Public Opinion in Iraq
First Poll Following Abu Ghraib Revelations

Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah
14-23 May 2004
Technical Notes

• Unless otherwise noted, these findings are based on face-to-face interviews conducted by IIACSS in Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Diwaniyah, Hillah & Baqubah between 14 and 23 May.

• Total sample was 1093 interviews persons selected randomly.

• Sample can be taken as indicative of areas sampled with overall Margin of Error of ±4.1%

• Refusals were the highest seen to date, a trend noted by other pollsters.
Most Urgent Issue Facing Iraq

- Security: 59%
- Economy: 16%
- Infrastructure: 15%
- All Others: 10%

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah
Security Greater Priority in Hillah & Diwaniyah than elsewhere;
IIACSS 14-23 May 2004

Hillah security results rose from 48% in March. This is probably due its proximity to Najaf and Karbala.

Note atypical infrastructure concerns.
Institutional & Individual Confidence

- Confidence in all institutions up marginally, but CPA & CF are at the bottom
- Moqtada’s “support” has grown dramatically, but this is illusory; a mere 2% would vote for him for president.
Confidence in Selected Institutions
IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baquba

Confidence has risen slightly (2-3%) in all institutions since the same cities were surveyed 21 April-1 May. The reasons for the increases are not clear.
Confidence in Selected Institutions November to May

- New Iraqi Police
- New Iraqi Army
- New Iraqi Ministries
- GC
- CPA
- CF

All Data:
IIACSS
Confidence in New Iraqi Police

All Data: IIACSS

November: 84
December: 80
January: 79
February: 79
March: 67
Confidence in New Iraqi Army

All Data: IIACSS
Confidence in New Iraqi Ministries

All Data: IIACSS

November: 63
December: 54
January: 42
February: 31
March: 39
Confidence in Governing Council

All Data: IIACSS
Confidence in CPA

All Data: IIACSS

- Nov: 47
- Dec: 32
- Jan: 14
- Feb: 9
- Mar: 11

6/15/2004
Confidence in Coalition Forces

All Data: IIACSS

Question Not Asked in November
Compared to 3 months ago my opinion of Moqtada al-Sadr is...

ICRSS 20-29 April
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babel, Diyala, Ramadi, Sulaymaniyah

Sulaymaniyah is very different.
-Much Better 3%
-Better 29%
-Somewhat Worse 49%
-Much Worse 20%

Better 41%
Much Better 40%
Somewhat Worse 14%
Much Worse 5%
Support of or Opposition to the Following Individuals
Don't Know/No Answer Excluded
(Recovered Data Add Ali Sistani to the This Chart, which replaces earlier version)
ICRSS 20-29 April 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babel, Ramadi, Sulaymaniyah

Massoud Barzani
Ayad Allawi
Mowaffak al-Rubaie
Adnan Pachachi
Jalal Talabani
Abdul Kareem al-Mohtadamawi
Muhsin Abdul Hamed
Sayyid Muhammad Bahr al-Uloom
Harem al-Dhari
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
Moqtada al-Sadr
Ibrahim Jafari
Ali Sistani

Somewhat Support
Strongly Support
Somewhat Oppose
Strongly Oppose

NB: Sistani's support is more intense than Moqtada's and has fewer negatives.
If you could vote for any living Iraqi for president, who would it be?

Absolute number of respondents per candidate from 1093 respondents

IIACSS 14-93
May
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah
Interim Government & Elections Commission

- Iraqis have heard little
- Even so, Interim Government concepts & Brahimi plan well-received.
- CPA, CF influence on elections commission unpopular
How much have you heard or read about the recent recommendations of the United Nations about the June 30 Interim Government?
IIACSS 14-23 May 2004: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

- DK/NA: 4%
- A Great Deal: 8%
- Not Very Much: 16%
- A Fair Amount: 20%
- Nothing: 52%

6/15/2004
Here are eight suggestions for ways to strengthen Iraq’s transition to elections in January.

How much would the following contribute to Iraq’s progress toward elections?

Results combine "a great deal" and "a fair amount."

IIACSS 14-23 May
Baghdad, Basrah,
Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah,
Baqubah

1. Convene an Iraqi assembly after June 30: 61%
2. Mobilize international assistance for Iraq: 74%
3. Find international assistance for Iraqi authorities organizing elections: 74%
4. Get Coalition to identify important political grievances, such as slow prisoner release: 75%
5. Define appropriate structure for caretaker government: 76%
6. Form a caretaker government to replace GC: 78%
7. Recruit international experts to supervise elections: 81%
8. Provide security necessary for political transition and elections: 93%
What powers should the unelected, interim government have for its 7 months in office?

IIACSS Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Diwaniyah, Hillah, Baqubah

Make laws or agreements that a future elected government could not change
- May 12%
- April 11%

Make long-term agreements with other countries
- May 26%
- April 27%

Replace current governors
- May 61%
- April 62%

Disarm and control the political party & religious militias
- May 64%
- April 63%

Replace current ministers
- May 60%
- April 63%

Increase or reduce taxes
- May 47%
- April 68%

Order Coalition Forces to leave Iraq
- May 70%
- April 77%

Take responsibility for prisoners held by CF
- April 83%

Adjusting prices, such as increasing the prices of subsidized petroleum products & other commodities
- May 49%

Make economic changes, such as giving people money in place of their food rations
- May 19%

Make economic changes, like adjusting prices
- April 84%

Missing bars indicate questions not asked or not asked in the same form.
How do you think having an interim government on June 30 will make things for Iraq?

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

- Better 63%
- Worse 15%
- Same 14%
- DK/NA 8%
How much have you heard or read about the formation of an independent commission supervising the elections to be held in January 2005?

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

- Great Deal: 4%
- Fair Amount: 17%
- Not Much: 14%
- Nothing: 65%
Regardless of how much you have heard about the independent election commission, please tell me how much influence should the following institutions have in selecting commission members?

**Religious Communities**
- Great Deal: 4%
- Fair Amount: 59%
- Not Much: 20%
- None: 20%

**International Experts**
- Great Deal: -21%
- Fair Amount: -6%
- Not Much: 42%
- None: 23%

**Community Tribal Leaders**
- Great Deal: -19%
- Fair Amount: -9%
- Not Much: 38%
- None: 26%

**UN**
- Great Deal: -27%
- Fair Amount: -10%
- Not Much: 36%
- None: 20%

**Community Political Leaders**
- Great Deal: -23%
- Fair Amount: -13%
- Not Much: 31%
- None: 23%

**GC**
- Great Deal: -55%
- Fair Amount: -11%
- Not Much: 11%
- None: 15%

**CPA**
- Great Deal: -69%
- Fair Amount: -8%
- Not Much: 8%
- None: 7%

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah
Security

• Only half of Iraqis feels safe in their own neighborhood
• Family, friends make people feel secure
• Fear of fighting in Fallujah, Karbala & Najaf have probably affected attitudes toward security.
How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?
IIACSS 14-23 May: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

- Very Safe: 51%
- Not Very Safe: 38%
- Not Safe At All: 11%
Which of the following contributes most to your sense of security?

IIACSS 14-23 May: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baquba

- Coalition Forces: 1%
- Joint CF & Iraqi Patrols: 1%
- Mosque Patrols: 2%
- None/Other/DK/NA: 3%
- Local Neighborhood Patrols: 4%
- Local Police: 18%
- Family: 26%
- Neighbors and Friends: 45%
What kind of violence do you think is most dangerous to Iraq?
IIACSS 14-23 May: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

Polls have shown that most Iraqis believe that events in Fallujah, Najaf, and Karbala have united the country. This may explain the decline in concern over sectarian war, especially interesting since the January poll was before the Ashoura bombings.

Likely reflects concerns about Fallujah, Najaf & Karbala

May reflect Fallujah, Najaf & Karbala
Have recent events and Fallujah and the acts of Moqtada al-Sadr made Iraq more unified or more divided?

ICRSS 20-29 April
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Babel, Diyala, Ramadi, Sulaymaniyah

- More Unified: 64%
- More Divided: 14%
- DK/NA: 22%
What kind of violence do you think is most dangerous to your FAMILY?

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004: Bagdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

Likely due to Fallujah, Najaf & Karbala

6/15/2004
Security Forces

- Support for joining Iraqi security forces increases across all branches.
- Iraqis believe their security forces can handle things without Coalition Forces.
Are you or any member of your family more or less interested in joining the Iraqi security forces than you were 3 months ago?

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

More Interested 51%

Less Interested 39%

DK/NA 10%
Would you support or oppose the idea that you or a member of your household join the following security forces...

**IIACSS 14-23 May**  
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

- Somewhat Support  
- Strongly Support  
- Somewhat Oppose  
- Strongly Oppose

**FPS**
- 14% Somewhat Support
- 7% Strongly Support
- 20% Somewhat Oppose
- 54% Strongly Oppose

**ICDC**
- 17% Somewhat Support
- 8% Strongly Support
- 21% Somewhat Oppose
- 50% Strongly Oppose

**New Iraqi Police**
- 19% Somewhat Support
- 9% Strongly Support
- 19% Somewhat Oppose
- 48% Strongly Oppose

**New Iraqi Army**
- 18% Somewhat Support
- 7% Strongly Support
- 22% Somewhat Oppose
- 48% Strongly Oppose
Do you think it is likely that the Iraqi Police and Army will maintain security without the presence of Coalition Forces

IIACSS 14-23 May: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

Not at all Likely 3%
DK/NA 4%
Not Very Likely 6%
Somewhat Likely 25%
Very Likely 62%

6/15/2004
Coalition Forces

• Seen as occupiers
• Now seen as liability whose presence makes things more dangerous
• Substantial deterioration of image
• Primary reason cited as reason for immediate departure:
  – “They are occupiers”
The Coalition Forces are...
IIACSS 14-23 May: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baquba

- Occupiers: 92%
- Liberators: 2%
- Peacekeepers: 3%
- Other/DK/NA: 3%
How long should Coalition Forces stay in Iraq?

IIACSS 14-23 April 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

- Leave immediately: 41%
- Leave after a permanent government is elected: 45%
- As long as CFs think necessary for stability: 6%
- Two years: 4%
- DK/NA: 4%
If Coalition Forces left Iraq immediately would you feel...?

- More Safe: 55%
- Less Safe: 32%
- No Difference: 10%
- DK/NA: 4%

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah
If Coalition Forces left immediately, would you feel more safe or less safe?
Percentages answering "More Safe."

In August 2003 85% agreed with the following statement when asked by the Gallup Organization. "Some people believe that if the U.S. were to pull out its troops any time soon, Iraq would fall into anarchy."
Iraqis were asked if CFs should stay or go and why they held their opinion.
Results are expressed as absolute numbers for each opinion for 1068 respondents.

Red = Depart; Blue = Remain

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004: Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

1. CFs are occupiers and must leave immediately
   - 418 respondents

2. They brought only death and destruction
   - 142 respondents

3. Iraqis can administer Iraq better
   - 102 respondents

4. They do not respect our religions & cultures
   - 76 respondents

5. They abuse Iraqis
   - 51 respondents

6. Facilitating Zionist domination of Iraq
   - 38 respondents

7. They want the our oil & resources
   - 23 respondents

8. CF presence brings Iraq future benefit
   - 16 respondents

9. Other/DK/NA
   - 11 respondents

10. Only Power that can effectively administer Iraq
    - 5 respondents

11. If CF leaves there will be a political vacuum
    - 22 respondents

NB: The 418 here are only slightly fewer than the 432 of all other stated reasons combined. This implies that status rather than behavior drives anti-Coalition sentiment.
How much do you agree with each of the following statements?
The violent attacks around the country...

- are an effort of outside groups to create instability in our country
  - Somewhat Agree: 12%
  - Totally Agree: 16%
  - Somewhat disagree: 18%
  - Totally Disagree: 20%

- show Iraqi is not ready to live in peace with world
  - Somewhat Agree: 12%
  - Totally Agree: 16%
  - Somewhat disagree: 18%
  - Totally Disagree: 20%

- emphasize the need for continuing CF presence
  - Somewhat Agree: 12%
  - Totally Agree: 16%
  - Somewhat disagree: 18%
  - Totally Disagree: 20%

- are an effort to liberate Iraq from U.S. & CF
  - Somewhat Agree: 12%
  - Totally Agree: 16%
  - Somewhat disagree: 18%
  - Totally Disagree: 20%

- are an effort to reinstate the old regime
  - Somewhat Agree: 12%
  - Totally Agree: 16%
  - Somewhat disagree: 18%
  - Totally Disagree: 20%

- have increased because people have lost faith in CF
  - Somewhat Agree: 12%
  - Totally Agree: 16%
  - Somewhat disagree: 18%
  - Totally Disagree: 20%

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah

6/15/2004
Please indicate if and how the following statements apply to those who attack the Coalition Forces and those who work with them. They:

- Totally True
- Partially True
- Not True

1. They believe the Coalition is trying to steal Iraq's wealth
   - Totally True: 7%
   - Partially True: 66%
   - Not True: 12%

2. They believe all foreign forces must leave at once
   - Totally True: 11%
   - Partially True: 59%
   - Not True: 15%

3. They believe national dignity requires the attacks
   - Totally True: 13%
   - Partially True: 53%
   - Not True: 15%

4. They want democracy, but do not believe the Coalition will help democracy
   - Totally True: 15%
   - Partially True: 41%
   - Not True: 22%

5. They want to establish in Islamic state with no outside influence
   - Totally True: 21%
   - Partially True: 31%
   - Not True: 28%

6. They are trying to undermine the transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces
   - Totally True: 36%
   - Partially True: 27%
   - Not True: 18%

7. They are trying to help us create a better future
   - Totally True: 32%
   - Partially True: 23%
   - Not True: 23%

8. They do not want democracy in Iraq
   - Totally True: 45%
   - Partially True: 17%
   - Not True: 21%

9. They are angry because they lost the privileges they had under Saddam
   - Totally True: 48%
   - Partially True: 15%
   - Not True: 17%

10. They want to return to Saddam & the Baath party
    - Totally True: 61%
    - Partially True: 9%
    - Not True: 11%

IIACSS 14-23 May
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baqubah
Abu Ghraib

• Most Iraqis were surprised.
• Most do not believe anyone will be punished.
• Those who do think that only “little people” will be punished.
Were you surprised when you saw the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib?

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baquba

- Yes: 71%
- No: 22%
- DK/NA: 7%
You said you were surprised by the abuses at Abu Grhaib. Why?

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baquba

- It humiliates Iraqis: 48
- It is unethical & a crime against humanity: 17
- I did not expect this from Americans: 14
- America declares itself for human rights and freedom: 3

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baquba

6/15/2004
You said you were NOT surprised by the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Why?

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baquba

- I expect the worst from Americans
- America is unfair
- Americans are the occupiers
- Other

6/15/2004
Do you believe that the abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib represents fewer than 100 people or that all Americans behave this way?

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baquba

- Fewer than 100 People: 38%
- All Americans are like this: 54%
- DK/NA: 8%
Do you believe anyone will be punished for what happened at Abu Ghraib?

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baquba

- Yes: 29%
- No: 61%
- DK/NA: 10%
You said you believe someone will be punished for Abu Ghraib. You believe everyone responsible will be punished, or only the little people?

IIACSS 14-23 May 2004
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Hillah, Diwaniyah, Baquba

- Everyone responsible: 38%
- Only the little people: 52%
- DK: 10%