interrogators in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Singh said.

The Pentagon and the Army did not immediately respond to requests for comment Wednesday evening.

The 2004 criminal inquiry of Nasser’s death was among a string of probes into alleged abuse of prisoners in U.S. jails in Afghanistan.

Trying to deflect the kind of scandal that followed the abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan ordered a review of their secretive network of about 20 jails at bases across Afghanistan.

Nasser was among eight detainees who were held at Gardez for between 18 and 20 days. The Army concluded he died of a stomach ailment.

Add comment April 17th, 2008

Remembering Marla Ruzicka

Today is the third anniversary of the death of Marla Ruzicka in Iraq. Antiwar activist Marla founded the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC), which is still active. Her life is described in Sweet Relief: The Marla Ruzicka Story.
Here is the short film A Glimpse of Marla , by the FullMonte. Read more about Marla at this blog devoted to remembrance of her.

Add comment April 16th, 2008

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