Posts filed under 'Terrorism'

New rumor that Bush may close GTMO

Periodically there are rumors that the Bush administration is about to close Guantanamo. ABC News is reporting the latest version, based on the fact that the Government’s evidence-free claims that prisoners are “enemy combatants” won’t hold wen the prisoners get access to the courts :

Bush to Close Guantanamo?

By Jan Crawford Greenburg

July 02, 2008 7:06 PM

President Bush will soon decide whether to close Guantanamo Bay as a prison for al-Qaeda suspects, sources tell ABC News. High-level discussions among top advisers have escalated in the past week, with the most senior administration officials in continuous talks about the future of the prison camp at Guantanamo Bay–and how it will be dramatically changed and/or closed in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling that gave detainees there access to federal courts.

Sources have confirmed that President Bush is expected to be briefed on these pressing GTMO issues–and may reach a decision on the future of the naval base as a prison for al Qaeda suspects–before he leaves for the G8 on Saturday. An announcement, however, is not expected before he leaves the country.

High-level administration officials say the Court’s decision dramatically changes the legal landscape–and raises questions about whether the government has solid evidence to present to federal judges to justify ongoing detentions.

That evidence, much of it classified and obtained by military and CIA personnel on the battlefield, is not the standard kind of proof judges are accustomed to seeing in regular criminal cases here, administration officials say. The documents do not contain the kind of detail-or include sources of that information-that’s typical in criminal cases, sources say.

Late last month for example, a federal appeals court in Washington said the government failed to prove its case with one detainee from China. The administration fears that’s a sign of things to come-in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling giving other detainees even broader habeas corpus rights to challenge their detentions in court, sources tell ABC News.

Of course, there is generally wide agreement–from Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and even Bush himself–that GTMO should eventually be closed. But the Court ruling could well hasten that move, since it undercuts the main reason to keep the detainees there. A key reason for imprisoning the detainees at GTMO in the first place was the belief that they would not have access to the courts, since they were not on U.S. soil.

The recent discussions—which have involved numerous meetings with the most senior advisers to the President–the Principals–are about how to handle the some 260 detainees still imprisoned at GTMO. Should they be brought to the United States, and where, of course, to put them if they are to be imprisoned in this country?

Bush has not decided whether he will announce that GTMO should be closed, sources say. But at the very least, sources say, he will soon announce a host of these legal and policy changes that will force Congress to come up with a solution–including where to imprison those detainees if GTMO does, in fact, shut its doors.

Add comment July 3rd, 2008

US Special Forces counterinsurgency manual leaked

Newly obtained by Wikileaks is the US Special Forces counterinsurgency manual. Here is brief report by Wikileaks investigative editor Julian Assange:

How to train death squads and quash revolutions from San Salvador to you

By Julian Assange (investigative editor)
Monday June 15, 2008

Wikileaks has obtained a sensitive US military counter-insurgency manual. The manual, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics Techniques and Procedures for Special Forces (1994, 2004), may be critically described as “What we learned about running death squads and propping up corrupt government in Latin America and how to apply it to other places”. Its contents are both history defining for Latin America and, given the continued role of US Special Forces in the suppression of insurgencies and guerilla movements world wide, history making.

The document, which has been verified, is official US Special Forces doctrine. It directly advocates training paramilitaries, pervasive surveillance, censorship, press control and restrictions on labor unions & political parties. It directly advocates warrantless searches, detainment without charge and the suspension of habeas corpus. It directly advocates bribery, employing terrorists, false flag operations, concealing human rights abuses from journalists. And it directly advocates the extensive use of “psychological operations” (propaganda) to make these and other “population & resource control” measures more palatable.

The document has been particularly informed by the long United States involvement in the El Salvador. However it is worth noting what the US Ambassador to El Salvador, Robert E. White had to say in FOIA documents obtained from the US State Department about the situation, as early as 1980:

The major, immediate threat to the existence of this government is the right-wing violence. In the city of San Salvador, the hired thugs of the extreme right, some of them well-trained Cuban and Nicaraguan terrorists, kill moderate left leaders and blow up government buildings. In the countryside, elements of the security forces torture and kill the campesinos, shoot up their houses and burn their crops. At least two hundred refugees from the countryside arrive daily in the capital city. This campaign of terror is radicalizing the rural areas just as surely as Somoza’s National Guard did in Nicaragua. Unfortunately, the command structure of the army and the security forces either tolerates or encourages this activity. These senior officers believe or pretend to believe that they are eliminating the guerillas.[1]

Selected extracts follow. Note that the manual is 219 pages long and contains substantial material throughout. These extracts should merely be considered representative. Emphasis has been added for further selectivity. The full manual can be found at US Special Forces counter-insurgency manual FM 31-20-3.

Here are a few of the quotes selected out by Wikileaks:

Most of the counterintelligence measures used will be overt in nature and aimed at protecting installations, units, and information and detecting espionage, sabotage, and subversion. Examples of counterintelligence measures to use are

  • Background investigations and records checks of persons in sensitive positions and persons whose loyalty may be questionable.
  • Maintenance of files on organizations, locations, and individuals of counterintelligence interest.
  • Internal security inspections of installations and units.
  • Control of civilian movement within government-controlled areas.
  • Identification systems to minimize the chance of insurgents gaining access to installations or moving freely.
  • Unannounced searches and raids on suspected meeting places.
  • Censorship.

[...]

PSYOP [Psychological Operations] are essential to the success of PRC [Population & Resources Control]. For maximum effectiveness, a strong psychological operations effort is directed toward the families of the insurgents and their popular support base. The PSYOP aspect of the PRC program tries to make the imposition of control more palatable to the people by relating the necessity of controls to their safety and well-being. PSYOP efforts also try to create a favorable national or local government image and counter the effects of the insurgent propaganda effort.

Control Measures

SF [US Special Forces] can advise and assist HN [Host Nation] forces in developing and implementing control measures. Among these measures are the following:

  • Security Forces. Police and other security forces use PRC [Population & Resources Control] measures to deprive the insurgent of support and to identify and locate members of his infrastructure. Appropriate PSYOP [Psychological Operations] help make these measures more acceptable to the population by explaining their need. The government informs the population that the PRC measures may cause an inconvenience but are necessary due to the actions of the insurgents.
  • Restrictions. Rights on the legality of detention or imprisonment of personnel (for example, habeas corpus) may be temporarily suspended. This measure must be taken as a last resort, since it may provide the insurgents with an effective propaganda theme. PRC [Population & Resources Control] measures can also include curfews or blackouts, travel restrictions, and restricted residential areas such as protected villages or resettlement areas. Registration and pass systems and control of sensitive items (resources control) and critical supplies such as weapons, food, and fuel are other PRC measures. Checkpoints, searches, roadblocks; surveillance, censorship, and press control; and restriction of activity that applies to selected groups (labor unions, political groups and the like) are further PRC measures.

[...]

Psychological Operations

PSYOP can support the mission by discrediting the insurgent forces to neutral groups, creating dissension among the insurgents themselves, and supporting defector programs. Divisive programs create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within the insurgent forces. Also important are national programs to win insurgents over to the government side with offers of amnesty and rewards. Motives for surrendering can range from personal rivalries and bitterness to disillusionment and discouragement. Pressure from the security forces has persuasive power.

[...]

Special Intelligence-Gathering Operations

Alternative intelligence-gathering techniques and sources, such as doppelganger or pseudo operations, can be tried and used when it is hard to obtain information from the civilian populace. These pseudo units are usually made up of ex-guerrilla and/or security force personnel posing as insurgents. They circulate among the civilian populace and, in some cases, infiltrate guerrilla units to gather information on guerrilla movements and its support infrastructure.

Much time and effort must be used to persuade insurgents to switch allegiance and serve with the security forces. Prospective candidates must be properly screened and then given a choice of serving with the HN [Host Nation] security forces or facing prosecution under HN law for terrorist crimes.

Government security force units and teams of varying size have been used in infiltration operations against underground and guerrilla forces. They have been especially effective in getting information on underground security and communications systems, the nature and extent of civilian support and underground liaison, underground supply methods, and possible collusion between local government officials and the underground. Before such a unit can be properly trained and disguised, however, much information about the appearance, mannerisms, and security procedures of enemy units must be gathered. Most of this information comes from defectors or reindoctrinated prisoners. Defectors also make excellent instructors and guides for an infiltrating unit. In using a disguised team, the selected men should be trained, oriented, and disguised to look and act like authentic underground or guerrilla units. In addition to acquiring valuable information, the infiltrating units can demoralize the insurgents to the extent that they become overly suspicious and distrustful of their own units.

[...]

After establishing the cordon and designating a holding area, the screening point or center is established. All civilians in the cordoned area will then pass through the screening center to be classified.

National police personnel will complete, if census data does not exist in the police files, a basic registration card and photograph all personnel over the age of 15. They print two copies of each photo- one is pasted to the registration card and the other to the village book (for possible use in later operations and to identify ralliers and informants).

The screening element leader ensures the screeners question relatives, friends, neighbors, and other knowledgeable individuals of guerrilla leaders or functionaries operating in the area on their whereabouts, activities, movements, and expected return.

The screening area must include areas where police and military intelligence personnel can privately interview selected individuals. The interrogators try to convince the interviewees that their cooperation will not be detected by the other inhabitants. They also discuss, during the interview, the availability of monetary rewards for certain types of information and equipment.

[...]

Civilian Self-Defense Forces [Paramilitaries, or, especially in an El-Salvador or Colombian civil war context, right wing "death squads"]

When a village accepts the CSDF program, the insurgents cannot choose to ignore it. To let the village go unpunished will encourage other villages to accept the government’s CSDF program. The insurgents have no choice; they have to attack the CSDF village to provide a lesson to other villages considering CSDF. In a sense, the psychological effectiveness of the CSDF concept starts by reversing the insurgent strategy of making the government the repressor. It forces the insurgents to cross a critical threshold-that of attacking and killing the very class of people they are supposed to be liberating.

To be successful, the CSDF program must have popular support from those directly involved or affected by it. The average peasant is not normally willing to fight to his death for his national government. His national government may have been a succession of corrupt dictators and inefficient bureaucrats. These governments are not the types of institutions that inspire fight-to-the-death emotions in the peasant. The village or town, however, is a different matter. The average peasant will fight much harder for his home and for his village than he ever would for his national government. The CSDF concept directly involves the peasant in the war and makes it a fight for the family and village instead of a fight for some faraway irrelevant government.

Now go read the entire manual and report on what tidbits you find.

Add comment June 16th, 2008

The Global War on Freedom, UK front arrests student for conducting his research

The Global War on Freedom has struck the UK front again. A graduate student at Nottingham University, Rizwaan Sabir, was arrested and held for six days because he downloaded an Al Qaeda manual from a US government web site for his research on Al Qaeda tactics. HJis friend, university staff member Hisham Yezza, whom Sabir had asked to print the 1,500 page manual to save costs, is scheduled to be deported to Algeria. If deported, Yezza is in danger of being detained and, possibly, tortured.

Here is a Guardian article. Below the article is a Press Release from concerned Nottingham  students and faculty:

Student researching al-Qaida tactics held for six days

By Polly Curtis and Martin Hodgson

A masters student researching terrorist tactics who was arrested and detained for six days after his university informed police about al-Qaida-related material he downloaded has spoken of the “psychological torture” he endured in custody.

Despite his Nottingham University supervisors insisting the materials were directly relevant to his research, Rizwaan Sabir, 22, was held for nearly a week under the Terrorism Act, accused of downloading the materials for illegal use. The student had obtained a copy of the al-Qaida training manual from a US government website for his research into terrorist tactics.

The case highlights what lecturers are claiming is a direct assault on academic freedom led by the government which, in its attempt to establish a “prevent agenda” against terrorist activity, is putting pressure on academics to become police informers.

Sabir was arrested on May 14 after the document was found by a university staff member on an administrator’s computer. The administrator, Hisham Yezza, an acquaintance of Sabir, had been asked by the student to print the 1,500-page document because Sabir could not afford the printing fees. The pair were arrested under the Terrorism Act, Sabir’s family home was searched and their computer and mobile phones seized. They were released uncharged six days later but Yezza, who is Algerian, was immediately rearrested on unrelated immigration charges and now faces deportation.

Dr Alf Nilsen, a research fellow at the university’s school of politics and international relations, said that Yezza is being held at Colnbrook immigration removal centre, due to be deported on Tuesday.

“If he is taken to Algeria, he may be subjected to severe human rights violations after his involvement in this case. He has been in the UK for 13 years. His work is here, his friends are here, his life is here.”

Of his detention, Sabir said: “I was absolutely broken. I didn’t sleep. I’d close my eyes then hear the keys clanking and I would be up again. As I realised the severity I thought I’d end up in Belmarsh with the nutcases. It was psychological torture.

“On Tuesday they read me a statement confirming it was an illegal document which shouldn’t be used for research purposes. To this day no one has ever clarified that point. They released me. I was shaking violently, I fell against the wall, then on the floor and I just cried.”

Bettina Rentz, a lecturer in international security and Sabir’s personal tutor, said: “He’s a serious student, who works very hard and wants a career in academia. This is a great concern for our academic freedom but also for the climate on campus.”

Students have begun a petition calling on the university to acknowledge the “disproportionate nature of [its] response to the possession of legitimate research materials”.

A spokesman for Nottingham University said it had a duty to inform police of “material of this nature”. The spokesman said it was “not legitimate research material”, but later amended that view, saying: “If you’re an academic or a registered student then you have very good cause to access whatever material your scholarship requires. But there is an expectation that you will act sensibly within current UK law and wouldn’t send it on to any Tom, Dick or Harry.”

At its annual conference next week the University and College Union will debate a motion on “assaults on academic freedom by the DIUS [Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills]“. Sally Hunt, general secretary of the UCU, said: “If we really want to tackle problems like extremism and terrorism, then we need to be safe to explore the issues and get a better understanding. The last thing we need is people too frightened to discuss an issue or research a subject because they fear being arrested or reported.”

The higher education minister, Bill Rammell, said: “The government does not want to or has never asked for staff or students to spy on their colleagues or friends. We want universities to work with staff and students on campus to isolate and challenge the very small minority who promote violent extremism.”

Sabir’s solicitor, Tayab Ali, said: “This could have been dealt with sensibly if the university had discussed the issue with Rizwaan and his tutors. This is the worrying aspect of the extension of detention [under the Terrorism Act]. They can use hugely powerful arrest powers before investigating.”

Press Release:

Contact: Sam Walton, 07948590262

From: a group of concerned students and academics at the University of
Nottingham.

For immediate use, 24/05/08 SATURDAY

Notts Uni detainee innocent but still facing deportation

Hicham Yezza, a popular, respected and valued former PhD student and
current employee of the University of Nottingham faces deportation to
Algeria on Sunday 1st June. This follows his unjust arrest under the
Terrorism Act 2000 on Wednesday 14th May alongside Rizwaan Sabir and
their release without charge six days later.

On his release Hicham was re-arrested under immigration legislation and,
due to confusion over his visa documentation, charged with offences
relating to his immigration status. He sought legal advice and
representation over these matters whilst in custody. On Friday 23rd May,
he was suddenly served with a deportation notice and moved to an
immigration detention centre. The deportation is being urgently
appealed.

Hicham has been resident in the U.K. for 13 years, during which time he
has studied for both undergraduate and postgraduate degrees in
Nottingham. He is an active member of debating societies, a prominent
member of an arts and theatre group, and has been writing editorials for
the Student Peace Movement magazine for the last five years. He is well
known and popular on campus amongst the university community and has
established himself as a voracious reader and an authority on literature
and music. An application for British citizenship was underway, and he
had been planning to make his yearly trip to Wales for the Hay Festival
when he was suddenly arrested.

Alf Nilsen, a research fellow at in the school of Politics and
International Relations says “This is a clear case of the police trying
to cover up their completely unjustified targeting of these two innocent
men by making Hicham look guilty by deporting him. Hicham is entirely
innocent and the rushed and heavy-handed way in which the authorities
are dealing with this matter is outrageous.”

[ENDS]

Contact: Sam Walton 07814683906, samdreddude@hotmail.com; or Musab
Younis: 078901018073, musabz@gmail.com

***************************

We’re focussing our campaigning on the following areas:

1) Lobbying the Home Office We have been made aware that a call from
an MP to the Home Office, in particular Liam Byrne, the relevant
minister, has the possibility to stop the deportation in its tracks. One
of our
major focuses is trying to get particular MPs to make this
representation. If the MPs we have close contact with are unsuccessful
in the immediate short term, we will be encouraging more and more people
to contact their MPs to make representations.

Direct representations to the Home Office are presumably relevant as
well, as are representations to other parts of government (up to and
including Jacqui Smith, Gordon Brown etc.), which we will be pursuing if
our initial efforts are not successful.
-
please keep us informed of any such contact as we will be trying to keep
track of which MPs have been ‘lobbied’ and whether this has been
successful.

2) Legal challenge The main legal avenue is to seek an injunction,
which would basically grant a stay of deportation. Whilst the cost of
this is minimal we are seeking to build up a legal fund as we anticipate
that future legal costs may mount. If an initial stay of deportation is
received it seems likely that there would be much more legal work to be
done to ensure Hicham’s release. Our understanding is that if Hicham’s
immediate deportation was stopped he would then have to face the
immigration charges.

We are looking to get the best possible legal advice and would
appreciate any recommendations for relevant specialist solicitors that
may be available. That said we are receiving recommendations all the
time and have many avenues to explore through the experience of some of
our members in anti-deportation campaigns in relation to asylum.

3) Media We are working to mount a coherent and sustained media campaign
and we’re already off to a flying start. We are seeking first to work
through known reliable journalists so that we get the right message out
first, before moving on to sending out press releases en masse. We would
very much appreciate contact details for journalists which people can
vouch for.

We would appreciate help from yourselves in any way you feel possible.
However here are a few things we have thought of:

First of all money to cover legal costs is a huge concern of us at the
moment. We would appreciate any contributions either from the Party
itself or personal donations and if you were able to spread this message
throughout the party we would be very grateful. We are in a situation
where even small amounts would make a real difference with the added
benefit that it is a clear demonstration of solidarity which will
inevitably boost moral and make a reality our aim of having the broadest
possible base of support.

Also if sitting MEPs or councillors were able to use their positions in
any way to either make formal representations, or simply to raise the
profile of the campaign we would be very grateful. We are already
working on model motions and resolutions for unions and similar
organisations, which could also be used in councils or parliaments.

Please send us any thoughts you have on these ideas and please pass on
this email address (staffandstudents@gmail.com) and our phone number
(07948 590262)

Add comment May 25th, 2008

Cory Doctorow on the dangers of misunderstanding risk

Cory Doctorow, in the Guardian Comment is Free section has an important article on how people’s lack of understanding of statistics leads to danger as ineffective and potentially harmful means are used to fight against extremely rare events. He uses my favorite examples: parents fears of their children being attacked by strangers, and our fear of terrorist attacks. In both cases the fear leads to coping strategies that are at best ineffective and that have many harmful side effects. One factor he ignores, however, are the vested interests that fan and take advantage of these fears. Think of some of those “charities” making fortunes off of the fears of our children being kidnapped. [Lest I be misunderstood, I am NOT saying that all such charities are frauds, but that some are.] And, at this stage in our country we are well aware of the politicians, of both political parties, that fan fears of terrorism to create support for all kinds of useless or harmful measures.

Doctorow concludes:

If there’s one thing the government and our educational institutions could do to keep us safer, it’s this: teach us how statistics works. They should drill it into us with the same vigor with which they approached convincing us that property values would rise forever, make it the subject of reality TV shows and infuse every corner of our news and politics with it. Without an adequate grasp of these concepts, no one can ever tell for sure if he or she is safe.

While this is true, it would require government to forswear taking advantage of our lack of understanding. At present, that seems Utopian. There is, perhaps, a greater chance for academic institutions.

Here is the entire article:

The odds are stacked against us

by Cory Doctorow

The single most pernicious threat to liberty today is humanity’s natural
tendency to misunderstand the statistics of rare events. We’re just not wired to have good intuition about things that happen with extreme infrequency.

I’ll prove it. If we were good at understanding statistics, then here’s what would happen when you flew to Las Vegas. You’d step out of McCarran airport, stare down the Strip at all those glittering, palatial casinos and say to yourself, “Holy crap – think of all the suckers who must have lost everything to finance this place!” Instead, our foolish minds are filled with thoughts like, “Man, look at all the money in this town – I’m going to win big!” And another casino is built.

The rare – and the lurid – loom large in our imagination, and it’s to our great detriment when it comes to our safety and security. As a new father, I’m understandably worried about the idea of my child falling victim to some nefarious predator Out There, waiting to break in and take my child away. There’s a part of me who understands the panicked parent who rings 999 when he sees some street photographer aiming a lens at a kids’ playground.

But the fact is that attacks by strangers are so rare as to be practically nonexistent. If your child is assaulted, the perpetrator is almost certainly a relative (most likely a parent). If not a relative, then a close family friend. If not a close family friend, then a trusted authority figure.

And yet we continue to focus our attention on the meteor-strike-rare paedophile attack instead of protecting our children from the real, everyday dangers they face from the familiar. This has the twin effects of making our children less safe, and of making adults less free, because we are all subjected to scrutiny on the grounds that we may be hunting children.

This is the same calculus that allows the fear of terrorism to take away our liberty: the statistically super-rare terrorist attacks present, on average, a much lower risk to our health, safety and person than, say, depriving us of our liquid medications, or of requiring us to leave our bags unlocked in flight so that sticky-fingered handlers can make off with our laptops and financial data and valuables.

The everyday threat of having our goods stolen, our ability to travel and earn our livings curtailed, and our personal information harvested by every junior terrorist fighter who wants to see your ID before letting you do anything is overshadowed by the one-in-a-billion confluence of someone with terrorist goals, the means to accomplish them, and the intelligence to bring them off (hint: you can’t really blow up an airplane with hair-gel and iPods).

Paradox of the false positive

Our innumeracy means that our fight against these super-rarities is likewise ineffective. Statisticians speak of something called the Paradox of the False Positive. Here’s how that works: imagine that you’ve got a disease that strikes one in a million people, and a test for the disease that’s 99% accurate. You administer the test to a million people, and it will be positive for around 10,000 of them – because for every hundred people, it will be wrong once (that’s what 99% accurate means). Yet, statistically, we know that there’s only one infected person in the entire sample. That means that your “99% accurate” test is wrong 9,999 times out of 10,000!

Terrorism is a lot less common than one in a million and automated “tests” for terrorism – data-mined conclusions drawn from transactions, Oyster cards, bank transfers, travel schedules, etc – are a lot less accurate than 99%. That means practically every person who is branded a terrorist by our data-mining efforts is innocent.

In other words, in the effort to find the terrorist needles in our haystacks, we’re just making much bigger haystacks.

You don’t get to understand the statistics of rare events by intuition. It’s something that has to be learned, through formal and informal instruction. If there’s one thing the government and our educational institutions could do to keep us safer, it’s this: teach us how statistics works. They should drill it into us with the same vigor with which they approached convincing us that property values would rise forever, make it the subject of reality TV shows and infuse every corner of our news and politics with it. Without an adequate grasp of these concepts, no one can ever tell for sure if he or she is safe.

1 comment May 22nd, 2008

Arrigo-DeBatto: An Intelligence Perspective on the APA Antitorture Resolution

Psychologist Jean Maria and retired Counterintelligence operative David DeBatto have written a critique of the American Psychological Association 2007 resolution against torture and it’s February 2008 revision. Arrigo and Debatto discuss the concrete settings and circumstances that psychologists operate under when participating in interrogations. These settings and circumstances, Arrigo and DeBatto argue, preclude effective ethical oversight by the APA or any other outside organization.

For other comments on the February revision , see those by Brad Olson and myself; those by Valtin; and those by Steven Miles that I posted this morning.

An Intelligence Perspective on

the February 22, 2008, APA Modification of the August 19, 2007, APA Resolution on

Reaffirmation of the American Psychological Association Position Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and Its Application to Individuals Defined in the United States Code as “Enemy Combatants”

Jean Maria Arrigo, PhD
Project on Ethics and Art in Testimony

David DeBatto
U.S. Army Counterintelligence Operative (ret.)

March 19, 2008

The original June 2005 American Psychological Association (APA) policy on psychological ethics in national security (APA PENS Report) and the August 2007 Resolution have been strengthened by a February 22, 2008, vote of the APA Council of Representatives. The February 2008 Modification affirms international human rights law and proscribes psychologists’ participation in a list of known abusive interrogation techniques. From an intelligence perspective, however, the Modification is largely a symbolic moral gain, without direct effect on operations, as we explain below.

The February 2008 Modification states:

BE IT RESOLVED that this unequivocal condemnation [of torture] includes all techniques considered torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Geneva Conventions; the Principles of Medical Ethics Relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, Particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; the Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners: or the World Medical Association Declaration of Tokyo. An absolute prohibition against the following techniques therefore arises from, is understood in the context of, and is interpreted according to these texts: mock executions; water-boarding or any other form of simulated drowning or suffocation; sexual humiliation; rape; cultural or religious humiliation; exploitation of fears, phobias or psychopathology; induced hypothermia; the use of psychotropic drugs or mind-altering substances; hooding; forced nakedness; stress positions; the use of dogs to threaten or intimidate; physical assault including slapping or shaking; exposure to extreme heat or cold; threats of harm or death; isolation; sensory deprivation and over-stimulation; sleep deprivation; or the threatened use of any of the above techniques to an individual or to members of an individual’s family. Psychologists are absolutely prohibited from knowingly planning, designing, participating in or assisting in the use of all condemned techniques at any time and may not enlist others to employ these techniques in order to circumvent this resolution’s prohibition. Like the earlier APA policy statements, the February 2008 Modification presumes the validity of psychologists’ roles in interrogations in national security settings, including settings where the conditions of detention violate human rights law. Similarly, the Modification points to no implementation, monitoring, or enforcement.-Violations of APA Ethics Code in civilian settings, in contrast, may be reported by victims or witnesses; and remedies are supported by the clinics, hospitals, schools, universities, and other institutions that embed civilian psychological practices.

Many institutional factors combine to defeat APA principles on interrogation in national security settings under the Bush Administration. We note four.

1. In intelligence operations, information is passed to participants strictly on a “need to know” basis. Inasmuch as the February 2008 Modification prohibits psychologists from “knowingly planning, designing, participating in or assisting in the use of all condemned techniques,” it is a simple matter to withhold morally relevant information from psychologists and to provide cover stories. Indeed, intelligence professionals consider psychologists easy to manipulate because psychologists’ principles and habits render them predictable, because they become attached to their projects, and because they tend to be ambitious in their national security careers. In a recent Associated Press interview, Col. Larry James, twice commander of the Behavioral Science Consultation Teams (BSCTs) at Guantanamo Bay, stated: “I learned a long, long time ago, if I’m going to be successful in the intel community, I’m meticulously-in a very, very dedicated way- going to stay in my lane…. So if I don’t have a specific need to know about something, I don’t want to know about it. I don’t ask about it” (Selsky, 2008).

2. The vast majority of psychologists in contact with detainees are junior officers who owe service in exchange for educational scholarships (Bennett, 2007). For example, the U.S. Army offers full tuition and a living allowance to prospective psychologists in exchange for one year of service for each year of graduate school, with extra service required for internships (U.S. Army, 2008) A psychologist who reneges on service must repay educational expenses.

3. Regardless of rank, a psychologist is a staff officer, not a commander, and he or she must obey the field commander of whatever rank. For example, suppose Colonel Smith diagnoses Private Jones, under combat operations in Baghdad, with a severe case of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Smith writes a medical order for Jones to be sent immediately to the U.S. for treatment of his PTSD. The combat commander, Captain Adams, countermands Smith’s medical order, stating: “Private Jones is necessary for continued combat operations in and around the Baghdad area of operations,” as well as, “this brigade is chronically undermanned in Private Jones’s MOS (Military Occupational Specialty).” The combatant commander’s orders will always take precedence over a medical order, especially in a combat theater of operations such as Afghanistan or Iraq.

4. The role of interrogation consultant is only one of many roles in which psychologists can facilitate abusive interrogations. For example, a U.S. Army Sergeant with over 20 years of service witnesses what he considers to be the blatant torture and abuse of Iraqi detainees by his fellow Army intelligence personnel. The sergeant reports the abuse up the chain of command. The company commander, not wanting to disgrace his command by reports of torture, orders the sergeant to be interviewed by the unit “Combat Stress Counselor,” an army clinical psychologists. The company commander instructs the psychologist to insure that her report on the sergeant shows him to be “mentally unstable” and “delusional, and his allegations of abuse and torture “without basis in fact”-otherwise, the psychologist’s career is in jeopardy. The counselor therefore diagnoses the sergeant as delusional and has him sent involuntarily to an army mental ward in Germany for an undetermined length of time (DeBatto, 2004). A recent study of district surgeons in apartheid South Africa outlined the institutional mechanisms of complicity in abusive interrogations (Gready, 2007). These mechanisms include selection of cooperative health professionals, security clearance, and oath of secrecy; the “culture of obedience”; “professional isolation,” “fear of the consequences of dissent” (p. 418); the presence of third parties, such as interpreters and security personnel, during treatment (p. 420); “blurring of the division between custodial and clinical staff”; scheduling of patient visits according to the convenience of detention authorities; and so on. A system ostensibly designed to safeguard the detainees thus becomes a system to protect and legitimize the authorities (p. 428).

APA policy ignores the institutional context of psychologists in detention centers. Rather, it addresses psychologists in national security settings as morally autonomous agents serving as independent consultants. This view conforms to the military “virtue ethic” of officership, that is, the belief that individual character is the basis of conduct. The virtue ethic is inspirational for officer training and as an individual guide to conduct. But military ethicists have warned that, “The focus on character may prevent leaders from taking a critical look at the institutions they lead and thereby ensure that morally corrupting rules, structures, and systems remain” (Robinson, 2007, p. 31). In any case, the APA model of the morally autonomous psychologist, “absolutely prohibited from knowingly planning, designing, participating in or assisting in the use of all condemned techniques,” defies the classic empirical social psychological studies on conformity and obedience (Asch, Milgram, Zimbardo), as well as the recent findings on self-control in demanding situations (Baumeister, 2008).

In further disregard of psychological realism, APA policymakers have not inquired into the opinions of senior interrogators concerning the value of psychologists in interrogations. The several senior U.S. Army interrogators whom we have consulted state that they do not want the assistance of psychologists in interrogations. Col. Steve Kleinman, a 30-year veteran interrogator often cited on other matters by APA, stated this clearly during his 2007 APA Convention presentation (Kleinman, 2007). Nor do psychologists serve to raise the moral level of interrogations overall. According to these interrogators, psychologists’ efforts are misplaced in “softening up” detainees for novice interrogators and for extralegal, untrained amateurs. Instead, psychologists should direct their efforts toward selection of interrogation trainees and preparation of novice interrogators for superior, nonabusive, methods of interrogation. These methods require social perception, tolerance, cultural sensitivity, cognitive complexity, flexible thinking, situational awareness, and self-control (McCauley, 2007; Arrigo & Bennett, 2007). The proper mentor for a novice interrogator is not a psychologist but a senior interrogator. A senior interrogator needing consultation will ordinarily prefer another senior interrogator, as a psychotherapist will prefer consultation with another psychotherapist. Moreover, psychologists, who greatly outrank interrogators, easily interfere with the dynamics of the interrogator-source relationship (Bennett, 2007).

Patriotic psychologists could contribute ethically to the effectiveness of interrogation by taking the “expert-performance approach” articulated by cognitive psychologists. The same training requirements detailed by senior interrogators (McCauley, 2007; Arrigo & Bennett, 2007) are found in many other domains of measurable expertise, such as chess and musicianship (Ericsson & Ward, 2007): “10 years of intense preparation-even for the most ‘talented’,” “training situations with immediate valid feedback,” “deliberate practice…in maintaining expertise.” and so on (pp. 346 & 349). Recent cognitive research (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice) also shows how various forms of self-control and initiative that are essential to effective interrogation-decision making, choice, creative problem solving, management of emotions, etc.- are quickly depleted through use. Indeed, “there are levels of depletion beyond which people may be unable to control themselves effectively, regardless of what is at stake” (p. 353). A senior interrogator gave this example: “In the high-adrenaline raid of a terrorist safe house, the direct interrogation approach of Special Forces may be to kick the captive in the head and then ask his name” (Arrigo & Bennett, 2007, p. 418). Scientific psychologists could research and promote the expert-performance approach to interrogation deemed effective by senior interrogators (McCauley, 2007). They could assist interrogators in establishing the necessary training programs and in securing resources (Arrigo & Bennett, 2007). Where is the APA opposition to the use of 18-year-old interrogators with 16 weeks of training and no professional mentorship?

Instead, the February 2008 Modification continues to accommodate interrogation practices championed by the Bush Administration; it leaves psychologists in place for the unethical and counterproductive purpose of destabilizing detainees through aversive techniques. But the Modification covers these psychologists with yet grander-still unoperationalized- ethical principles. In this way, APA contributes to the degradation and ineffectiveness of the armed services and intelligence agencies. Intelligence professionals are least of all deceived by high principles that have not been operationalized.

A truly significant Modification to the June 2005 APA PENS Report and August 2007 APA Resolution would add these requirements:

Psychologists, their trainees, and supervisees may serve only in detention sites where international human rights law is observed.

The American Psychological Association requests the Department of Defense to amend the U.S. Army Field Manual for Interrogation to: (a) prohibit military psychologists or their trainees or supervisees from participating in any phase of interrogations, including the review of a detainee’s medical files for use in an interrogation; (b) impose severe penalties for commanding officers who violate this regulation by way of coercion and/or threats against a psychologist or their trainees or supervisees; (c) train psychologists to submit written complaints through their chain of command to the Office of the Army Inspector General against any commanding officers who attempt to involve them in interrogations or to influence their mental health assessments of patients; (d) inform psychologists of the implications of their research or clinical work in regard to interrogations; (e) prohibit destruction, or concealment from legitimate investigation, any evidence of psychologists’ involvement in interrogations.

The American Psychological Association requests all other national security agencies and government contractors who employ or fund psychologists, their trainees, or supervisees to enact effective, corresponding regulations.

The obstacle to such requirements has been hidden financial interests. The APA’s effective refusal to assist and legitimize abusive interrogations under the Bush Administration would jeopardize the APA’s vigorous lobbying efforts for Department of Defense funding (see APA Science Policy Insider News, 2002-2007). These financial interests were represented by the participation of unacknowledged, high-level APA lobbyists in the original APA PENS Report (Arrigo, 2007). To turn the tide against psychologists’ participation in coercive interrogations we assert that APA lobbying efforts should be conducted transparently, with input from military ethicists as well as the general APA membership.

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Ray Bennett, U.S. Army Interrogator (ret’d), and to Stephen Soldz for critical reviews and additional information.

References

American Psychological Association Science Policy Insider News. (2002-2007). Online newsletter. Available at: http://www.apa.org/ppo/spin/1102.html.

Arrigo, Jean Maria. (2007, August). A counterintelligence perspective on PENS task force process. Symposium on ethics and interrogations: Confronting the challenge. Presented to the Convention of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA.

Arrigo, Jean Maria, & Bennett, Ray. (2007). Organizational supports for abusive interrogations in “The War on Terror.” In Torture Is for Amateurs, special issue of Peace and Conflict, 13 (4): 411-421.

Baumeister, Roy F. (2008). Free will in scientific psychology. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3 (1): 14-19.

Baumeister, Roy F., Vohs, Kathleen D., & Tice, Dianne M. (2007). The strength model of self-control. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16 (6): 351-358.

Bennett, Ray. (2007, January 21). Involvement of medical professionals in military and intelligence interrogations-Operational issues. Telephone interview conducted by J.M. Arrigo. Intelligence Ethics Collection, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.

DeBatto, David. (2004, December 8). Whitewashing torture? Salon.com. On-line periodical: http://dir.salon.com/story/news/feature/2004/12/08/coverup/index.html.

Ericsson, K. Anders, & Ward, Paul. (2007). Capturing the naturally occurring superior performance of experts in the laboratory: Toward a science of expert and exceptional performance. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 16 (6): 346-350.

Gready, Paul. (2007). Medical complicity in human rights abuses: A case study of district surgeons in apartheid South Africa. Journal of Human Rights, 6: 415-432.

Kleinman, Steve. (2007, August). What are Psychologists doing in U.S. Military Detention Centers? Symposium on ethics and interrogations: Confronting the challenge. Presented to the Convention of the American Psychological Association, San Francisco, CA.

McCauley, Clark. (2007). Toward a social psychology of professional military interrogations. In Torture Is for Amateurs, special issue of Peace and Conflict, 13 (4): 399-410.Robinson, Paul. (2007). Ethics training and development in the military. Parameters: US Army War College Quarterly, 37 (1): 4-22.

Selsky, Andrew O. (2008, February 6). AP confirms secret camp inside Gitmo. [Associated press writer]. Guardian.co.uk. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-7288144,00.html. [Accessed March 16, 2008].

U.S. Army. (2008). Health Professionals Scholarship Program. Available at: http://www.goarmy.com/amedd/docs/hpsp.pdf. [Accessed March 12, 2008].

Add comment March 19th, 2008

The lure of death: On loving an assassin

Journalist Jason P Howe has a fascinating and chilling piece in the Independent on his love affair with a Columbian assassin. It provides a description of the evolution of killers in paramilitaries, with unfortunate application to all too many places in the world today:

‘I fell in love with a female assassin’

They met on a train and fell in love. Then Jason P Howe discovered that his girlfriend Marylin was leading a secret double life – as an assassin for right-wing death squads in Colombia’s brutal civil war. With their story set to become a major Hollywood film, he recalls an extraordinary, doomed romance

There comes a point in every new relationship when your girlfriend wants to share a secret. Usually it’s to do with sex – how many other partners she’s had (with a few conveniently erased) – that sort of thing. Often, the secret changes the basis of the relationship; honesty comes with consequences. But what happens if your new girlfriend has a much darker and more sinister secret than having slept around a bit?

Sitting naked on the edge of the bed in a cheap, sweltering hotel room in the heart of a war-torn, drug-producing region of Colombia, I lit a cigarette and listened as the girl I had just made love with told me a secret dark enough to shake anyone from their postcoital bliss.

I had been in Colombia for a few months to learn how to become a photojournalist. Not by attending some theoretical university course, or taking portraits in a cosy studio, but by pitching myself in at the deep end.

Times of peace have been rare in the country’s history. For the past 40 years or so, a Marxist-inspired rebel group known as the Farc (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) have been at war with the government, funding their growing army by kidnapping and extortion, and taxing the illegal cocaine trade. Right-wing death squads known as “self-defence forces” have sprung up as a response to the Farc’s kidnapping of wealthy landowners and drug-lords. Under the umbrella of an organisation called the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) these private militias, or paramilitaries (known locally as “paras”), are secretly supported by those high in the government and military, who back their dirty war against the Farc rebels.

This triangular conflict has exacted, and continues to exact, a hefty price from the Colombian people. During the past four decades, over 200,000 have lost their lives and more than three million have been forced from their homes by violence or intimidation. This week, following an incursion by government forces to kill Farc rebels in Ecuador, the conflict was at the centre of a diplomatic crisis involving both nations, together with Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.

To dismiss all this brutality as a simple war over drugs does the Colombian people a gross injustice. Its roots are buried in the economic and social imbalance that permeates the country, a huge working class living in poverty, lining the pockets of a tiny, wealthy upper class who own more than 90 per cent of the land, industry and business. My goal, therefore, was to meet and photograph members of each of the groups involved, and to attempt explain Latin America’s 40-year conflict.

I began by travelling to a part of the country with a strong Farc presence, and, after much perseverance, persuaded the rebels to let me live in one of their camps. After documenting their daily lives and being alongside them in a firefight against government troops, it was time to go off in search of their sworn enemies, the paras.

I headed towards the Putumayo, one of the narco-trafficking centres and scene of ongoing skirmishes between Farc and the paras in southern Colombia on the border with Ecuador. It took a couple of days travelling on a local bus to get to the capital, Puerto Asis.

En route, I began talking with a fellow passenger, a beautiful Colombian girl called Marylin who told me she was returning from a clothes-buying trip in one of the big cities. I explained my purpose in visiting the region, and Marylin told me she had friends in both the paramilitaries and the military, so would be able to help. She invited me to stay with her family, who had a roadside store and bar on the outskirts of town. I was attracted to Marylin, but had no idea how close we would become and how our future would unfold.

I spent the next few weeks living with her family, making trips out into the countryside to photograph the coca fields and to meet the paramilitaries. Marylin and I spent long afternoons lying together in a hammock. We held hands and kissed occasionally, but it went no further. Eventually, my time and funds ran out and I had to return to England. As I said goodbye, I promised to do my best to return and Marylin told me I was now “part of the family”.

Six months later, I was back, determined to explore this conflict fully, learn as much as I could and maybe publish a book. I made my way back to Puerto Asis with the intention of spending some time with Marylin and her family. But I was in for some surprises: Marylin told me that she had joined the AUC and had been active in combat in the nearby village of El Tigre. Another female friend who had been fighting at her side had been killed, along with 25 other paramilitary fighters and at least 15 rebels. When the combat ceased, the entire population of the village fled. Marylin’s brother was now working on a coca plantation and carried a pistol that he slept with under his pillow. I didn’t find it particularly shocking. This was, after all, a country torn apart by every type of violence. Only luck, or lack of it, dictated which side you were on.

Months passed. I travelled around the country developing my project. The results received positive attention, including a prize in an international competition, and it was suggested that I go to Iraq to document the war there. And so I did. But, after six months living with the daily car bombings and rocket attacks in Baghdad, I was hankering to return to Colombia.

A year after our first meeting, I arrived back at Marylin’s home in a battered taxi. I sat and drank an ice-cold beer with her father while waiting for her to return from an “errand”. I then walked hand-in-hand with her and her four-year-old daughter, Natalie, down the rutted cart track to a tree-shaded river behind her house. With her daughter splashing around near the bank we waded, arm in arm, into the deeper, cooler water. I felt there was a change in the atmosphere, but I couldn’t exactly put my finger on what I was sensing.

I asked Marylin if things would be different between us if I stayed at a hotel in the town rather than with her family. She agreed that it might make it easier for us to be together, so I found myself a room. That evening, she came for dinner. We ate on the balcony and, as we shared a bottle of wine and listened to the chorus of insects, I began to think that the year of groundwork I had put in was about to pay off. Marylin stayed the night.

Puerto Asis, Marylin’s home town sits a degree or two above the equator. Air-conditioning was an expensive extra and I was broke. The tiny hotel room was stifling, and, as we lay curled in the sweat-soaked sheets, with the shouts of street vendors and the rumble of early morning traffic drifting in though the balcony window, Marylin said she had something to tell me.

She then hit me with a confession that would both thrill and confuse me. She explained that in the months that I had been away in Iraq her role within the AUC had changed; she had joined the urban militia and become an assassin. Her job was now to eliminate informers and traitors. So far, she told me, she had killed at least 10 people in the area. I lit a cigarette and inhaled deeply, Marylin looked at me through the smoke as I exhaled, waiting to see how I would respond to what she had just told me.

Strangely, her confession did not have the impact one would expect; I did not recoil in horror. The months I had spent in Colombia and in Iraq surrounded by violence had altered my perspective. I don’t think that I had become immune to death or suffering but I had certainly become less easily shocked. The difference between victim and victor, rebel and refugee, often felt like only a matter of perspective.

I had always enjoyed the company of the “doers”, the rebels and the soldiers who were out risking their lives for causes I supposed they believed in. I was left cold by the wealthy, well-dressed beauty queens who inhabited the upmarket clubs of Bogota. Although I would later feel very differently, my initial reaction to Marylin’s words were an acceptance that may even have bordered on approval. I guess I felt that as war-zone lovers go, she was pretty “cool”.

In the beginning, her visits to my hotel room – usually armed with a pistol – did not disturb me greatly. At first, I don’t think the real implications of what Marylin was doing had filtered through the surreal haze. I was young and living out a great adventure. This was surely the closest I would ever get to someone who was truly and totally involved and immersed in this conflict. The woman I had only recently begun sleeping with was a hired killer and there was a gun on my bedside table.

Watching her take the pistol from her belt, unbutton her jeans and slip into bed I somehow couldn’t quite equate the woman in my arms with the bodies I had seen in the local morgue, their heads shattered by gunshots at close range, murders she confessed to having committed. High on a combination of the heady tropical climate, local rum, grade A cocaine and in the arms of nubile 22-year-old, fantasy and reality became blurred. It felt like I was living in a Quentin Tarantino movie.

One morning, Marylin told me that the previous night she had persuaded a friend to help her decapitate and dismember a woman she had been contracted to kill. This was no informer, but, rather, a friend of hers who paid her to kill her boyfriend’s other girlfriend. She described so graphically what had happened, with so little feeling, that at last reality kicked in. I found my feelings about her changing. The romantic light started to fade fast. She no longer seemed to be a legitimate part of a civil conflict but had evolved into a freelance killer, taking life in exchange for money – no more, no less.

Although I still found her sexually attractive and wanted to be with her, something else was ricocheting around in my brain. Some of the thoughts that would have occurred to anyone else much earlier were, now, at last, beginning to filter through.

Over the past year, I had photographed her swimming in the river with her daughter and reading bedtime stories. Now, the images I was recording concentrated almost entirely on the other side of her life. I was, with thoughts of self-preservation in mind, reducing her to “subject”.

I asked Marylin if she would be prepared to let me interview her about her life and what she had become involved in. Wearing a balaclava and brandishing a pistol, she permitted me to video our conversation.

I began by asking her how she had first become involved with the paramilitaries and why she decided to join them. How she had been persuaded to kill her first victim and how she felt about it. She started hesitantly, but gathered confidence as her story unfolded.

“When I killed the first person, I was afraid, I was scared. I killed the first person just to see if I could. But there is an obligation to kill. If you don’t, they kill you. That’s why the first was very hard, because the person I killed was kneeling down begging, crying and saying, ‘Don’t kill me. I have children.’ That’s why it was difficult and sad. But if you don’t kill that person, someone else from the AUC will kill you. After the killing, you keep trembling. You can’t eat or talk to anyone. I was at home, but I kept imagining the person begging not to be killed. I shut myself inside, but with time I forgot everything. The superiors always say, ‘Don’t worry, that was just the first time. When you kill the second one, it will all be OK.’ But you keep trembling.

“The second time is only a bit easier, but as they say here, ‘If you can kill one, you can kill many more.’

“You have to lose the fear. Now I am still killing and nothing happens. I feel normal. Before, I had an obligation to kill, I was sent to kill. But once I left the organisation, I was not obligated. I now only do the job for money.

“Yes [I killed one of my friends], because they were going to kill me. They told me to take care because they worked for the other side and had connections with the guerrillas. And so it was my life or theirs. So I asked permission to do it, which [the AUC] gave me. [The AUC] investigated and it came out positive that [my friends] worked for the guerrillas, so I killed them. It was very painful for me. I was at the burial and at the vigil. It hurt me to see his mother crying, knowing I was the one guilty of having caused that. But it’s your life and you’re taught in the [AUC] school: First you, then the others. In total, I have killed 23 people.”

An incredible sadness washed over me as I listened to this intelligent young woman, who I had become so close to, talk of her life. Marylin was an extreme victim of circumstance. Her boredom and quest for excitement had brought her into contact with the paramilitaries, who had brainwashed her and left her with no respect for human life. Not her own, not even her family’s.

But her excuses, or lack of them, riled me and I told her she represented everything that was wrong with the country. From my privileged and ultimately unqualified position as an outsider I found it impossible to identify with her, only to be angry, upset and judgemental.

Reducing her to a “subject” had not worked, I did not seem able to be detached and objective or able to put my own feelings aside. I had travelled too far beyond that point. While on one level I relished the intensity of what I was experiencing, there was a price to be paid for getting in so deep and it was high. I realised that the things I had seen and heard in the last couple of months were incredible. Through them, my passion for Colombia had grown and my understanding of what was happening in this much misunderstood country had broadened. But I felt that I had lost something and been damaged by them, too.

I returned to Iraq and then moved on to covering the war in Afghanistan. Over the course of a year, Marylin and I exchanged emails periodically. They mainly involved her asking me where I was and asking me not to forget her. She told me that the things I had said to her after her interview had had a big impact. No one had spoken to her like that, really questioned her about what she was doing with her life. She told me that she did want to make a new beginning, but that she knew the AUC do not let their members leave, at least not alive.

After a long period of silence, I began to fear something had happened. So I decided that I would return to Puerto Asis to learn the truth.

It took me some time to pluck up the courage to drive out to her home to see if she and her family were still around. I wondered if she had perhaps made the break and left to begin a new life or whether, more likely, her past had caught up with her. Given the dreadful things that I already knew she had been involved in, I was at least somewhat prepared for bad news. What I was not ready for was how confusing it was going to be to hear it.

Her family showed their normal surprise at finding me at their front door. All my fears were confirmed as her father, his eyes welling with tears, told me that Marylin was dead. She was 25 years and two months old when she was kidnapped from her home and stoned to death. Her abductors crushed her head with rocks and then shot her.

The next morning, her now six-year-old daughter, Natalie, awoke as an orphan, Marylin’s parents had lost a third daughter and her brother so overcome with grief that he was unable to walk, talk, or even feed himself. Marylin was not killed by some local seeking revenge for one of the many deaths that had occurred at her hands during her time as an assassin. She was murdered by her own group in a symbolic stoning for being a sapo (”frog”), which is what Colombians call informers.

Her most recent boyfriend was a government soldier, convenient enough when the paramilitaries and the military were working side-by-side in their war to wrest control of the coca fields of Putumayo from the Farc, but enough to get her killed when that relationship soured and her pillow talk continued.

Marylin’s death had a special significance for me, because I, too, had shared some of that pillow talk. We had been friends and then lovers. Our lives never had much in common; except that Colombia’s dirty little war had both of us locked into its fatal grip. I found it difficult to speak; I wasn’t actually sure what I was feeling.

Was I feeling sorry that a young woman, who had deliberately taken the lives of other human beings, had received the same kind of street-corner justice she had been responsible for handing out? Was I reliving the conversations we had about changing her life and the emails I received from her thanking me and saying she needed to talk more about how she could get out of the mess she was in? Was I wishing I had done more to help her? Was I feeling sorry for her parents and her beautiful daughter, who one day would want an explanation as to why her mother was killed and, maybe, discover the horrors that occurred while she was a sleeping baby? Was I remembering what it was like to kiss her in those days before I had any clue she was an assassin? Was I trying to imagine, or perhaps trying not to imagine, what she looked like after her head had been destroyed with stones and rocks?

In truth, I was thinking, feeling and imagining all of these things. At the same time, though, I knew that whatever pain her family was feeling, she had caused this same pain to others many times over.

Back in my hotel room I let out the longest of breaths, lit a cigarette and stared at the ceiling fan. The whirling blades churned together my memories of the wars I’d been in, my ex-girlfriend and my current situation.

Early next morning, together with Marylin’s mother and Natalie, both wearing their best dresses and carrying flowers, I went to see where Marylin body had been laid to rest. Her coffin was in a concrete box, resting on top of the tomb of her sister, who had also been killed by the conflict. The number of bodies demanding burial had long ago outstripped the space available. Alongside lay a much smaller tomb; the remains of another of her sisters, who’d died of natural causes aged three months. I could not imagine how Marylin’s mother felt holding the hand of her granddaughter, looking over the graves of all three of her daughters.

My plan for travelling deeper into Putumayo to photograph the paramilitaries no longer seemed such a good idea. Marylin had always pointed me in the right direction and warned me when pushing further was not a good idea. I wanted to learn more about her life and death, but didn’t want to get killed for asking the wrong questions of the wrong people.

That night, eating dinner against a background of revving motorbikes and honking trucks, another local told me more of what had happened to Marylin. Between mouthfuls of soup, the woman told me that Marylin had been involved with the AUC a lot longer than she had admitted to me, and that it was commonly believed in the town that she was involved in the massacre of 26 villagers in El Tigre. Many of the victims were decapitated and disembowelled before being thrown into a river. I booked a seat on the next available flight out.

As I watched Puerto Asis disappear below me, the plane was enveloped by cloud. On my iPod, someone was singing “this city’s made us crazy and we must get out”.

As I sit typing this, nearly 9,000 miles away in a freezing, dark hotel room in Kabul, Afghanistan, covering yet another never-ending conflict, I wonder whether it could have ever ended any differently. Was Marylin really killed because she was an informer or because, as she indicated in her emails, she did really want to leave the AUC and start a new life?

This is what I want to believe. I want to believe that she had a change of heart. I want to believe that she wasn’t the cold, heartless, evil killer she appeared to be. But who am I trying to fool?

This article was originally published in Arena magazine. Jason P Howe is the author of Colombia: Between the Lines, out later this year. To order a copy, contact books@conflictpics.com

Add comment March 6th, 2008

9-11 Chairs accuse CIA and administration of stonewalling commission

For those who missed it, the Chair and Vice Chair of the 9-11 Commission today accused the CIA, and the Administration, of obstructing the Commission’s work by hiding the CIA torture tapes. It is not an accident that this appeared in the New York Times today only hours before Attorney General Mukasey announced that the Department of Justice was asking for an independent investigation of the tapes’ destruction.

Left unsaid in the op-ed, and in most commentary on the tape’s destruction, is the question of what else was kept from the 9-11 Commission. After all, if the administration withheld the tapes, there is no reason not to think they withheld other delicate materials. The credibility of the entire 9-11 report is now on the line.

Stonewalled by the C.I.A.

By Thomas H. Kean & Lee N. Hamilton

Published: January 2, 2008

MORE than five years ago, Congress and President Bush created the 9/11 commission. The goal was to provide the American people with the fullest possible account of the “facts and circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001” — and to offer recommendations to prevent future attacks. Soon after its creation, the president’s chief of staff directed all executive branch agencies to cooperate with the commission.

The commission’s mandate was sweeping and it explicitly included the intelligence agencies. But the recent revelations that the C.I.A. destroyed videotaped interrogations of Qaeda operatives leads us to conclude that the agency failed to respond to our lawful requests for information about the 9/11 plot. Those who knew about those videotapes — and did not tell us about them — obstructed our investigation.

There could have been absolutely no doubt in the mind of anyone at the C.I.A. — or the White House — of the commission’s interest in any and all information related to Qaeda detainees involved in the 9/11 plot. Yet no one in the administration ever told the commission of the existence of videotapes of detainee interrogations.

When the press reported that, in 2002 and maybe at other times, the C.I.A. had recorded hundreds of hours of interrogations of at least two Qaeda detainees, we went back to check our records. We found that we did ask, repeatedly, for the kind of information that would have been contained in such videotapes.

The commission did not have a mandate to investigate how detainees were treated; our role was to investigate the history and evolution of Al Qaeda and the 9/11 plot. Beginning in June 2003, we requested all reports of intelligence information on these broad topics that had been gleaned from the interrogations of 118 named individuals, including both Abu Zubaydah and Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri, two senior Qaeda operatives, portions of whose interrogations were apparently recorded and then destroyed.

The C.I.A. gave us many reports summarizing information gained in the interrogations. But the reports raised almost as many questions as they answered. Agency officials assured us that, if we posed specific questions, they would do all they could to answer them.

So, in October 2003, we sent another wave of questions to the C.I.A.’s general counsel. One set posed dozens of specific questions about the reports, including those about Abu Zubaydah. A second set, even more important in our view, asked for details about the translation process in the interrogations; the background of the interrogators; the way the interrogators handled inconsistencies in the detainees’ stories; the particular questions that had been asked to elicit reported information; the way interrogators had followed up on certain lines of questioning; the context of the interrogations so we could assess the credibility and demeanor of the detainees when they made the reported statements; and the views or assessments of the interrogators themselves.

The general counsel responded in writing with non-specific replies. The agency did not disclose that any interrogations had ever been recorded or that it had held any further relevant information, in any form. Not satisfied with this response, we decided that we needed to question the detainees directly, including Abu Zubaydah and a few other key captives.

In a lunch meeting on Dec. 23, 2003, George Tenet, the C.I.A. director, told us point blank that we would have no such access. During the meeting, we emphasized to him that the C.I.A. should provide any documents responsive to our requests, even if the commission had not specifically asked for them. Mr. Tenet replied by alluding to several documents he thought would be helpful to us, but neither he, nor anyone else in the meeting, mentioned videotapes.

A meeting on Jan. 21, 2004, with Mr. Tenet, the White House counsel, the secretary of defense and a representative from the Justice Department also resulted in the denial of commission access to the detainees. Once again, videotapes were not mentioned.

As a result of this January meeting, the C.I.A. agreed to pose some of our questions to detainees and report back to us. The commission concluded this was all the administration could give us. But the commission never felt that its earlier questions had been satisfactorily answered. So the public would be aware of our concerns, we highlighted our caveats on page 146 in the commission report.

As a legal matter, it is not up to us to examine the C.I.A.’s failure to disclose the existence of these tapes. That is for others. What we do know is that government officials decided not to inform a lawfully constituted body, created by Congress and the president, to investigate one the greatest tragedies to confront this country. We call that obstruction.

Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton served as chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the 9/11 commission.

Add comment January 2nd, 2008

APA sidelined Task Force on the Psychological Effects of Efforts to Prevent Terrorism to not offend Bush administration

 Those of us fighting the American Psychological Association’s campaign of denial, deceit, and delay in order to maintain psychologists in Bush’s illegal and abusive interrogations are not surprised that the APA leadership has used similar slimy tactics to counter other challenges to its cozy relationship with the War of Terror boondoggle and war machine. Paul Kimmel writes of how APA sidelined a report from an APA task force he chaired, the Task Force on the Psychological Effects of Efforts to Prevent Terrorism. [This article will appear in the APA's Peace Psychology Division newsletter (Division 48).  Reprinted with permission.]

Reflections From Panama

Paul Kimmel

Hola, amigos

Greetings from Panama City where Ramona and I are living until December to see if we want to relocate here in 2008.  We missed seeing you in San Francisco, but through the wonders of the Internet, kept up with much of what happened there.  We were saddened, but not surprised, when we read Linda Woolf’s commentary on the Moratorium proposal.

As Yogi Berra said, it was like “deja vu all over again.”  The experiences that she described in dealing with the APA before and during the Council meetings brought back many memories of my two years as Chair of the Council’s Task Force on the Psychological Effects of Efforts to Prevent Terrorism.

At their February 2003 meetings we were charged with “assessing the emotional and behavioral effects of processes initiated in the U.S. to safeguard American lives and property and prevent future acts of terrorism.”

Council approved this Task Force proposal nearly unanimously with one long time council member calling it the “most important task force ever established by Council.”

The Board of Directors of the APA, President Sternberg and Secretary Levant vetted the 15 Task Force members that I recommended and added one other researcher from NIH.  We pursued our assignments individually and coordinated through conference calls attended by a variety of employees of the APA’s Public Interest Directorate between June and October of 2003. The editing of the final document was done by e-mail with expert help from Art Kendall on the necessary detailed work.

Three other experts in conflict resolution reviewed our work in March 2004.  Their comments were taken into account in the Final Report that went to the Board of Directors’ June 2004 meeting.  At this meeting the Report was approved for the Council meetings of July 2004.

And then the fun began.

Just before the afternoon session at which I was scheduled to present our Report to the APA Council, Ron Levant, Rhea Farberman, Henry Tomes and my contact on the Board of Directors called me from lunch to discuss our Report.  I was told that to have the Report “received” by the Association - as proposed in our Agenda item - would not be as powerful as having it “reported” to the APA after being reviewed by a number of relevant Boards and Committees.  They suggested that I amend our item on the floor to have such a review take place so that the Association could do more with our findings and recommendations than just accepting them.

With little time to consult the rest of the Task Force (there had been no mention of such a review process before this hurried discussion), I amended the proposal as requested (although Bernice Lott, another TF member on Council, who was skeptical of this last minute turn of events, opposed postponing the reception of our time-sensitive work). My expectation was that by going through the review process, the Report would be stronger and the Association would act upon it more quickly and comprehensively after Council approved it in February 2005.

Attending the meetings and responding to the suggestions of the many Boards and Committees involved a lot more work for me and our authors, as these groups had different interests and points of view regarding our findings and recommendations.

When we finished revising our Report in light of their suggestions, the APA Board of Directors recommended it be rejected as lacking “peer review” in spite of the fact that it was a policy piece and not an academic journal article.

It was also suggested that our findings and recommendations were too “political” (it seems that only the status quo is not “political” or “politically correct” at the Association).

We brought our responses to the Board of Directors’ objections to the February 2005 Council meetings, only to find our item being moved down the agenda by Ron Levant (presiding as President) until there were just 10 minutes left in the final afternoon session.

This was barely enough time to go over the main item and no time for discussion of or response to the Board’s critique.

Our first speaker was cut off by Levant (there were several others ready and able to address their issues) and a vote was called.

We were voted down - as Representatives were leaving to catch flights and other Convention activities - and the Report was never received by the APA.

As many of you know, I took the initiative to transform the 12 articles written by the Task Force members into chapters in “Collateral Damage: The Psychological Consequences of America’s War on Terrorism” published by Praeger in August 2006.  The APA’s attorney made it clear that I was not to intimate in any way that the book was endorsed or approved by the Association.

Like Linda in her struggles with the recent Moratorium proposal, I felt neglected, misled and taken advantage of by the Board of Directors and members of the APA Central Office.

There was little money for the Task Force (our only meeting was at our own expense, staying late at the 2004 Convention in Toronto) and no single staff member was assigned by the Public Interest Directorate to assist us as needed with our volunteer activities.

The APA’s Director of Public Affairs told me that the Association could not publish some of our statements such as “more people will die from the ‘war on terrorism’ than died on 9/11,” even before the Report was seen by Council.  In short, rather than feeling we were part of a professional organization working together to promote the general welfare, I felt that we were being led through a series of obstacles in an effort to prevent us from bringing to the public important information about the effects of our government’s policies on terrorism.

After being rejected, our Report was referred to the Board of Scientific Affairs for further review where it has remained undiscussed for two and one half years.

Thus, our findings and recommendations are available only to those who purchase “Collateral Damage.”

Joanne Tortorici Luna favorably reviewed our book in the August 15 2007) on-line issue of PsyCritiques.  It ends, “It is good to know that, in a moment of our history when even a supposedly independent press has largely suspended its critical voice, there are still some who will call it as they see it. Psychologists are sometimes referred to as those who are willing to speak the unspeakable.  There is no better time than now.”

I sincerely hope that the time is not too far off when our membership association will speak with a clearer voice on critical national and international issues.

In the meantime, I suggest that you read the rest of the PsyCritiques’
book review and/or buy a copy of “Collateral Damage” to see what it is that the Association will not associate with.

Hasta luego,

Paul Kimmel

1 comment September 21st, 2007

Psychologists and CIA torture, the Khalid Sheikh Mohammed experience

Last month Vanity Fair online published Katherine Eban’s account of the psychologist-designed torture of Abu Zubaydah, designed and conducted by CIA consultants Mitchell and Jessen, former Suvival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) psychologists. This week, the New Yorker publishes a companion piece by Jane Mayer on the CIA torture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed [The Black Sites]. In the course of a long piece, the article sheds more light on the role of psychologists in US torture.

Here are a few excerpts on the role of psychologists:

The C.I.A. program’s first important detainee was Abu Zubaydah, a top Al Qaeda operative, who was captured by Pakistani forces in March of 2002. Lacking in-house specialists on interrogation, the agency hired a group of outside contractors, who implemented a regime of techniques that one well-informed former adviser to the American intelligence community described as “a ‘Clockwork Orange’ kind of approach.” The experts were retired military psychologists, and their backgrounds were in training Special Forces soldiers how to survive torture, should they ever be captured by enemy states. The program, known as SERE—an acronym for Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape—was created at the end of the Korean War. It subjected trainees to simulated torture, including waterboarding (simulated drowning), sleep deprivation, isolation, exposure to temperature extremes, enclosure in tiny spaces, bombardment with agonizing sounds, and religious and sexual humiliation. The SERE program was designed strictly for defense against torture regimes, but the C.I.A.’s new team used its expertise to help interrogators inflict abuse. “They were very arrogant, and pro-torture,” a European official knowledgeable about the program said. “They sought to render the detainees vulnerable—to break down all of their senses. It takes a psychologist trained in this to understand these rupturing experiences.”

The use of psychologists was also considered a way for C.I.A. officials to skirt measures such as the Convention Against Torture. The former adviser to the intelligence community said, “Clearly, some senior people felt they needed a theory to justify what they were doing. You can’t just say, ‘We want to do what Egypt’s doing.’ When the lawyers asked what their basis was, they could say, ‘We have Ph.D.s who have these theories.’ ” He said that, inside the C.I.A., where a number of scientists work, there was strong internal opposition to the new techniques. “Behavioral scientists said, ‘Don’t even think about this!’ They thought officers could be prosecuted.”

Nevertheless, the SERE experts’ theories were apparently put into practice with Zubaydah’s interrogation. Zubaydah told the Red Cross that he was not only waterboarded, as has been previously reported; he was also kept for a prolonged period in a cage, known as a “dog box,” which was so small that he could not stand. According to an eyewitness, one psychologist advising on the treatment of Zubaydah, James Mitchell, argued that he needed to be reduced to a state of “learned helplessness.” (Mitchell disputes this characterization.)

Steve Kleinman, a reserve Air Force colonel and an experienced interrogator who has known Mitchell professionally for years, said that “learned helplessness was his whole paradigm.” Mitchell, he said, “draws a diagram showing what he says is the whole cycle. It starts with isolation. Then they eliminate the prisoners’ ability to forecast the future—when their next meal is, when they can go to the bathroom. It creates dread and dependency. It was the K.G.B. model. But the K.G.B. used it to get people who had turned against the state to confess falsely. The K.G.B. wasn’t after intelligence.”

As the C.I.A. captured and interrogated other Al Qaeda figures, it established a protocol of psychological coercion. The program tied together many strands of the agency’s secret history of Cold War-era experiments in behavioral science. (In June, the C.I.A. declassified long-held secret documents known as the Family Jewels, which shed light on C.I.A. drug experiments on rats and monkeys, and on the infamous case of Frank R. Olson, an agency employee who leaped to his death from a hotel window in 1953, nine days after he was unwittingly drugged with LSD.) The C.I.A.’s most useful research focussed on the surprisingly powerful effects of psychological manipulations, such as extreme sensory deprivation. According to Alfred McCoy, a history professor at the University of Wisconsin, in Madison, who has written a history of the C.I.A.’s experiments in coercing subjects, the agency learned that “if subjects are confined without light, odors, sound, or any fixed references of time and place, very deep breakdowns can be provoked.”

Agency scientists found that in just a few hours some subjects suspended in water tanks—or confined in isolated rooms wearing blacked-out goggles and earmuffs—regressed to semi-psychotic states. Moreover, McCoy said, detainees become so desperate for human interaction that “they bond with the interrogator like a father, or like a drowning man having a lifesaver thrown at him. If you deprive people of all their senses, they’ll turn to you like their daddy.” McCoy added that “after the Cold War we put away those tools. There was bipartisan reform. We backed away from those dark days. Then, under the pressure of the war on terror, they didn’t just bring back the old psychological techniques—they perfected them.”

The C.I.A.’s interrogation program is remarkable for its mechanistic aura. “It’s one of the most sophisticated, refined programs of torture ever,” an outside expert familiar with the protocol said. “At every stage, there was a rigid attention to detail. Procedure was adhered to almost to the letter. There was top-down quality control, and such a set routine that you get to the point where you know what each detainee is going to say, because you’ve heard it before. It was almost automated. People were utterly dehumanized. People fell apart. It was the intentional and systematic infliction of great suffering masquerading as a legal process. It is just chilling.”

Katherine Eban’s Vanity Fair articlerevealed the existence of a December 10, 2002 document — SERE Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure — establishing certain of these SERE-derived torture techniques as standard Operating procedure for US abuse at Guantanamo. Mayer reveals a bit more of the contents of this chilling document which shows the degree to which torture became routinized and bureaucratically organized in American gulags:

A secret government document, dated December 10, 2002, detailing “SERE Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure,” outlines the advantages of stripping detainees. “In addition to degradation of the detainee, stripping can be used to demonstrate the omnipotence of the captor or to debilitate the detainee.” The document advises interrogators to “tear clothing from detainees by firmly pulling downward against buttoned buttons and seams. Tearing motions shall be downward to prevent pulling the detainee off balance.” The memo also advocates the “Shoulder Slap,” “Stomach Slap,” “Hooding,” “Manhandling,” “Walling,” and a variety of “Stress Positions,” including one called “Worship the Gods.”

Mayer also reveals the important role of doctors in US torture:

In the process of being transported, C.I.A. detainees such as Mohammed were screened by medical experts, who checked their vital signs, took blood samples, and marked a chart with a diagram of a human body, noting scars, wounds, and other imperfections. As the person involved in the Council of Europe inquiry put it, “It’s like when you hire a motor vehicle, circling where the scratches are on the rearview mirror. Each detainee was continually assessed, physically and psychologically.”

Mayer also makes clear that we are talking about “torture” here, not any supposed “torture-lite”:

Ramzi Kassem, who teaches at Yale Law School, said that a Yemeni client of his, Sanad al-Kazimi, who is now in Guantánamo, alleged that he had received similar treatment in the Dark Prison, the facility near Kabul. Kazimi claimed to have been suspended by his arms for long periods, causing his legs to swell painfully. “It’s so traumatic, he can barely speak of it,” Kassem said. “He breaks down in tears.” Kazimi also claimed that, while hanging, he was beaten with electric cables.

According to sources familiar with interrogation techniques, the hanging position is designed, in part, to prevent detainees from being able to sleep. The former C.I.A. officer, who is knowledgeable about the interrogation program, explained that “sleep deprivation works. Your electrolyte balance changes. You lose all balance and ability to think rationally. Stuff comes out.” Sleep deprivation has been recognized as an effective form of coercion since the Middle Ages, when it was called tormentum insomniae. It was also recognized for decades in the United States as an illegal form of torture. An American Bar Association report, published in 1930, which was cited in a later U.S. Supreme Court decision, said, “It has been known since 1500 at least that deprivation of sleep is the most effective torture and certain to produce any confession desired.”

Under President Bush’s new executive order, C.I.A. detainees must receive the “basic necessities of life, including adequate food and water, shelter from the elements, necessary clothing, protection from extremes of heat and cold, and essential medical care.” Sleep, according to the order, is not among the basic necessities.

In addition to keeping a prisoner awake, the simple act of remaining upright can over time cause significant pain. McCoy, the historian, noted that “longtime standing” was a common K.G.B. interrogation technique. In his 2006 book, “A Question of Torture,” he writes that the Soviets found that making a victim stand for eighteen to twenty-four hours can produce “excruciating pain, as ankles double in size, skin becomes tense and intensely painful, blisters erupt oozing watery serum, heart rates soar, kidneys shut down, and delusions deepen.”

And:

Among the few C.I.A. officials who knew the details of the detention and interrogation program, there was a tense debate about where to draw the line in terms of treatment. John Brennan, Tenet’s former chief of staff, said, “It all comes down to individual moral barometers.” Waterboarding, in particular, troubled many officials, from both a moral and a legal perspective. Until 2002, when Bush Administration lawyers asserted that waterboarding was a permissible interrogation technique for “enemy combatants,” it was classified as a form of torture, and treated as a serious criminal offense. American soldiers were court-martialled for waterboarding captives as recently as the Vietnam War.

But the psychological disorientation was paramount:

Some detainees held by the C.I.A. claimed that their cells were bombarded with deafening sound twenty-fours hours a day for weeks, and even months. One detainee, Binyam Mohamed, who is now in Guantánamo, told his lawyer, Clive Stafford Smith, that speakers blared music into his cell while he was handcuffed. Detainees recalled the sound as ranging from ghoulish laughter, “like the soundtrack from a horror film,” to ear-splitting rap anthems. Stafford Smith said that his client found the psychological torture more intolerable than the physical abuse that he said he had been previously subjected to in Morocco, where, he said, local intelligence agents had sliced him with a razor blade. “The C.I.A. worked people day and night for months,” Stafford Smith quoted Binyam Mohamed as saying. “Plenty lost their minds. I could hear people knocking their heads against the walls and doors, screaming their heads off.”

Some US interrogators with SERE training claim that this treatment can’t be torture because its nothing more than is done to US troops during SERE training. They can’t seem to distinguish a couple of days of abuse under known limited conditions from the never-ending tortures inflicted upon real detainees:

One of these former [CIA] officers defends the C.I.A.’s program by noting that “there was absolutely nothing done to K.S.M. that wasn’t done to the interrogators themselves”—a reference to SERE-like training. Yet the Red Cross report emphasizes that it was the simultaneous use of several techniques for extended periods that made the treatment “especially abusive.” Senator Carl Levin, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, who has been a prominent critic of the Administration’s embrace of harsh interrogation techniques, said that, particularly with sensory deprivation, “there’s a point where it’s torture. You can put someone in a refrigerator and it’s torture. Everything is a matter of degree.”

As Mayer makes clear, the US torture regime became more systematic, more routinized, more bureaucratic over time. Eventually Mohammed was moved to the US’s state-of-the-art secret torture facility in Poland:

But, according to well-informed sources, it was a far more high-tech facility than the prisons in Afghanistan. The cells had hydraulic doors and air-conditioning. Multiple cameras in each cell provided video surveillance of the detainees. In some ways, the circumstances were better: the detainees were given bottled water. Without confirming the existence of any black sites, Robert Grenier, the former C.I.A. counterterrorism chief, said, “The agency’s techniques became less aggressive as they learned the art of interrogation,” which, he added, “is an art.”

Mohammed was kept in a prolonged state of sensory deprivation, during which every point of reference was erased. The Council on Europe’s report describes a four-month isolation regime as typical. The prisoners had no exposure to natural light, making it impossible for them to tell if it was night or day. They interacted only with masked, silent guards. (A detainee held at what was most likely an Eastern European black site, Mohammed al-Asad, told me that white noise was piped in constantly, although during electrical outages he could hear people crying.) According to a source familiar with the Red Cross report, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed claimed that he was shackled and kept naked, except for a pair of goggles and earmuffs. (Some prisoners were kept naked for as long as forty days.) He had no idea where he was, although, at one point, he apparently glimpsed Polish writing on a water bottle.

In the C.I.A.’s program, meals were delivered sporadically, to insure that the prisoners remained temporally disoriented. The food was largely tasteless, and barely enough to live on. Mohammed, who upon his capture in Rawalpindi was photographed looking flabby and unkempt, was now described as being slim. Experts on the C.I.A. program say that the administering of food is part of its psychological arsenal. Sometimes portions were smaller than the day before, for no apparent reason. “It was all part of the conditioning,” the person involved in the Council of Europe inquiry said. “It’s all calibrated to develop dependency.”

The inquiry source said that most of the Poland detainees were waterboarded, including Mohammed. According to the sources familiar with the Red Cross report, Mohammed claimed to have been waterboarded five times. Two former C.I.A. officers who are friends with one of Mohammed’s interrogators called this bravado, insisting that he was waterboarded only once. According to one of the officers, Mohammed needed only to be shown the drowning equipment again before he “broke.”

“Waterboarding works,” the former officer said. “Drowning is a baseline fear. So is falling. People dream about it. It’s human nature. Suffocation is a very scary thing. When you’re waterboarded, you’re inverted, so it exacerbates the fear. It’s not painful, but it scares the shit out of you.” (The former officer was waterboarded himself in a training course.) Mohammed, he claimed, “didn’t resist. He sang right away. He cracked real quick.” He said, “A lot of them want to talk. Their egos are unimaginable. K.S.M. was just a little doughboy. He couldn’t stand toe to toe and fight it out.”

The article also shows the moral complexity of America’s torture regime as a former CIA official insists the program is “safe” for the detainees but speaks of the psychological damage to the interrogators”:

The former officer said that the C.I.A. kept a doctor standing by during interrogations. He insisted that the method was safe and effective, but said that it could cause lasting psychic damage to the interrogators. During interrogations, the former agency official said, officers worked in teams, watching each other behind two-way mirrors. Even with this group support, the friend said, Mohammed’s interrogator “has horrible nightmares.” He went on, “When you cross over that line of darkness, it’s hard to come back. You lose your soul. You can do your best to justify it, but it’s well outside the norm. You can’t go to that dark a place without it changing you.” He said of his friend, “He’s a good guy. It really haunts him. You are inflicting something really evil and horrible on somebody.”

This article again raises the issue of the centrality of psychology to America’s torture regime. It was the supposed knowledge, expertise, credentials, and legitimacy of psychologists that was important to the CIA torture-planners.The psychological profession will be stained by this association, and by its silence while these abuses occurred in our name. Not untill the profession fully investigates and condemns these abuses will the stain begin to be lifted. No simple “banning” of specific torture techniques by the American Psychological Association (APA) can possibly be an adequate reply to these horrors. The profession must loudly and collectively cry “Shame!” and “Never again!”

Further, the critical collaboration and silence of the APA leadership during this profound moral crisis cannot go unchallenged. In the interests of maintaining their ties to the military and the CIA, these leaders were more than willing to turn a blind eye to the torture being designed and conducted by our psychological colleagues. They never uttered a peep of concern for these abuses, but, rather, parsed words to try and evade responsibility. In the final accounting for US torture, the APA leadership will certainly bear a measure of the responsibility.

 

 

 

 

1 comment August 5th, 2007

British psychiatrists to detain dissidents

There are worrying developments for human rights, and for the mental health professions, in Great Britain. a new article reports that British psychiatrists are going to start emulating their disgraced Soviet-era colleagues who hospitalized and involuntary drugged dissidents under the pretense of treating mental illness. The British psychiatrist will be part of preventive detention teams on the watch for “terrorists” under every bed:

Psychiatrists set to use mental health law to detain terrorist suspects

May 31, 2007
by Angela Hussain

Psychiatrists are set to increasingly use mental health law to detain terrorists suspects, prompting fears that psychiatry will be directly involved in the abuse of civil rights.

The government has set up a VIP “stalker” squad to identify and detain terrorists and other individuals who pose a threat to prominent people, such as the Prime Minister, the cabinet and the Royal Family.

The unit, staffed by psychiatrists as well as police, could have extra powers to detain suspects using mental health law.

Critics say a mental health bill going through parliament includes a wider definition of mental disorder. They fear it will mean people - including terrorist suspects - may be detained on grounds of their cultural, political or religious beliefs.

The new London-based unit, called the fixated threat assessment centre (FTAC) and set up last year, uses the police to identify suspects.

Liberty, the human rights organisation, said the unit represented a threat to civil liberties.

Its policy director, Gareth Crossman, told newspapers: “This blurs the line between medical decisions and police actions.

“If you are going to allow doctors to take people’s liberty away, they have to be independent. That credibility is undermined when the doctors are part of the same team as the police.”

In a statement, the Metropolitan Police said: “The fixated threat assessment centre is a joint initiative between the Metropolitan Police, Home Office and Department of Health. Its role is to assess, manage and reduce risks and threats from fixated individuals, against people in public life, particularly protected VIPs.”

The Mail on Sunday reported that FTAC’s senior forensic psychiatrist is David James. He has made a study of attacks on British and European politicians by people diagnosed with pathological fixations.

Also on the staff is Robert Halsey, a consultant forensic clinical psychologist who specialises in risk assessment.

At least one terror suspect - allegedly linked to the 7/7 bomb plot and a suicide bombing in Israel - has already been held under the Mental Health Act.

The government has always argued its mental health bill is a suitable balance between patient rights and public safety.

But Shadow Health Secretary Andrew Lansley told the Mail that classing someone as mentally ill on the grounds of their religious beliefs is “a very worrying scenario”

He said: “The Government is trying to bring in a wider definition of mental disorder and is resisting exclusions which ensure that people cannot be treated as mentally disordered on the grounds of their cultural, political or religious beliefs.

“When you hear they are also setting up something like this police unit, it raises questions about quite what their intentions are.

“The use of mental health powers of detention should be confined to the purposes of treatment. But the Government wants to be able to detain someone who is mentally disordered even when the treatment would have no benefit.

“Combined with the idea that someone could be classed as mentally ill on the grounds of their religious beliefs, it is a very worrying scenario.”

There appears to no limit to the evils that people will participate in under the guise of “protecting society from an enemy.”

2 comments June 2nd, 2007

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